Gaslighting Ukraine Part X: Russia’s fascist ideology and war crimes
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By Timothy Holtgrefe
June 2025 For several years prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin had devoted much of his time and effort to promoting false narratives and a revisionist history of Ukraine as early as 2005. However, the rhetorical gaslighting and denial of Ukraine’s rich cultural heritage is actually nothing new. In fact for Russian autocrats it is an historical continuity going back several hundred years in an effort to subjugate a race of people.
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What is surprising is not that the Russian Empire ‘russified’ their ethnic minorities, as all colonizers have performed similar practices, but that so many of these false narratives continue to persist into today’s political discourse regarding the current war in Ukraine; even in the West. This is part 10 of an HQ exclusive series to investigate Russia’s relentless attack on history. In this episode, it will be made known that Russia has been intentionally committing war crimes with genocidal intent and that Putin intends to resurrect the Soviet Union under fascism.
Missing the Point
As peace talks move ahead to bring an end to the Russo-Ukrainian War, there are signs that some western media influencers and even leaders are displaying susceptibility to false narratives of why the war began or that the two sides are somehow equal in fault for its cause. Few national discussions seem to appreciate Russia’s true intent to destroy Ukraine, or that Russia has violated countless agreements, even as Putin increases attacks on civilian populations during negotiations. Trump’s key foreign envoy, Steve Witkoff stated on March 22, 2025 that he regards Putin as “not a bad guy” and when reflecting on whether or not he can be trusted, said “I thought he was straight up with me.” Others on Trump’s team have echoed similar feelings about the Russo-Ukrainian conflict that seem out of touch, such as: “It’s a complicated situation…and all the components that led up to [it]” (Reevell, 2025). This is not just the misgivings of a particular political party or administration, but rather a failure of true journalism to guide our national discussion regarding this war.
It will be shown that these negotiations will lead nowhere without a fundamental understanding of the following root causes: 1) The popularity of Russian fascist, Ivan Ilyin, 2) Putin’s intent to create a Eurasian Empire, 3) Russia’s war crimes are done with genocidal intent, and, therefore, 4) Putin has no intention of ending the war peacefully in a settlement. Remarkably, the evidence for the above is routinely broadcasted on the Kremlin’s state-controlled media programs. More to the point, all of these conditions have existed regardless of anything the West has done or not done.
As peace talks move ahead to bring an end to the Russo-Ukrainian War, there are signs that some western media influencers and even leaders are displaying susceptibility to false narratives of why the war began or that the two sides are somehow equal in fault for its cause. Few national discussions seem to appreciate Russia’s true intent to destroy Ukraine, or that Russia has violated countless agreements, even as Putin increases attacks on civilian populations during negotiations. Trump’s key foreign envoy, Steve Witkoff stated on March 22, 2025 that he regards Putin as “not a bad guy” and when reflecting on whether or not he can be trusted, said “I thought he was straight up with me.” Others on Trump’s team have echoed similar feelings about the Russo-Ukrainian conflict that seem out of touch, such as: “It’s a complicated situation…and all the components that led up to [it]” (Reevell, 2025). This is not just the misgivings of a particular political party or administration, but rather a failure of true journalism to guide our national discussion regarding this war.
It will be shown that these negotiations will lead nowhere without a fundamental understanding of the following root causes: 1) The popularity of Russian fascist, Ivan Ilyin, 2) Putin’s intent to create a Eurasian Empire, 3) Russia’s war crimes are done with genocidal intent, and, therefore, 4) Putin has no intention of ending the war peacefully in a settlement. Remarkably, the evidence for the above is routinely broadcasted on the Kremlin’s state-controlled media programs. More to the point, all of these conditions have existed regardless of anything the West has done or not done.
1. Russian Fascism Defined
The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum defines Fascism as an “ultranationalist, authoritarian political philosophy. It combines elements of nationalism, militarism, economic self-sufficiency, and totalitarianism.” It opposes “democratic government. Often, also seeking to expand territory through armed conflict.” The website goes on to define fascist governments as “one-party states led by an authoritarian leader who claims to embody the national will.” Furthermore, the state seeks “expanding the size and influence of the national state” for the purpose of “removing obstacles to national unity and suppressing those seen as challenging it” such as “those seen as alien.” For Nazi Germany, these obstacles to national purity were defined as “Jews” or “Jewish.”
Although the word ‘fascism’ can sometimes be overused, it has a definition. When an actual fascist emerged in the 21st century, what should have been obvious was instead lost in a world full of both politically charged hyperbole and denial. In a New York Times essay by Yale University historian Timothy Snyder entitled “We Should Say It. Russia Is Fascist,” Dr. Snyder pointed out the key signs of fascism, indicating that they match up with the current actions and rhetoric of the Russian regime (Snyder, 2022).
The specific fascist ideas Putin resurrected were the works of Ivan Ilyin, a Russian fascist writer who lived in Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Ilyin’s philosophy and writings were introduced to Putin sometime in the early 2000s by Russian filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov (Snyder, 2018, p.44). Learning Ilyin’s ideas and influence on Putin’s Russia, we can make sense of his foreign policy goals and style of propaganda.
The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum defines Fascism as an “ultranationalist, authoritarian political philosophy. It combines elements of nationalism, militarism, economic self-sufficiency, and totalitarianism.” It opposes “democratic government. Often, also seeking to expand territory through armed conflict.” The website goes on to define fascist governments as “one-party states led by an authoritarian leader who claims to embody the national will.” Furthermore, the state seeks “expanding the size and influence of the national state” for the purpose of “removing obstacles to national unity and suppressing those seen as challenging it” such as “those seen as alien.” For Nazi Germany, these obstacles to national purity were defined as “Jews” or “Jewish.”
Although the word ‘fascism’ can sometimes be overused, it has a definition. When an actual fascist emerged in the 21st century, what should have been obvious was instead lost in a world full of both politically charged hyperbole and denial. In a New York Times essay by Yale University historian Timothy Snyder entitled “We Should Say It. Russia Is Fascist,” Dr. Snyder pointed out the key signs of fascism, indicating that they match up with the current actions and rhetoric of the Russian regime (Snyder, 2022).
The specific fascist ideas Putin resurrected were the works of Ivan Ilyin, a Russian fascist writer who lived in Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Ilyin’s philosophy and writings were introduced to Putin sometime in the early 2000s by Russian filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov (Snyder, 2018, p.44). Learning Ilyin’s ideas and influence on Putin’s Russia, we can make sense of his foreign policy goals and style of propaganda.
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The fact that Ivan Ilyin is not a household name highlights the extent to which American journalism and media have failed in their fundamental civic duty during this war. Like Adolf Hitler, Ilyin was inspired by Mussolini’s march on Rome and believed fascism was the politics of the world to come. He was similarly impressed with Hitler and saw the Fuhrer as the defender of civilization. He wrote that Hitler, “performed an enormous service for all of Europe” and approved of his antisemitism. He bemoaned that “Europe does not understand the National Socialist movement” (cited by Kellogg, 2008, p.72). Nazism, according to Ilyin, was a “Spirit” of which Russians must partake. After the war, his political views did not change and he lived out the rest of his life in Switzerland until his death in 1954 (p.73).
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After the fall of communism, Ilyin’s book Our Tasks was republished and began to circulate in new editions, as well as his ideas. Mirroring Hitler’s ‘stabbed-in-the-back’ style of revanchism, disillusioned Russians were attracted to Ilyin's argument for a return of the Russian empire replacing communism with fascism. Ilyin had been dead for half a century, forgotten, but in 2005, Putin organized his reburial in Moscow (Synder, 2018, p.17). In the 2010s, Putin would publicly honor Ilyin, quote him, and rely on his authority to explain why Russia had to undermine the European Union and invade Ukraine. When asked to name a historian, Putin cited Ivan Ilyin as his authority on the past (Putin, 2014). In early 2014, members of Russia’s ruling party and all civil servants received a collection of Ilyin’s political publications from the Kremlin (Snyder, 2018, p.18).
Ivan Ilyin’s Vision
Ilyin envisioned Russia overthrowing Bolshevism only to rise again under Christian fascism. For Ilyin, our human world of facts and passions is senseless: “the world of empirical existence cannot be theologically justified” (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.24). His vision was a totalitarian one and saw individuality as evil. He believed humans can be bewitched with facts and passion of history, but humans must hold on to a prehistoric innocence. Ilyin made an exception for Russia and for Russians. Like other fascists of the world, Ilyin saw his nation as an organism without sin. When God created the world, somehow Russia had escaped history and remained in eternity and was chosen to rule humanity (p.24).
Ilyin envisioned Russia overthrowing Bolshevism only to rise again under Christian fascism. For Ilyin, our human world of facts and passions is senseless: “the world of empirical existence cannot be theologically justified” (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.24). His vision was a totalitarian one and saw individuality as evil. He believed humans can be bewitched with facts and passion of history, but humans must hold on to a prehistoric innocence. Ilyin made an exception for Russia and for Russians. Like other fascists of the world, Ilyin saw his nation as an organism without sin. When God created the world, somehow Russia had escaped history and remained in eternity and was chosen to rule humanity (p.24).
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Knowing nothing of Russian history, Ilyin interpreted any historical sufferings in Russia as a result of foreign corruption or even attack, while any aggression enacted by Russia as “self defense.” Russia does no wrong; wrong can only be done to Russia. Holy Russia is innocent. Facts do not matter and responsibility vanishes. “Power,” Ilyin prophesized, “comes all by itself to the strong man.” This man will be “sufficiently manly,” like Mussolini and would appear as Russia’s redeemer to unify its people (cited p.24).
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Following the Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt, Ilyin defined politics as “the art of identifying and neutralizing the enemy” (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.26; Müller, 2003, p.9). That enemy would be outside Russia, specifically the West. Political parties should exist, according to Ilyin, only to ritualize elections. Voting with a secret ballot allowed citizens to think of themselves as individuals, thereby confirming their evil. Therefore, individuality must be overcome by political habits that excite collective love for the redeemer. Voting should unite the country in a gesture of subjugation (Ilyin, 1954).
Ilyin’s ideas of fascism hit all the right notes for Russian nationalists who felt humiliated after the collapse of the Soviet empire and justified the subsequent elite oligarchic power structure that followed. As Snyder (2018) explains,
Ilyin’s ideas of fascism hit all the right notes for Russian nationalists who felt humiliated after the collapse of the Soviet empire and justified the subsequent elite oligarchic power structure that followed. As Snyder (2018) explains,
“If the purpose of the state is to preserve the wealth of the redeemer and his friends, then the rule of law is not important. In this way, the weakness of Putin’s domestic policies and failure to reform the lives of average Russians is then recast as the mystical connection of a leader with his people. Rather than governing, the leader produces crisis and spectacle. Individual reason is suppressed in favor of national submission” (p.28).
Ilyin’s Christian fascism is visible today on Russian state TV. Patriotic citizens are now being primed for the idea that even the worst outcome for the Russo-Ukrainian War is a good thing, because those dying for the motherland will skyrocket to paradise. During one such segment, a prominent propagandist chimed in, “But we will go to heaven, while they will simply croak.” Vladimir Simonyan comforted the audiences by adding, “We’re all going to die someday” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.176).
Fascism: Creating a Permanent Enemy
Ilyin shared Stalinist judgment about contagious perversity of Western culture down to the smallest detail. He believed, for instance, that jazz was a deliberate plot to reduce European listeners to mindless dancers incapable of normal sexual intercourse. Ilyin saw Russia as the only territory from which divine totality could be restored and the West as the permanent enemy with its decadence. His view was that Russia would save the world not ‘from’ but ‘with’ fascism. By Ilyin’s definition, Russia can only be a victim, never an aggressor (Kripkov, 1997, p.273). Bolsheviks had no fundamental problem with accepting the premise behind Ilyin’s book. The only difference was that they saw Marxism as the redeemer and themselves as the constant victim of foreign plots in the form of capitalist saboteurs (Snyder, 2018, p.33). Indeed, both Hitler and Stalin oversaw mass genocide of Jews or Ukrainians as a defense against a global conspiracy and used ethnic minorities as a convenient scapegoat for inherent problems within their utopias.
Ilyin shared Stalinist judgment about contagious perversity of Western culture down to the smallest detail. He believed, for instance, that jazz was a deliberate plot to reduce European listeners to mindless dancers incapable of normal sexual intercourse. Ilyin saw Russia as the only territory from which divine totality could be restored and the West as the permanent enemy with its decadence. His view was that Russia would save the world not ‘from’ but ‘with’ fascism. By Ilyin’s definition, Russia can only be a victim, never an aggressor (Kripkov, 1997, p.273). Bolsheviks had no fundamental problem with accepting the premise behind Ilyin’s book. The only difference was that they saw Marxism as the redeemer and themselves as the constant victim of foreign plots in the form of capitalist saboteurs (Snyder, 2018, p.33). Indeed, both Hitler and Stalin oversaw mass genocide of Jews or Ukrainians as a defense against a global conspiracy and used ethnic minorities as a convenient scapegoat for inherent problems within their utopias.
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Moscow’s first step toward embracing Ivan Ilyin’s interpretation of the West began during the Soviet era under Leonid Brezhnev, when the Second World War was elevated as the pinnacle of Soviet history. Citizens were encouraged not to look to the future, but to revere the past—the victory of their parents or grandparents over an enemy that had come from the West. It became illegal to acknowledge that Stalin had initially entered the war as Hitler’s ally in 1939.
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Subsequently, the West was no longer demonized solely for its capitalism, but as Russia’s eternal adversary, inherently decadent and morally corrupt (Snyder, 2018, p.34). Both the Soviet and post-Soviet visions masked the inherent need for westward expansion towards warm-water ports and resources.
Ilyin’s ideas of fascist dictatorship, the preservation of all Soviet territory, and permanent war against the sinful West nationally became popular with former communists, turned oligarchs in 1990s Russia. Ilyin’s ideas and Putin rose together in popularity (p.42-3). The notion that Europe and America were eternal enemies because they envied pristine Russian culture was pure fiction that generated real policy. The intent was to destroy the attainments abroad that Russia’s leaders could not manage at home (p.35).
Ilyin’s ideas of fascist dictatorship, the preservation of all Soviet territory, and permanent war against the sinful West nationally became popular with former communists, turned oligarchs in 1990s Russia. Ilyin’s ideas and Putin rose together in popularity (p.42-3). The notion that Europe and America were eternal enemies because they envied pristine Russian culture was pure fiction that generated real policy. The intent was to destroy the attainments abroad that Russia’s leaders could not manage at home (p.35).
In the 21st century, it proved easier to blame the West than to take stock in Russian choices. The Russian leaders who did the blaming in the 2010s were the very individuals who stole the national wealth. Once again, Russia is innocent and the West is a permanent source of spiritual threat (Zarakhovich, 2009). Ilyin meant that politics began with a leader’s decision to choose an enemy to consolidate a dictatorship (Snyder, 2018, p.54). Russia’s real geopolitical problem in the modern era was China. However, precisely because Chinese power was real and proximate, considering Russia’s actual geopolitics might lead to depressing conclusions (Kaczmarski, 2012). Therefore, the West was chosen as an enemy precisely because it presented no real threat to Russia. In 2009, Obama ensured no buildup of missile defense systems in eastern Europe and Russia did not even figure in American public opinion polls about global threats and challenges (Snyder, 2018, p.54-55). When Mitt Romney referred to Russia as America’s “number one geopolitical foe” in March 2012, he was ridiculed (Wolf, 2013).
Ilyin’s devine Russian innocence continues in Russia’s current war propaganda in Ukraine. Contrary to empirical facts, Russia could not have invaded Ukraine unprovoked because Russia is always innocent. Therefore, Russia is not at war with Ukraine insomuch as it is at war with the collective decadent West. Signalling Ilyin’s idea of Christian fascism, Deputy of the State Duma Vyacheslav Kikonov claimed, “This is truly a holy war we’re waging and we must win” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.301).
On September 5, 2023, Valery Garbuzov, director of one of Russia’s Academy of Science think tanks, ISKRAN, decided, heroically, to tell the truth in a public space rammed with lies. In a piece entitled “On the Lost Illusions of a Bygone Era,” published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, he argued that Russia is in the throes of a post-imperial crisis and has returned to expansionism under Putin’s
Ilyin’s devine Russian innocence continues in Russia’s current war propaganda in Ukraine. Contrary to empirical facts, Russia could not have invaded Ukraine unprovoked because Russia is always innocent. Therefore, Russia is not at war with Ukraine insomuch as it is at war with the collective decadent West. Signalling Ilyin’s idea of Christian fascism, Deputy of the State Duma Vyacheslav Kikonov claimed, “This is truly a holy war we’re waging and we must win” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.301).
On September 5, 2023, Valery Garbuzov, director of one of Russia’s Academy of Science think tanks, ISKRAN, decided, heroically, to tell the truth in a public space rammed with lies. In a piece entitled “On the Lost Illusions of a Bygone Era,” published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, he argued that Russia is in the throes of a post-imperial crisis and has returned to expansionism under Putin’s
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administration, even though Russia’s “menacing character” was kept under wraps for more than 30 years. Garbuzov explains that Russia’s ruling elites perpetuate anti-Western mythology to remain in power, resurrecting long-outdated narratives about the ever-present “Anglo-Saxons.” He continued, “These myths are being spread day and night by a new generation of well-paid professional political manipulators and numerous panelists on television talk shows…apparently completely devoid of any historical consciousness” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.341).
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Shortly thereafter, Garbuzov was fired. His former colleagues then penned a message of support by criticizing popular propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s program, comparing him to Hitler’s propaganda chief, Joseph Goebbels. Quickly, their post was removed from their website (p.342).
In short, the West is the convenient permanent enemy for existing. Russian aggression is not the result of any actions from the West but rather the ideology carried over by Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmidt that politics originates from defining the enemy for society. Since Russia is always innocent, any excuse will be concocted to always justify painting Europe and America as aggressors against Russia. Factuality itself is viewed as a western weapon against Russia.
In short, the West is the convenient permanent enemy for existing. Russian aggression is not the result of any actions from the West but rather the ideology carried over by Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmidt that politics originates from defining the enemy for society. Since Russia is always innocent, any excuse will be concocted to always justify painting Europe and America as aggressors against Russia. Factuality itself is viewed as a western weapon against Russia.
Fascism: Rebranding Nazi Ideas as “Eurasianism”
The Eurasianism of the 2010s blended elements of a Russian tradition developed by Lev Gumilev—who was openly antisemitic—with Nazi ideas mediated by the younger Russian fascist Alexander Dugin. Dugin adapted Gumilev’s Eurasianist concepts to make Nazi ideology sound more Russian.
The Eurasianism of the 2010s blended elements of a Russian tradition developed by Lev Gumilev—who was openly antisemitic—with Nazi ideas mediated by the younger Russian fascist Alexander Dugin. Dugin adapted Gumilev’s Eurasianist concepts to make Nazi ideology sound more Russian.
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Dugin, as a kid in the 1970s, played his guitar while singing about killing millions of people in ovens. His life’s work was to bring fascism to Russia (Clover, 2017, p.155). In the early 1990s, Dugin became a close friend to the French conspiracy theorist Jean Parvulesco, who spoke to him of the ancient conflict between people of the sea (Atlanticists) and people of the earth (Eurasianists). In Parvulesco’s ideas, the Americans and British yield to abstract Jewish ideas because their maritime economies separate them from the earthly truths of human experience. These were updates of Nazi pseudo-history and cult ideology, as Dugin well understood. At the time, Dugin was writing under the pen name “Sievers,” a reference to Wolfram Sievers, a German Nazi executed for war crimes in 1947 who had been known for collecting the bones of murdered Jews (p.158,177). Dugin’s European contacts allowed him to bring Nazi concepts home to Russia.
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In 1993, Dugin and Eduard Limonov, who called Dugin the “St. Cyril and Methodius of fascism,” founded the National Bolshevik Party (p.225). In 1997, Dugin called for a “fascism, borderless and red.” Dugin exhibited standard fascist views: democracy was hollow, the middle class was evil, Russians must be ruled by a “Man of Destiny,” America was malevolent, and Russia was innocent (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.89). “The West,” claimed Dugin, “is the place where Lucifer fell. It is the center for the global capitalist octopus” (cited by Clover, 2017, p.238). They blamed the fall of the Soviet empire on the corruption of the West and the evil of Jews (p.180).
In 1999, Eurasianist Sergei Glazyev got help from an American Conspiracy theorist Lyndon LaRouche who translated Glazyev’s book Genocide: Russia and the New World Order, which claimed that a cabal of Jewish neoliberals had deliberately destroyed Russia in the 1990s (Snyder, 2018, p.97). Similar to how Hitler interpreted Germany’s loss after the First World War, Jews would be viewed as the real perpetrators and, in this case, “Russians” the real victims. He was elected to parliament as a communist in 1999, and then helped to found the radical nationalist party Rodina in 2003. His party was meant to draw votes away from the communist party towards a group trusted by Putin (p.98).
In 1999, Eurasianist Sergei Glazyev got help from an American Conspiracy theorist Lyndon LaRouche who translated Glazyev’s book Genocide: Russia and the New World Order, which claimed that a cabal of Jewish neoliberals had deliberately destroyed Russia in the 1990s (Snyder, 2018, p.97). Similar to how Hitler interpreted Germany’s loss after the First World War, Jews would be viewed as the real perpetrators and, in this case, “Russians” the real victims. He was elected to parliament as a communist in 1999, and then helped to found the radical nationalist party Rodina in 2003. His party was meant to draw votes away from the communist party towards a group trusted by Putin (p.98).
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As the Obama administration attempted to “reset” Russian relations to focus more on China, Fascist ideas burst into the Russian public sphere. The dramatic change in Russia’s orientation bore no relation to any new unfriendly action from outside. Western enmity was not a matter of what a Western actor was ‘doing,’ but what the West was portrayed as ‘being.’ In 2012, fascist thinkers were placed in the Russian mainstream by a Russian president who seemed to think that he needed them. Ilyin had been granted as full a resuscitation as a state can give a philosopher, Dugin was a frequent guest on Russia’s largest television channel, and a fascist novelist Alexander Prokhanov, who, like Dugin, used the notion of Eurasia to mean the return of Soviet Union in fascist form in several publications (Clover, 2017, p.183-7). Like Adolf Hitler, Prokhanov blamed world Jewry for inventing the ideas that “enslaved” his homeland.
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He also blamed the Jews for the Holocaust. In a television interview Prokhanov presented European success as a sign of evil, the belief in a global Jewish conspiracy, and the certainty of Ukraine’s Russian fate. He claimed Europe was killing Russians—professing “We didn’t get infected with AIDS, they deliberately infected us.” The fundamental problem, said Prokhanov in this interview, was the Jews (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.92).
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Prokhanov continued further blaming Jews for antisemitism, calling it the natural result of “the fact that Jews have taken over the world and are using their power for evil.” The only defense of course against the Jewish world conspiracy was a Russian redeemer. “When I speak of Russia, I have in view people living in Ukraine and Belarus.” Prokhanov continued, “the future of the empire has already been proclaimed by Putin…and Ukraine’s contribution to this empire would be grandiose” (cited p.93).
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Today, Nazi language is ever present to not mistake the intent behind ‘Eurasianism’. In an apparent effort to strengthen Russia’s ideological stand and eliminate foreign influence, head of Moscow University television, Vitaly Tretyakov, pushed for public denunciations of anti-war academics or even those advocating for a negotiated peace, along with those critical of the Soviet Union. He called for the Russian Academy of Sciences to arrange these public denunciations and “Maybe we should burn these books!” In the same segment, political scientist Sergei Mikheyev eagerly chimed in, “Right along with their authors!” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.269).
In January 2023, television host Sergey Mardan genocidally raged, “The enemy has to be destroyed down to the root! It has to be exterminated!...If Stalin had deported [the people of] Western Ukraine—to me, it’s still a mystery why he didn’t do it—perhaps none of this would be happening” (cited p.277). ‘Eurasianism’ is simply code for a restored Soviet Union under fascism.
In January 2023, television host Sergey Mardan genocidally raged, “The enemy has to be destroyed down to the root! It has to be exterminated!...If Stalin had deported [the people of] Western Ukraine—to me, it’s still a mystery why he didn’t do it—perhaps none of this would be happening” (cited p.277). ‘Eurasianism’ is simply code for a restored Soviet Union under fascism.
Fascism: Justifying Authoritarianism
In 2004, citing Ilyin, public relations specialist Vladimir Surkov concluded that the Russian people should have as much freedom as they were ready to have. Of course, what Ilyin meant by “freedom” was the freedom of the individual to submerge himself in a collectivity that subjugates itself to a leader (Snyder, 2018, p.47). Surkov would similarly justify the end of elected governorships throughout Russia citing Ilyin, claiming that Russians did not yet know how to vote (Satter, 2016, p.116).
In 2004, citing Ilyin, public relations specialist Vladimir Surkov concluded that the Russian people should have as much freedom as they were ready to have. Of course, what Ilyin meant by “freedom” was the freedom of the individual to submerge himself in a collectivity that subjugates itself to a leader (Snyder, 2018, p.47). Surkov would similarly justify the end of elected governorships throughout Russia citing Ilyin, claiming that Russians did not yet know how to vote (Satter, 2016, p.116).
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During Medvedev’s presidency, the constitution was changed—extending presidential terms and allowing Putin to run again. Many Russians, disillusioned by economic stagnation after the 2008 financial crisis, saw the election as a last chance for change. With waning support, Putin relied on electoral fraud to stay in power, often admitting it without consequence (Snyder, 2018, p.48).
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By the reckonings of independent Russian electoral observers, United Russia (Putin’s Party) won about 26% of the vote in the December 4th elections. The party was nevertheless accorded enough votes to control a majority in parliament. Both Russian and international observers criticized unbalanced media coverage, and physical and digital manipulation of the vote. On December 10th, some 50,000 people gathered in Moscow; on December 24th, the figure grew to 80,000. Russians gathered in 99 cities over the course of the month, in the largest protests in the history of the Russian Federation. The main slogan was “For Free Elections!” (Englund & Lally, 2011).
The fraud was repeated March 4, 2012. This time most of the electoral manipulation was done digitally rather than manual. Tens of millions of cyber votes were added, diluting the votes cast by human beings—giving Putin a fictional majority. In Chechnya, Putin was accorded 99.8% of the ballots (Satter, 2016, p.91). In Novosibirsk, protesters complained when vote counts totaled 146% of the population. On March 5, 2012, in Moscow some 20,000 Russian citizens protested the falsified presidential elections (p.65).
In order to join the European Union, countries had to demonstrate their sovereignty in specific ways that Russia had not: by creating a market that could bear competition, an administration that could implement law, and a democracy that held free and fair elections. Surkov transformed this failure into a claim of superiority by speaking of “sovereign democracy.” This term was celebrated by extreme nationalists such as the fascist Alexander Dugin. Any attempt to make Russia an actual democracy could now be prevented, thought Dugin, by referencing sovereignty (Snyder, 2018, p.46).
Invoking Ilyin’s fascist vision of a redeemer who would enchant the world allowed Russia to sidestep the question of building legitimate political institutions. By discrediting democratic elections in 2011 and 2012, Putin assumed the role of Ilyin’s redeemer.
The fraud was repeated March 4, 2012. This time most of the electoral manipulation was done digitally rather than manual. Tens of millions of cyber votes were added, diluting the votes cast by human beings—giving Putin a fictional majority. In Chechnya, Putin was accorded 99.8% of the ballots (Satter, 2016, p.91). In Novosibirsk, protesters complained when vote counts totaled 146% of the population. On March 5, 2012, in Moscow some 20,000 Russian citizens protested the falsified presidential elections (p.65).
In order to join the European Union, countries had to demonstrate their sovereignty in specific ways that Russia had not: by creating a market that could bear competition, an administration that could implement law, and a democracy that held free and fair elections. Surkov transformed this failure into a claim of superiority by speaking of “sovereign democracy.” This term was celebrated by extreme nationalists such as the fascist Alexander Dugin. Any attempt to make Russia an actual democracy could now be prevented, thought Dugin, by referencing sovereignty (Snyder, 2018, p.46).
Invoking Ilyin’s fascist vision of a redeemer who would enchant the world allowed Russia to sidestep the question of building legitimate political institutions. By discrediting democratic elections in 2011 and 2012, Putin assumed the role of Ilyin’s redeemer.
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Fascism: Putin Sees Democracy as a Threat
Putin might have understood that many of the protestors were concerned about the rule of law and the principle of succession in their country. Instead, he seemed to interpret this as a CIA led coup attempt. Putin casually accepted that there had been fraud; Medvedev helpfully added that all Russian elections had been fraudulent. By ignoring the will of the people while expecting ritual participation in symbolic displays of support, Putin embraced Ilyin’s contempt of democracy. His return to power in 2012 marked him as a vengeful dismantler of the rule of law (Clover, 2016, p.65). |
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The protestors, rather than Putin himself, would be portrayed as the danger to Russian statehood with links to some intractable foreign foe. This domestic political emergency would become permanent. After 2012, the fictional problem became the designs of the European Union and the United States to destroy Russia. Those who wished to have votes counted in 2011 and 2012 were not Russian citizens who wanted to see the law followed. They were mindless agents of global sexual decadence whose actions threatened the innocent national organism. Just as Ilyin had described opposition to his views as “sexual perversion” and homosexuality, Putin would surprise European leaders by calling his own opposition “sexually deformed” (Goble, 2015).
Sergei Lavrov would describe Russia’s crackdown on protests not as an attack on free speech, but taking a stand against homosexuality to defend Russian innocence. Vladimir Yakunin, a close associate of Putin, published a long article in November 2012, stating that Russia was eternally confronted with a conspiracy of enemies, which has controlled the course of history since time began. This global group had released homosexual propaganda around the world in order to reduce birth rates in Russia and thereby preserve the power of the West (Snyder, 2018, p.52). As Snyder 2018 points out, “Human sexuality remains an inexhaustible raw material for manufactured anxiety. Voting = West = sodomy” (p.52). Russia was portrayed as blameless, with all issues attributed to external forces. Putin positioned masculinity as an argument against democratic values and enacted laws banning any depiction of him as gay in print or online media (Zhurzhenko, 2016).
Sergei Lavrov would describe Russia’s crackdown on protests not as an attack on free speech, but taking a stand against homosexuality to defend Russian innocence. Vladimir Yakunin, a close associate of Putin, published a long article in November 2012, stating that Russia was eternally confronted with a conspiracy of enemies, which has controlled the course of history since time began. This global group had released homosexual propaganda around the world in order to reduce birth rates in Russia and thereby preserve the power of the West (Snyder, 2018, p.52). As Snyder 2018 points out, “Human sexuality remains an inexhaustible raw material for manufactured anxiety. Voting = West = sodomy” (p.52). Russia was portrayed as blameless, with all issues attributed to external forces. Putin positioned masculinity as an argument against democratic values and enacted laws banning any depiction of him as gay in print or online media (Zhurzhenko, 2016).
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The Kremlin’s impulse was to associate democratic opposition with global sodomy and that protestors worked for a foreign power. On December 15, he claimed that the demonstrators were paid. Evidence was not provided and was not the point. If, as Ilyin maintained, voting was just an opening to foreign influence, then Putin’s job was to make up a story about foreign influence and use it to alter domestic politics (Grove, 2012). Russian television channels and newspapers generated the narrative that all who protested fraud were paid by Western institutions. The association between opposition and treason was axiomatic. Precisely because Putin had made the Russian state vulnerable, he had to claim that it was a malign foreign entity that had done so (Snyder, 2018, p.55). By this reasoning, Putin was not a failed leader but a national redeemer.
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Fascism: Authoritarianism Realized
Liberal opposition leader Boris Nemtsov had devoted himself to investigating Putin’s role in the war in the Donbas, documenting the presence of Russian soldiers whose existence Putin denied. Nemtsov was among those who organized a Russian peace rally against Putin’s aggression and the war in Ukraine scheduled for March 1, 2015. Two days before the rally, while walking home across a bridge just outside of Red Square, Boris Nemtsov was shot to death (Shore, 2018, p.261). Even before Alexei Nalvalny’s murder, true opposition ended with Nemtsov’s murder and elections became rituals meant to glorify the redeemer. |
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During Russia’s 2024 presidential race, a reporter asked State Duma member Nikolay Kharitonov, “Do you think you can win?” He cautiously replied, “I can’t talk this way, to win or not to win.” Andrei Bogdanov, chairman of the Russian Party of Freedom and Justice, was quite forthcoming when he was asked, “Are you planning to win?” Bogdanov replied, “Of course not! Do I look like an idiot?” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.390). In light of a predetermined outcome, top Russian propagandists have repeatedly emphasized that Putin is the only viable candidate, facing no real opposition—since prominent challengers are either dead, exiled, or imprisoned after surviving assassination attempts, as in the cases of Vladimir Kara-Murza and Alexei Navalny (p.380).
Igor Girkin and his supporters were unable to complete the necessary paperwork for his presidential bid, as the process required notarized signatures—and multiple notaries refused to cooperate. Meanwhile, Yekaterina Duntsova’s candidacy was blocked by the Central Election Commission, which claimed to have found over 100 errors in her submission, including alleged spelling mistakes. Her subsequent appeal was rejected by Russia’s Supreme Court (Davis, 2024, p.391).
As the only peace candidate, Boris Nadezhdin vocally urged the Kremlin to cease the hostilities and to negotiate with Ukraine. Nadzhdin replied with chilling sincerity, “I just hope that at the conclusion of this electoral campaign I will stay alive, remain free, and won’t be declared a foreign agent” (cited p.391). He was publicly threatened by prominent pro-Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov and barred from participating in the election. In the aftermath, some of his supporters have been arrested, and law enforcement has conducted searches of their homes. TV host Marat Bulatov blatantly described the process as a mere “ritual,” designed to support Putin. Commentator Vitaly Serukhanov added, “It would be incorrect, not to say criminal, not to support the Supreme Commander” (cited p.431-2).
Igor Girkin and his supporters were unable to complete the necessary paperwork for his presidential bid, as the process required notarized signatures—and multiple notaries refused to cooperate. Meanwhile, Yekaterina Duntsova’s candidacy was blocked by the Central Election Commission, which claimed to have found over 100 errors in her submission, including alleged spelling mistakes. Her subsequent appeal was rejected by Russia’s Supreme Court (Davis, 2024, p.391).
As the only peace candidate, Boris Nadezhdin vocally urged the Kremlin to cease the hostilities and to negotiate with Ukraine. Nadzhdin replied with chilling sincerity, “I just hope that at the conclusion of this electoral campaign I will stay alive, remain free, and won’t be declared a foreign agent” (cited p.391). He was publicly threatened by prominent pro-Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov and barred from participating in the election. In the aftermath, some of his supporters have been arrested, and law enforcement has conducted searches of their homes. TV host Marat Bulatov blatantly described the process as a mere “ritual,” designed to support Putin. Commentator Vitaly Serukhanov added, “It would be incorrect, not to say criminal, not to support the Supreme Commander” (cited p.431-2).
Schizofascism
While attempting to frame an independent Ukraine as a fascist state, Alexander Prokhanov blamed Ukrainian Jews for Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine—and for the Holocaust. This was a new variety of fascism, which Yale historian Timothy Snyder refers to as schizofascism: actual fascists calling their opponents “fascists” while treating the Second World War as an argument for more violence (Snyder, 2018, p.145).
While attempting to frame an independent Ukraine as a fascist state, Alexander Prokhanov blamed Ukrainian Jews for Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine—and for the Holocaust. This was a new variety of fascism, which Yale historian Timothy Snyder refers to as schizofascism: actual fascists calling their opponents “fascists” while treating the Second World War as an argument for more violence (Snyder, 2018, p.145).
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Fascism, how Russian propagandists define it, is meant as the eternal threat from the West. Since Russia is always innocent, no Russian could ever be a fascist. Thanks to Brezhnev mythologizing the Second World War, Russians educated in the 1970s, including the leaders and war propagandists of the 2010s, were instructed that “fascist” meant “anti-Russian” (Snyder, p.147). In the Russian language it is practically a grammatical error to imagine that a Russian could be a fascist. Thus a fascist like Dugin could celebrate the victory of fascism in fascist language while condemning as “fascist” his opponents, while endorsing Nazi geopolitics. Ukrainians defending their country are “junta mercenaries from the ranks of the Ukrainian swine-fascists” (Dugin, 2014).
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Having invaded Ukraine in 2014, voters in Russia’s sham elections of occupied Crimea had no access to international or Ukrainian media. They were told they must choose between Nazism and Russia (Patrikarakos, 2017, p.92-4). According to internal information of the Russian presidential administration, the turnout was about 30% and the votes split between the two options. However, the official results announced a 90% voter turnout in favor of annexation (Gregory, 2014). In Sevastopol, official turnout was 123%. Qualified observers were absent, though Moscow selected a few from the European extreme Right to endorse official results (Snyder, 2018, p.141-2).
Schizofascism was one of many contradictions on display in spring 2014. Ukrainian society was full of nationalists but not a nation; the Ukrainian state was repressive, but did not exist; Russians were forced to speak Ukrainian though there was no such language. Glazyev overcame these contradictions by invoking the West. Russians were in Ukraine to defeat “the Nazi junta that the Americans had installed in Kyiv” (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.147). Like his advisor Glazyev, Putin defined Ukrainians who resisted Russian invasions as fascists (Putin, 2014).
Schizofascism was one of many contradictions on display in spring 2014. Ukrainian society was full of nationalists but not a nation; the Ukrainian state was repressive, but did not exist; Russians were forced to speak Ukrainian though there was no such language. Glazyev overcame these contradictions by invoking the West. Russians were in Ukraine to defeat “the Nazi junta that the Americans had installed in Kyiv” (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.147). Like his advisor Glazyev, Putin defined Ukrainians who resisted Russian invasions as fascists (Putin, 2014).
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Russian foreign policy in 2014 bore more than a passing resemblance to some of the more notorious moments of the 1930s. Lavrov repeated the principle that a state might intervene to protect anyone that it defines as a member of its own culture (Lavrov, 2014). This was the argument that Hitler had used in annexing Austria, partitioning Czechoslovakia, and invading Poland, and the argument Stalin had used when invading Poland with Hitler in 1939 and annexing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940 (Synder, 2018, p.147). By 2014, Russian law made it a criminal act to suggest, or even re-post on social media, that the Soviet Union had invaded Poland, occupied Baltic States, or committed war crimes between 1939 and 1941 (Bugush & Nuzov, 2016). Russian soldiers, when asked about their actions in Crimea, changed the subject to the Second World War (Snyder, 2018, p.156).
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In Donetsk, a Russian neo-Nazi named Pavel Gubarev proclaimed himself “people’s governor” on May 1, on the logic that “Ukraine never existed” (cited by Snyder, p.144). Putin made essentially the same statement in April 2014, “The essential issue is how to ensure the legitimate rights and interests of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the southeast of Ukraine” (cited p.148). The fact that Russians as Ukrainian citizens enjoyed greater freedom of expression than Russian citizens went unmentioned.
As Russia’s full-scale invasion stalled in 2022, famous Russian singer Vika Tsyganova blamed the breakdown in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on ethnicity, claiming in a televised interview that Russian Jews should never have been on the team to negotiate with Ukrainian Jews. Looking for anyone else to blame for Russia’s military setbacks, Tsyganov claimed Jews had actually engineered Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin’s usual propaganda line that Ukraine is a Nazi state went unmentioned during these antisemitic attacks (Davis, 2024, p.367).
Unlike other societies, antisemitic sentiments in Russia are not limited to crackpot conspiracy theorists, they are pushed by mainstream propagandists and government officials. As historian Marci Shore (2017) puts it, “Putin and his ideologues have created an alternative reality where fascism is anti-fascism and everything is called what it is not” (p.143).
As Russia’s full-scale invasion stalled in 2022, famous Russian singer Vika Tsyganova blamed the breakdown in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on ethnicity, claiming in a televised interview that Russian Jews should never have been on the team to negotiate with Ukrainian Jews. Looking for anyone else to blame for Russia’s military setbacks, Tsyganov claimed Jews had actually engineered Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin’s usual propaganda line that Ukraine is a Nazi state went unmentioned during these antisemitic attacks (Davis, 2024, p.367).
Unlike other societies, antisemitic sentiments in Russia are not limited to crackpot conspiracy theorists, they are pushed by mainstream propagandists and government officials. As historian Marci Shore (2017) puts it, “Putin and his ideologues have created an alternative reality where fascism is anti-fascism and everything is called what it is not” (p.143).
2) A Soviet Empire Under Fascism
According to Putin, his inner circle, and state media; the endgame is to resurrect the Soviet Empire under Ilyin’s Christian fascism. In 2005, Putin symbolically reburied Ivan Ilyin at a monastery where Soviet secret police had once incinerated thousands of Great Terror victims—turning a site of mourning into a tribute to a fascist thinker who claimed Russia was eternally innocent and sacred (Snyder, 2018, p.59).
According to Putin, his inner circle, and state media; the endgame is to resurrect the Soviet Empire under Ilyin’s Christian fascism. In 2005, Putin symbolically reburied Ivan Ilyin at a monastery where Soviet secret police had once incinerated thousands of Great Terror victims—turning a site of mourning into a tribute to a fascist thinker who claimed Russia was eternally innocent and sacred (Snyder, 2018, p.59).
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When Putin laid flowers on Ilyin’s grave in 2009, he was in the company of his favorite Orthodox monk, Tikhon Shevkunov, who had no trouble seeing the Soviet executioners as Russian patriots and, since Russians can only be innocent according to Ilyin, blended the values of communism with the Bible: “A certain ideology dominated in the Soviet Union, and regardless of our feelings about it, it was based on Builder of Communism, if you read it, is just a pathetic copy of the Bible” (cited p.59). Putin leveraged the Russian Orthodox Church to reframe Soviet crimes as an innocent Russian response to global hostility, encouraging Russians to view their Soviet past with pride and nostalgia.
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By 2012, the transformation of the Russian state to Ilyin’s proposals was complete. The definition of treason was expanded to include information from nongovernmental organizations beyond Russia, which made telling the truth over email a high crime. Undefined “extremism” was outlawed. Russia’s own past became a foreign threat. Acknowledging that the Second World War began in 1939 with Stalin’s Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement with Hitler to invade and partition Poland could now result in jail time. Thanks to the new “foreign agents” law that went into effect, anyone receiving funds, assistance, or even holding a press conference with any organization or anyone abroad had to register themselves as a foreign agent. This officially ended any academic cooperation between universities and their archives outside Putin’s censorship of history (HRW, 2012). Putin’s new vision of Russia’s past provided a trove of symbols of innocence exploited by rulers to illustrate the harmony of the virgin homeland troubled only by the threat of foreign penetration (Snyder, 2018, p.57-8). If all conflicts were the fault of the outsider, there was no need to consider Russians, their choices, or their crimes; past, present, or even future.
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On January 23, 2012, Putin published an article in which he developed Ilyin’s definition of the Russian nation. Citing Ilyin by name, “the nation question” in Russia was an import from the West that had no applicability to Russia (cited by Snyder, p.60). In 2017, when Russia had to somehow address the centenary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Russian television aired a multipart drama about Leon Trotsky, thereby coding the revolution as Jewish. The hero at the end of the drama was none other than Ivan Ilyin (p.60).
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Alexander Dugin, Alexander Prokhanov, and Sergei Glazyev revived or remade Nazi ideas for Russian purposes and rehabilitated fascist thinkers. In effect, their Eurasianist ideas were western expansion by any means while seeking willing western collaborators, much how the Nazis expanded east during the Second World War (Rothchild, 1974, p.281-311). Initially, this method would be done asymmetrically to make integration into the EU impossible and integration into Russia’s counter to the EU, a Eurasian Union, possible (Synder, 2018, p.68). In Ilyin’s world view, Russian empire meant salvation, and all other regimes marked various points on the slippery slope to Satanism. Empire was the natural state of affairs; fascist empires would be most successful; Russia would be the perfect fascist empire (p.71).
Russia did not deliver the promise of social advancement to the bulk of the Russian population. Russians who founded businesses could be arrested at any time for any imagined violation of the law, and very often are ( p.79). Today, state TV hosts such as Bagdasarov cheerfully encourage “purges” of Putin’s dissidents. Dmitry Kiselyov praised the likes of Joseph Stalin and his chief of secret police, Lavrentiy Beria, as examples to follow (Davis, 2024, p.180). Both the desired outcome and real results are modeled on Ilyin’s idea of a Soviet Empire under fascism.
Russia did not deliver the promise of social advancement to the bulk of the Russian population. Russians who founded businesses could be arrested at any time for any imagined violation of the law, and very often are ( p.79). Today, state TV hosts such as Bagdasarov cheerfully encourage “purges” of Putin’s dissidents. Dmitry Kiselyov praised the likes of Joseph Stalin and his chief of secret police, Lavrentiy Beria, as examples to follow (Davis, 2024, p.180). Both the desired outcome and real results are modeled on Ilyin’s idea of a Soviet Empire under fascism.
An Empire from Vladivostok to Lisbon
Although Putin has called the idea of him attacking other European countries “ridiculous” and “rubbish” in 2024 (Teslova, 2024), the Kremlin’s own rhetoric has suggested otherwise. Russia’s ideologues have openly fantasized of a Eurasian empire “from Vladivostok to Lisbon” and state-media pundits have threatened on live TV that Poland and the rest of Europe are the next targets after Ukraine.
Although Putin has called the idea of him attacking other European countries “ridiculous” and “rubbish” in 2024 (Teslova, 2024), the Kremlin’s own rhetoric has suggested otherwise. Russia’s ideologues have openly fantasized of a Eurasian empire “from Vladivostok to Lisbon” and state-media pundits have threatened on live TV that Poland and the rest of Europe are the next targets after Ukraine.
Russian foreign policy itself arose “from the philosophy of Eurasianism” (Glazyev, 2013). Unlike EU membership, one capital would dominate the rest and sovereignty for states smaller than Russia would be obsolete. Following the Nazi legalist philosopher, Carl Schmit; Putin’s Eurasian advisor, Sergei Glazyev, maintained that states are obsolete and that “great spaces” should be dominated by great powers (Glazyev & Tkachuk, 2014, p.82).
Long before Putin began to speak of a Eurasia that must include Ukraine, Dugin defined the independent Ukrainian state as the barrier to Russia’s Eurasianist destiny. With state funds from the Kremlin, Dugin founded a youth movement in 2005, whose members urged the disintegration and russification of Ukraine. The existence of Ukraine, in Dugin’s view, constituted “an enormous danger for all of Eurasia” (Shekhovtsov, 2016). According to Dugin, the annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia was the “necessary condition” of the Eurasian imperial project (cited by Synder, 2018, p.97).
Since 2010, Russia’s aim has been to weaken the EU by promoting a Eurasian Customs Union as an alternative to the EU. Launched on January 1, 2010, the union was intended to eventually absorb EU member states. In 2011 and 2012, Putin made clear that if the EU rejected integration with Russia, he would push Europe toward a Eurasian future—prioritizing empire over cooperation (Snyder, p.81).
In Nezavisimaya Gazeta on January 23, 2012, Putin claimed, citing Ilyin, that integration was not about common achievement, as the Europeans thought, but about what Putin called “civilization” (p.82). On Putin’s logic, the rule of law ceased to be a general aspiration and became an aspect of a foreign Western civilization. There was no need to do anything to make Russia more like Europe. Europe should be more like Russia. Through media influences and even Orthodox Church sermons, propaganda was designed to influence citizens from joining the EU and prevent their societies from thinking that this was possible (Solik et al., 2019). Since the EU is a consensual organization, it was vulnerable to campaigns that raised emotions.
Long before Putin began to speak of a Eurasia that must include Ukraine, Dugin defined the independent Ukrainian state as the barrier to Russia’s Eurasianist destiny. With state funds from the Kremlin, Dugin founded a youth movement in 2005, whose members urged the disintegration and russification of Ukraine. The existence of Ukraine, in Dugin’s view, constituted “an enormous danger for all of Eurasia” (Shekhovtsov, 2016). According to Dugin, the annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia was the “necessary condition” of the Eurasian imperial project (cited by Synder, 2018, p.97).
Since 2010, Russia’s aim has been to weaken the EU by promoting a Eurasian Customs Union as an alternative to the EU. Launched on January 1, 2010, the union was intended to eventually absorb EU member states. In 2011 and 2012, Putin made clear that if the EU rejected integration with Russia, he would push Europe toward a Eurasian future—prioritizing empire over cooperation (Snyder, p.81).
In Nezavisimaya Gazeta on January 23, 2012, Putin claimed, citing Ilyin, that integration was not about common achievement, as the Europeans thought, but about what Putin called “civilization” (p.82). On Putin’s logic, the rule of law ceased to be a general aspiration and became an aspect of a foreign Western civilization. There was no need to do anything to make Russia more like Europe. Europe should be more like Russia. Through media influences and even Orthodox Church sermons, propaganda was designed to influence citizens from joining the EU and prevent their societies from thinking that this was possible (Solik et al., 2019). Since the EU is a consensual organization, it was vulnerable to campaigns that raised emotions.
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In the long run, Putin explained, Eurasia would overwhelm the EU in a larger “Union of Europe,” a “space” between the Atlantic and the Pacific, “from Lisbon to Vladivostok.” Not to join Eurasia, Putin said, would be “to promote separatism in the broadest sense of the word” (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.82). If Russia could be recast as the guardian of lost civilizational values, the need to reform its kleptocracy would fade—Russia would be celebrated instead of reformed.
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In 2013, Russia began to seduce or bully its European neighbors into abandoning their own institutions and histories, and blame them for Russia’s inherit crisis. Putin, moving very quickly, had formulated politics that transformed Russians’ protests against his fake elections into a European and American offensive against Russia in which Ukraine would be the field of battle. Europeans and Americans were challenging Russian civilization by supporting democracy and recognizing Ukraine. Only Russians were allowed to interpret who Ukrainians actually were (p.62). Putin’s vision of Russian civilization drove his effort to reduce Yanukovych from obedient client to powerless puppet—triggering a Ukrainian revolt against a regime that suspended rights, mimicked Russian repression, and used violence. His coercion ultimately sparked revolution (See Part 9). Despite efforts, Ukraine would not be bullied into becoming Russia.
The process of supplanting the EU with Eurasia was to begin immediately in 2013 starting with Ukraine. Fascist writers such as Prokhanov ecstatically envisioned the EU’s collapse into a “constellation of European fascist states” to join Russia’s Eurasian Union (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.97). As the EU presented an existential threat to Russia’s Eurasian empire, Prokhanov’s vision would translate into Russian foreign policy. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov later repeated this aspiration, citing Ilyin as its source, that Eurasia would overcome the EU, leading to “the creation of a unified humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean” (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.99). On March 7, 2014, Alexander Dugin rejoiced in Russia’s invasion of Donbas calling it “the expansion of liberational (from Americans) ideology into Europe. It is the goal of full Eurasianism—-Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” (Dugin, 2014).
The process of supplanting the EU with Eurasia was to begin immediately in 2013 starting with Ukraine. Fascist writers such as Prokhanov ecstatically envisioned the EU’s collapse into a “constellation of European fascist states” to join Russia’s Eurasian Union (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.97). As the EU presented an existential threat to Russia’s Eurasian empire, Prokhanov’s vision would translate into Russian foreign policy. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov later repeated this aspiration, citing Ilyin as its source, that Eurasia would overcome the EU, leading to “the creation of a unified humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean” (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.99). On March 7, 2014, Alexander Dugin rejoiced in Russia’s invasion of Donbas calling it “the expansion of liberational (from Americans) ideology into Europe. It is the goal of full Eurasianism—-Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” (Dugin, 2014).
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Having invaded Ukraine in 2014, Russian leaders took the position that their neighbor was not a sovereign state arguing that invasion and annexation were justified by the very chaos caused by the Russian invasion. The goal according to Dugin was, “we must take over and destroy Europe” (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.141). From the mouths of Dugin, Prokhanov, Solovyov, Lavrov, and Putin himself, the open admission is to expand a fascist commonwealth dominated by Moscow to as far as Portugal.
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In Their Own Words
Perhaps no one has done more to expose Russia’s open declaration of a Soviet Union under fascism than media analyst, Julia Davis. In her book, In Their Own Words, she has collected transcripts of Russian state-owned television pundits when they often reveal too much. In December 2021, on the eve of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Nikkolai Starikov threatened, “American protectorate will be publicly destroyed.” Having said too much, Starikov snapped back to the approved propaganda line, “It will be liberated. There will be a free Ukraine.” Vladimir Solovyov brashly added, “why should we stop with Ukraine?” Fellow host Olga Skabeeva later chimed in and said, “Biden announced the goal of our special operation: He said that Putin wants to restore the USSR. As though there’s anything wrong with that” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.150).
Russian parliament members, such as Oleg Matveychev, also give away Moscow’s intentions. In less than a month after Moscow’s 2022 invasion, Matveychev argued, “Here’s what will be on the table after our victory…After Ukraine’s demilitarization is completed…we’re going to raise the stakes…The dissolution of NATO, because the presence of NATO in some countries is getting in our way” (cited by Davis, p.161). On Kremlin state TV in May 2022, Olga Skabeeva announced, “We’re forced to conduct the demilitarization not only of Ukraine, but of the entire NATO alliance” (p.188).
Perhaps no one has done more to expose Russia’s open declaration of a Soviet Union under fascism than media analyst, Julia Davis. In her book, In Their Own Words, she has collected transcripts of Russian state-owned television pundits when they often reveal too much. In December 2021, on the eve of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Nikkolai Starikov threatened, “American protectorate will be publicly destroyed.” Having said too much, Starikov snapped back to the approved propaganda line, “It will be liberated. There will be a free Ukraine.” Vladimir Solovyov brashly added, “why should we stop with Ukraine?” Fellow host Olga Skabeeva later chimed in and said, “Biden announced the goal of our special operation: He said that Putin wants to restore the USSR. As though there’s anything wrong with that” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.150).
Russian parliament members, such as Oleg Matveychev, also give away Moscow’s intentions. In less than a month after Moscow’s 2022 invasion, Matveychev argued, “Here’s what will be on the table after our victory…After Ukraine’s demilitarization is completed…we’re going to raise the stakes…The dissolution of NATO, because the presence of NATO in some countries is getting in our way” (cited by Davis, p.161). On Kremlin state TV in May 2022, Olga Skabeeva announced, “We’re forced to conduct the demilitarization not only of Ukraine, but of the entire NATO alliance” (p.188).
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On live TV, Kremlin-aligned pundits openly name Poland as the next target. Interpreting Western hesitation in supporting Ukraine as weakness, they now speculate about future victims. These threats are credible as Russian state media similarly discussed plans to invade Ukraine as early as 2019. They openly fantasize about the US leaving NATO so they can invade Poland and the Baltics. Dmitry Lekuh said that Poland is “the next candidate to be thrown under Russian tanks” (cited by Davis, 2018, p.373).
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Appearing on state television, pundits and lawmakers alike insisted that Russia is not interested in negotiations and simply cannot allow Ukraine’s sovereign existence to continue. They have furthermore threatened the Baltic states, referring to them as “accidental formations” that “may not survive this era” (cited p.374).
It is a popular theme in Russian state media that once Russia defeats Ukraine, Ukrainians will cheerily join the ranks of the Russian armed forces and fight alongside them against Europe and America. Daniil Bezsonov, Deputy Minister of Information described Ukrainians as Russia’s “mobilization resource in a future war with NATO” (cited by Davis, p.405). As recently as 2025, Russian officials are intensifying the narratives once used to justify the invasion of Ukraine to prepare for aggression against other European states. Just as Putin denied he had any intention of invading Ukraine up until two weeks before his invasion in February, he once again expects the world to take him at his word.
It is a popular theme in Russian state media that once Russia defeats Ukraine, Ukrainians will cheerily join the ranks of the Russian armed forces and fight alongside them against Europe and America. Daniil Bezsonov, Deputy Minister of Information described Ukrainians as Russia’s “mobilization resource in a future war with NATO” (cited by Davis, p.405). As recently as 2025, Russian officials are intensifying the narratives once used to justify the invasion of Ukraine to prepare for aggression against other European states. Just as Putin denied he had any intention of invading Ukraine up until two weeks before his invasion in February, he once again expects the world to take him at his word.
Russian Aggression
Ilyin’s Christian totalitarianism, Gmilev’s Eurasianism, and Dugin’s “Eurasian” Nazism appeared in Putin’s discourse as he sought an exit from the dilemma he created for his country in 2012 (Clover, 2017, p.183-7). Using Ilyin’s concept of forming politics around a defined enemy, which was adopted from Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt, Putin defined what he called, the Russian World and Russian culture to include former Soviet countries that included Ukraine.
Putin preferred to imagine Ukrainians as a folk scattered across a broad land of what he defined as Russian territory, “from the Carpathians to Kamchatka” (cited by Synder, 2018, p.97). These lines were published in the midst of a new armament program, which doubled Russia’s annual weapons procurement budget between 2011 and 2013 (p.97). Putin believed a Russian leader had the right to speak for the Ukrainian people and that Ukrainian statehood was irrelevant. He concluded with a cry of defiance that Ukrainians and Russians would never be divided, and threatened war to those who failed to understand (Putin, 2012). When Putin threw down this gauntlet in 2012, no one in the West was paying attention.
Ilyin’s Christian totalitarianism, Gmilev’s Eurasianism, and Dugin’s “Eurasian” Nazism appeared in Putin’s discourse as he sought an exit from the dilemma he created for his country in 2012 (Clover, 2017, p.183-7). Using Ilyin’s concept of forming politics around a defined enemy, which was adopted from Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt, Putin defined what he called, the Russian World and Russian culture to include former Soviet countries that included Ukraine.
Putin preferred to imagine Ukrainians as a folk scattered across a broad land of what he defined as Russian territory, “from the Carpathians to Kamchatka” (cited by Synder, 2018, p.97). These lines were published in the midst of a new armament program, which doubled Russia’s annual weapons procurement budget between 2011 and 2013 (p.97). Putin believed a Russian leader had the right to speak for the Ukrainian people and that Ukrainian statehood was irrelevant. He concluded with a cry of defiance that Ukrainians and Russians would never be divided, and threatened war to those who failed to understand (Putin, 2012). When Putin threw down this gauntlet in 2012, no one in the West was paying attention.
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To clear protestors from the street by violence and then portray them as agents of Europe was to define the EU as an enemy. Putin could control the state but not reform it. So foreign policy had to take the place of domestic policy, and diplomacy had to be about culture rather than security. In effect, this meant exporting Russian chaos while speaking of Russian order. Putin evoked a special Russian ability to thrive amidst global chaos. Such “passionarity” would determine, according to Putin, “who will take the lead and who will remain outsiders and inevitably lose their independence” (cited by Snyder, 2018, p.83).
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Russia took several aggressive actions. In April 2007, Estonia was crippled for weeks in a major cyberattack. Russia invaded Georgia to make European integration impossible for its neighbor (Grassegger & Krogerus, 2017). In Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, Russia financed and organized internet discussion outlets, ran by bots, to cast doubt on the value of EU membership using arguments as “decadent and unsafe” (Krekó et al., 2016).
Dugin had long urged the destruction of Ukraine. If Ukraine signed an association agreement with the EU, it would not be able to join Putin’s Eurasia. In September 2013, Glazyev said that Russia could invade Ukrainian territory if Ukraine did not join Eurasia (Walker, 2013). Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2014. Europeans, failing to grasp the stakes, proved more vulnerable to Russian aggression than Ukrainians. Few saw that attacking Ukraine’s integration also threatened their own fragile democracies, making them easy targets for disinformation.
On February 24, shocking but fictitious reports appeared about Ukrainian atrocities in Crimea, and about refugees from the peninsula who needed urgent assistance. Russian military intelligence created fictitious personae on the internet to spread these stories. A group of internet trolls in St. Petersburg, known as the Internet Research Agency, was at work to confuse Ukrainian and international opinion (Chen, 2015). By now, it was a hallmark of Russian foreign policy: a cyber campaign accompanying conventional warfare.
Dugin had long urged the destruction of Ukraine. If Ukraine signed an association agreement with the EU, it would not be able to join Putin’s Eurasia. In September 2013, Glazyev said that Russia could invade Ukrainian territory if Ukraine did not join Eurasia (Walker, 2013). Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2014. Europeans, failing to grasp the stakes, proved more vulnerable to Russian aggression than Ukrainians. Few saw that attacking Ukraine’s integration also threatened their own fragile democracies, making them easy targets for disinformation.
On February 24, shocking but fictitious reports appeared about Ukrainian atrocities in Crimea, and about refugees from the peninsula who needed urgent assistance. Russian military intelligence created fictitious personae on the internet to spread these stories. A group of internet trolls in St. Petersburg, known as the Internet Research Agency, was at work to confuse Ukrainian and international opinion (Chen, 2015). By now, it was a hallmark of Russian foreign policy: a cyber campaign accompanying conventional warfare.
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Russia’s war in Ukraine also created training grounds for terrorism. In fall 2016, a Serbian nationalist was arrested for planning an armed coup in Montenegro. He had fought on the Russian side in Ukraine, and said that he had been recruited for the plot by Russian nationalists (Balkan Insight, 2017) In January 2017, Swedish neo-Nazis trained by Russian paramilitaries in Russia bombed an asylum center for refugees in Gothenburg (Times of Israel, 2017). These episodes, together with the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in England (BBC, 2021), the killing of Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in Germany (Al Jazeera, 2021), and the attempted poisoning of Sergei Skripal in England (Chappell, 2018); all are cause to declare the Russian Federation a state sponsor of terrorism—a classification the West has yet to designate.
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3 ) The Return of Genocide to Ukraine
If Ukrainian identity is made synonymous with Nazism according to Russian propaganda, then the Kremlin’s stated war goal of “De-Nazification” is code for ethnic cleansing. The Russian state targets civilian infrastructure, destroys Ukrainian identity and culture in occupied territories, and intentionally kills, tortures, and rapes civilians. Russian propagandists and state officials openly talk about destroying Ukraine and Ukrainians, killing millions, drowning and burning children.
Ukrainians themselves were already dehumanized to prepare for what was coming. Putin’s war was based on the denial of Ukraine’s existence as a state or nation—a supposed illusion destined to collapse. When Ukrainians resisted more fiercely than expected, this didn’t challenge the premise; it simply expanded violence from elites to the broader population. Russian propagandists now use openly genocidal language, calling Ukrainians vermin, worms, demons, or zombies. If all Ukrainians are inherently “Nazis,” then, in their logic, all can be killed. The Nazi label has never reflected political reality. The true fascists—inside Russia—are the ones advocating genocide.
If Ukrainian identity is made synonymous with Nazism according to Russian propaganda, then the Kremlin’s stated war goal of “De-Nazification” is code for ethnic cleansing. The Russian state targets civilian infrastructure, destroys Ukrainian identity and culture in occupied territories, and intentionally kills, tortures, and rapes civilians. Russian propagandists and state officials openly talk about destroying Ukraine and Ukrainians, killing millions, drowning and burning children.
Ukrainians themselves were already dehumanized to prepare for what was coming. Putin’s war was based on the denial of Ukraine’s existence as a state or nation—a supposed illusion destined to collapse. When Ukrainians resisted more fiercely than expected, this didn’t challenge the premise; it simply expanded violence from elites to the broader population. Russian propagandists now use openly genocidal language, calling Ukrainians vermin, worms, demons, or zombies. If all Ukrainians are inherently “Nazis,” then, in their logic, all can be killed. The Nazi label has never reflected political reality. The true fascists—inside Russia—are the ones advocating genocide.
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At least 20,000 documented cases of children have been forcibly relocated into Russian occupied territories for reeducation and taught to be Russians (Raymond & Haworth, 2025). One such example in September and October 2022, under the pretense of a two-week rehabilitation program, Russian authorities compelled parents in occupied Kherson to send their children to camps in occupied Crimea. The attendees recounted experiences of mockery and humiliation based on their Ukrainian nationality. Children expressing pro-Ukrainian sentiments were confined to basements or isolation cells. The use of the Ukrainian language was prohibited. For six months they were forced to listen to Russian patriotic songs and perform labor (Hird & Trotter, 2025). Concurrently, in occupied territories, anyone caught reading a Ukrainian textbook is deemed an extremist and is sentenced to five years in prison (Pomerantsev & Dykhman, 2025).
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According to a United Nations (2024) report, 95% of Ukrainian prisoners of war experienced torture while in Russian captivity. Warcrimes and genocide also include, but not limited to, bombing of Mariupol Maternity Hospital, bombing Mariupol Drama Theater full of children, Bucha Massacre, indiscriminate shelling of Kharkiv, indiscriminate shelling of Chernihiv, indiscriminate shelling of Sumy, missile strike on Kramatorsk Railway Station killing 53 people including 9 children, use of cluster munitions in civilian areas, systematic torture and mass rape of civilians in occupied areas, forced deportations of civilians to Russia, forced deportation and illegal adoption of Ukrainian children, targeting of medical facilities, use of human shields, human safari drone campaigns in Kherson (UN, 2025), and execution of Ukrainian POWs.
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Journalists are not allowed in Russian occupied regions. One who remained, Ukrainian journalist Viktoria Roshchnyna, died in captivity, not near any battlefield. She was murdered under unbelievable agony and torture. Her body was returned to Ukraine missing eyes, part of her brain, and larynx. Her feet had electric shock burns, a broken hip, and injuries consistent with strangulation (Coynash, 2025).
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Normalizing Genocide
These incidents are neither isolated, collateral damage, nor are they discouraged. Several awards were presented to the Airborne Forces (VDV) of the Russian Federation in the Kyiv region. According to state TV outlet Zvezda, the unit had been involved in “performing the cleaning of settlements” in Bucha (Davis, 2024, p.168). Vladimir Solovyov openly identified himself as a terrorist, as he described his ideas about destroying Ukrainian cities along with civilians, as needed. Vladimir Solovyov has been twice decorated by Putin for his service to the Kremlin (p.255, 309).
Russian state TV hosts and pundits routinely refer to Ukraine as “the territory formerly known as Ukraine” and matter-of-factly discuss how many millions of Ukrainians might have to die for Russia to complete its so-called “denazification.” Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrey Kartapolov expounded, “For us, the special military operation is just the first act, an introduction” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.188). Unironically, Sergey Mikheyev asserted that, “the Ukrainian question” must be dealt with once and for all.” Satanovsky replied, “Those who are with us will be fine, and the rest we will kill.” In October 2022, RT’s director of broadcasting, Anton Krasovsky, suggested drowning Ukrainian children, setting Ukrainian homes on fire—with the inhabitants inside—and alleged that Ukrainian grandmothers would gladly pay to be raped by Russian soldiers. He insisted that Ukraine should end in its current form, with its only surviving silver zoned for pig rearing (Davis, p.185, 247, 292).
These incidents are neither isolated, collateral damage, nor are they discouraged. Several awards were presented to the Airborne Forces (VDV) of the Russian Federation in the Kyiv region. According to state TV outlet Zvezda, the unit had been involved in “performing the cleaning of settlements” in Bucha (Davis, 2024, p.168). Vladimir Solovyov openly identified himself as a terrorist, as he described his ideas about destroying Ukrainian cities along with civilians, as needed. Vladimir Solovyov has been twice decorated by Putin for his service to the Kremlin (p.255, 309).
Russian state TV hosts and pundits routinely refer to Ukraine as “the territory formerly known as Ukraine” and matter-of-factly discuss how many millions of Ukrainians might have to die for Russia to complete its so-called “denazification.” Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrey Kartapolov expounded, “For us, the special military operation is just the first act, an introduction” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.188). Unironically, Sergey Mikheyev asserted that, “the Ukrainian question” must be dealt with once and for all.” Satanovsky replied, “Those who are with us will be fine, and the rest we will kill.” In October 2022, RT’s director of broadcasting, Anton Krasovsky, suggested drowning Ukrainian children, setting Ukrainian homes on fire—with the inhabitants inside—and alleged that Ukrainian grandmothers would gladly pay to be raped by Russian soldiers. He insisted that Ukraine should end in its current form, with its only surviving silver zoned for pig rearing (Davis, p.185, 247, 292).
In October 2022, Pavel Gubarev, a Russian political figure who proclaimed himself the “People’s Governor” of the Donetsk Region in 2014 and later as leader of the Donbas People’s Militia, explained that Ukrainians were, “Russian people, possessed by the devil,” and that Russia’s aim was to “convince them” that they are not Ukrainian. He added, “But if you don’t want us to change your minds, then we will kill you. We will kill as many of you as we have to. We will kill 1 million or 5 million, we can exterminate all of you.” In May 2022, State Duma deputy Aleksey Zhuravlyov appeared to calculate the number of Ukrainians to be reeducated by “re-installing their brains,” as opposed to the millions who would refuse to abandon their Ukrainian identity and who must therefore be killed. “A maximum of 5% are incurable. Simply put, 2 million people….These 2 million people should have left Ukraine, or must be denazified, which means to be destroyed” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.293).
The widespread consensus in the state-controlled media seems to be that so-called “denazification” means mass murder. Russian state media calls for genocide while some pundits in the west, calling for an end to aid for Ukraine, are seemingly oblivious.
The widespread consensus in the state-controlled media seems to be that so-called “denazification” means mass murder. Russian state media calls for genocide while some pundits in the west, calling for an end to aid for Ukraine, are seemingly oblivious.
4) Negotiations Will Fail
If a nation has fallen to fascist revanchism, has no regard for human life, and is committed to genocide; history shows such nations will only exploit our avoidance of conflict to pursue more conflict. Negotiations have only served Russia’s propaganda of innocence and every prior treaty involving Ukraine has already been broken by Moscow.
On the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Kremlin mouthpieces openly admitted—on state TV and in parliament—that Putin had deliberately made impossible demands in talks with the West. NATO’s refusal to bar future members was then used as a pretext to launch a broader invasion of Ukraine. Russian military expert and TV segment guest Igor Korotchenko asked, “Why did we need these talks? I believe, for only one reason: legitimizing Russia’s further military and military-technical activities….we knew in advance how these talks would end.” Host Olga Skabeeva responded that talks about NATO were “merely a formality, just to show we tried everything. We’re talking to them so brashly, it’s clear that we’ve already decided what to do and how to behave” (Davis, 2024, p.139, 141). For negotiations both before and after the invasion, the proposals for peace were never meant to be accepted. In August 2022, Solovyov made the conditions for the war ending very clear. He said, “The nation of Ukraine should completely disappear.” Korotchenko conceded that Russia wants to erase Ukraine off the map, because “it never really existed in the first place” (cited p.217). This is who Ukraine is negotiating with.
If a nation has fallen to fascist revanchism, has no regard for human life, and is committed to genocide; history shows such nations will only exploit our avoidance of conflict to pursue more conflict. Negotiations have only served Russia’s propaganda of innocence and every prior treaty involving Ukraine has already been broken by Moscow.
On the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Kremlin mouthpieces openly admitted—on state TV and in parliament—that Putin had deliberately made impossible demands in talks with the West. NATO’s refusal to bar future members was then used as a pretext to launch a broader invasion of Ukraine. Russian military expert and TV segment guest Igor Korotchenko asked, “Why did we need these talks? I believe, for only one reason: legitimizing Russia’s further military and military-technical activities….we knew in advance how these talks would end.” Host Olga Skabeeva responded that talks about NATO were “merely a formality, just to show we tried everything. We’re talking to them so brashly, it’s clear that we’ve already decided what to do and how to behave” (Davis, 2024, p.139, 141). For negotiations both before and after the invasion, the proposals for peace were never meant to be accepted. In August 2022, Solovyov made the conditions for the war ending very clear. He said, “The nation of Ukraine should completely disappear.” Korotchenko conceded that Russia wants to erase Ukraine off the map, because “it never really existed in the first place” (cited p.217). This is who Ukraine is negotiating with.
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Today, Putin again is deliberately setting unrealistic conditions for ending the war. While Ukraine has agreed to several unconditional ceasefire proposals, the Kremlin has flatly refused. Moscow has made it clear in various ways that it does not want to stop the war. There is nothing Trump can offer Russia to make the killings stop because Russia wants to and plans to kill more people. State pundits are enraged at the very idea of negotiating with Ukraine. On the Russian TV show “The Right to Know”, featured host Dmitry Klikov admitted Russia cannot be trusted to honor any treaties, “I can’t seriously say that we make any deals with anyone.”
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In May 2025, Solovyov insisted that Russia is not interested in a ceasefire and does not want to stop the war. “You want a ceasefire—and I want your death!” (RMM, 2025). So far Russia has violated its own proposed ceasefires and even Putin has failed to attend his own peace summits.
Meanwhile, attacks on civilian targets have only increased during negotiations (Evans et al., 2025). 100% of the targets on the night of April 22, 2025 were civilians. Even on Palm Sunday civilians were bombed during church services in Sumy. The rescue area was then double-tapped with cluster munitions (Davlikanova, 2025). For over a year, drones patrolling the skies over Kherson have been performing human safaree campaigns targeting ordinary civilians in their cars, on buses, and walking in the park. Remarkably, the drone footage of these war crimes is then uploaded on telegram channels for the entire world to witness (UN, 2025).
Meanwhile, attacks on civilian targets have only increased during negotiations (Evans et al., 2025). 100% of the targets on the night of April 22, 2025 were civilians. Even on Palm Sunday civilians were bombed during church services in Sumy. The rescue area was then double-tapped with cluster munitions (Davlikanova, 2025). For over a year, drones patrolling the skies over Kherson have been performing human safaree campaigns targeting ordinary civilians in their cars, on buses, and walking in the park. Remarkably, the drone footage of these war crimes is then uploaded on telegram channels for the entire world to witness (UN, 2025).
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Putin will continue the war because he believes American support will eventually wither and he can slowly take whatever he wants. The current American administration believes that by refusing to call Putin a war criminal and dangling trade deals to entice Putin to agree to a ceasefire will somehow restore some form of cooperation. This will not happen because it does not address the root cause of this war—Russia’s fascism.
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Western Accomplices
Putin befriended and supported European politicians on the Right who were willing to defend Russian interests, while journalists on the Left were duped by Russia’s ‘Ukrainian Nazis’ narrative.
One such far Right politician was Maria Le Pen, leader of France’s Front National party. In 2014, Le Pen endorsed the results of Crimea's sham election. She was happy to agree that Russians were the victims of a “new cold war that the EU is carrying out against Russia.” Her advisor, Aymeric Chauprade, promised his Russian audience that her party would destroy the European Union if it came to power (Polyakova et al., 2016).
Many of Russia’s western allies were fascists. American white supremacists Richard Spencer, Matthew Heimbach, and David Duke celebrated Putin and defended his war, and Russia repaid them by using an approximation of the Confederate battle flag as the emblem of its occupied territories in southeastern Ukraine (Michel, 2016). The Polish fascist Konrad Rekas endorsed Putin’s Eurasia concept and his invasion of Ukraine. Together, they all tried to spread the Russian propaganda line that Ukraine was dominated by Jews (Snyder, 2018, p.148). RT interviewed leading white supremacist, Richard Spencer, who was married to Nina Kouprianova, Dugin’s translator. Spencer admired Putin and believed that Russia was “the sole white power in the world” (Michel, 2016). An interesting statement since Russia is a multiethnic empire that includes Muslim Circassians and asiatic Buryats.
One center Left politician was Gerhard Schroder, the retired German chancellor, who was in the employ of the Russian gas company Gazprom. A second was Milos Zeman, elected president of Czechia in 2013 after a campaign partly financed by the Russian oil company Lukoil (Snyder, 2018, p.100). Like Trump, all the above believed they could placate Russia’s aggressive posture with trade deals and economic incentives—leaving Ukraine vulnerable to Russian aggression.
Putin befriended and supported European politicians on the Right who were willing to defend Russian interests, while journalists on the Left were duped by Russia’s ‘Ukrainian Nazis’ narrative.
One such far Right politician was Maria Le Pen, leader of France’s Front National party. In 2014, Le Pen endorsed the results of Crimea's sham election. She was happy to agree that Russians were the victims of a “new cold war that the EU is carrying out against Russia.” Her advisor, Aymeric Chauprade, promised his Russian audience that her party would destroy the European Union if it came to power (Polyakova et al., 2016).
Many of Russia’s western allies were fascists. American white supremacists Richard Spencer, Matthew Heimbach, and David Duke celebrated Putin and defended his war, and Russia repaid them by using an approximation of the Confederate battle flag as the emblem of its occupied territories in southeastern Ukraine (Michel, 2016). The Polish fascist Konrad Rekas endorsed Putin’s Eurasia concept and his invasion of Ukraine. Together, they all tried to spread the Russian propaganda line that Ukraine was dominated by Jews (Snyder, 2018, p.148). RT interviewed leading white supremacist, Richard Spencer, who was married to Nina Kouprianova, Dugin’s translator. Spencer admired Putin and believed that Russia was “the sole white power in the world” (Michel, 2016). An interesting statement since Russia is a multiethnic empire that includes Muslim Circassians and asiatic Buryats.
One center Left politician was Gerhard Schroder, the retired German chancellor, who was in the employ of the Russian gas company Gazprom. A second was Milos Zeman, elected president of Czechia in 2013 after a campaign partly financed by the Russian oil company Lukoil (Snyder, 2018, p.100). Like Trump, all the above believed they could placate Russia’s aggressive posture with trade deals and economic incentives—leaving Ukraine vulnerable to Russian aggression.
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Left leaning journalists such as John Pilger, wrote in The Guardian in May 2014 that Putin “was the only leader to condemn the rise of fascism” (Pilger, 2014). Just a few days earlier, neo-Nazis had marched on the streets of Moscow without meeting condemnation from their president. One Russian anchor had claimed Jews had brought the Holocaust on themselves while Putin himself made media appearances with Prokhanov (Times of Israel, 2014). These people were not condemned by either Pilger or other journalists that repeated the false schizofascist narratives about Ukraine.
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Since 2014, little has been learned in western media. The collective West had found itself politically divided over how to respond to the first illegal annexation of sovereign territory in Europe by a fascist aggressor since the Second World War. Now after several years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, most Americans still have no clue who Ivan Ilyin is or, in a sense, Vladimir Putin.
Conclusion
Our media and journalists should say it: Russia is a fascist state. Russia is a terrorist state. By not doing so, we leave ourselves vulnerable to the Munich trap. A major world power has once again brought war to Europe. This regime openly declares its ambitions and draws inspiration from Ivan Ilyin, a Russian fascist who lived in exile in Nazi Germany. Yet again, Western leaders delude themselves into thinking they can do business and contain aggression. And once again, European nations share misplaced trust in an aggressor’s assurances. If Russia could so brazenly invade Ukraine after denying any such intent, then its promises not to target the rest of a divided and hesitant Europe are dangerously reckless.
Western calls for diplomacy have so far only emboldened Russia, which sees this as signs of weakness. Despite clear warnings from the Kremlin, the West has failed to recognize that Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond the territories already seized. His ultimate aim is to dismantle the post–World War II rules-based order and rebuild the Soviet Union under fascism. Whether through Western concessions or military escalation, the goal remains the same: the full subjugation of Ukraine and its resources that will sustain Moscow’s future aggression from sanctions.
Appealing to the Kremlin’s morality is an exercise in gross imbecility. Western talk of abandoning Ukraine or forcing a peace deal only encourages Moscow to escalate—militarily or otherwise. Appeasement is the gravest of mistakes when negotiating with a fascist. Any concession will invite further demands. Putin has deliberately set unacceptable terms, such as Ukraine’s disarmament and recognition of occupied territories—knowing they will be rejected. Four years on, Putin shows no interest in compromise.
War and genocide is the inevitable result of appeasing fascism. Both Zelenskyy and Trump were elected in part on the promise to end the war. Like Zelenskyy, Trump will soon find that Putin has no interest in compromise. That Putin’s fascist ideology, derived from Ivan Ilyin, is incompatible with peace. There is no diplomatic solution to this war, only a military one that requires Cold War brinkmanship to force a settlement. The time to fully arm Ukraine and completely sanction Russia was yesterday. As historian Timothy Snyder (2022) warns, “If Ukraine does not win, we can expect decades of darkness.”
Our media and journalists should say it: Russia is a fascist state. Russia is a terrorist state. By not doing so, we leave ourselves vulnerable to the Munich trap. A major world power has once again brought war to Europe. This regime openly declares its ambitions and draws inspiration from Ivan Ilyin, a Russian fascist who lived in exile in Nazi Germany. Yet again, Western leaders delude themselves into thinking they can do business and contain aggression. And once again, European nations share misplaced trust in an aggressor’s assurances. If Russia could so brazenly invade Ukraine after denying any such intent, then its promises not to target the rest of a divided and hesitant Europe are dangerously reckless.
Western calls for diplomacy have so far only emboldened Russia, which sees this as signs of weakness. Despite clear warnings from the Kremlin, the West has failed to recognize that Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond the territories already seized. His ultimate aim is to dismantle the post–World War II rules-based order and rebuild the Soviet Union under fascism. Whether through Western concessions or military escalation, the goal remains the same: the full subjugation of Ukraine and its resources that will sustain Moscow’s future aggression from sanctions.
Appealing to the Kremlin’s morality is an exercise in gross imbecility. Western talk of abandoning Ukraine or forcing a peace deal only encourages Moscow to escalate—militarily or otherwise. Appeasement is the gravest of mistakes when negotiating with a fascist. Any concession will invite further demands. Putin has deliberately set unacceptable terms, such as Ukraine’s disarmament and recognition of occupied territories—knowing they will be rejected. Four years on, Putin shows no interest in compromise.
War and genocide is the inevitable result of appeasing fascism. Both Zelenskyy and Trump were elected in part on the promise to end the war. Like Zelenskyy, Trump will soon find that Putin has no interest in compromise. That Putin’s fascist ideology, derived from Ivan Ilyin, is incompatible with peace. There is no diplomatic solution to this war, only a military one that requires Cold War brinkmanship to force a settlement. The time to fully arm Ukraine and completely sanction Russia was yesterday. As historian Timothy Snyder (2022) warns, “If Ukraine does not win, we can expect decades of darkness.”
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