Gaslighting Ukraine Part XI: How Russian Disinformation Works
|
By Timothy Holtgrefe
March 2026 For several years prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin had devoted much of his time and effort to promoting false narratives and a revisionist history of Ukraine as early as 2005. However, the rhetorical gaslighting and denial of Ukraine’s rich cultural heritage is actually nothing new. In fact for Russian autocrats it is an historical continuity going back several hundred years in an effort to subjugate a race of people.
|
|
What is surprising is not that the Russian Empire ‘russified’ their ethnic minorities, as all colonizers have performed similar practices, but that so many of these false narratives continue to persist into today’s political discourse regarding the current war in Ukraine; even in the West. This is part 11 of an HQ exclusive series to investigate Russia’s relentless attack on history. In this episode, we will explore how Russia’s disinformation is a purposeful form of hybrid warfare against the West to undermine aid to Ukraine.
Russia’s Asymmetrical War Against the West
As discussed in Part 10, the Kremlin has been radicalized by the fascist writings of Ivan Ilyin. Russia’s state television introduces Ilyin’s themes to millions of Russians in pure Orwellian form: An eternal war between Russian innocence and Western decadence. Such themes take for granted Soviet victory in the Second World War made Russians innocent of all wrongdoing for all time (See Part 5), the myth that Kyiv was the site of Russia’s virgin birth (See Part 1), Ukrainian society and Ukrainian history are dismissed or suppressed (See Part 2 & Part 3), suppression and denial of crimes against humanity (See Part 4), all Ukrainian nationals are Nazis (See Part 6), Crimea is historically Russian (See Part 7), NATO provoked Putin into invading Ukraine (See Part 8), Ukrainian protestors attacked helpless riot police in Kyiv’s Maidan which became a Western-backed coup (See Part 9), Russia was Rus, history never was, and invasion is self-defense.
This is how wars of conquest and mass murder have returned to Ukraine in the 21st century. Prior to targeting civilian infrastructure, destroying Ukrainian identity and culture, and intentionally killing, torturing, and raping civilians; the Kremlin first targeted the minds of the world to be bystanders while this all happens. Tens of thousands of children have been forcibly relocated into Russian occupied territories for reeducation and taught to be Russians. Russian propaganda and state officials openly talk about destroying Ukraine and Ukrainians, killing millions, drowning and burning children; all while Putin is restoring Stalin’s image with new statues of the totalitarian dictator throughout Russia (Part 10). However, these basic facts have a competing narrative in our information space. To the dismay of Ukrainians, few in the West seem to openly acknowledge what is occurring and many still believe this war has something to do with Russian security.
Why is Russia’s asymmetrical warfare so effective? How can they influence a foreign society’s understanding about a war? How does it work? And how do we know it is happening? As previous articles in this series have already addressed the falsehood of Moscow’s most prevalent claims, this study will concentrate on the ways and means these lies skillfully influence Western audiences and why they continue circulating in western political discourse. To do this we will first define what disinformation is and looks like in a broader context of a 21st century hybrid war.
As discussed in Part 10, the Kremlin has been radicalized by the fascist writings of Ivan Ilyin. Russia’s state television introduces Ilyin’s themes to millions of Russians in pure Orwellian form: An eternal war between Russian innocence and Western decadence. Such themes take for granted Soviet victory in the Second World War made Russians innocent of all wrongdoing for all time (See Part 5), the myth that Kyiv was the site of Russia’s virgin birth (See Part 1), Ukrainian society and Ukrainian history are dismissed or suppressed (See Part 2 & Part 3), suppression and denial of crimes against humanity (See Part 4), all Ukrainian nationals are Nazis (See Part 6), Crimea is historically Russian (See Part 7), NATO provoked Putin into invading Ukraine (See Part 8), Ukrainian protestors attacked helpless riot police in Kyiv’s Maidan which became a Western-backed coup (See Part 9), Russia was Rus, history never was, and invasion is self-defense.
This is how wars of conquest and mass murder have returned to Ukraine in the 21st century. Prior to targeting civilian infrastructure, destroying Ukrainian identity and culture, and intentionally killing, torturing, and raping civilians; the Kremlin first targeted the minds of the world to be bystanders while this all happens. Tens of thousands of children have been forcibly relocated into Russian occupied territories for reeducation and taught to be Russians. Russian propaganda and state officials openly talk about destroying Ukraine and Ukrainians, killing millions, drowning and burning children; all while Putin is restoring Stalin’s image with new statues of the totalitarian dictator throughout Russia (Part 10). However, these basic facts have a competing narrative in our information space. To the dismay of Ukrainians, few in the West seem to openly acknowledge what is occurring and many still believe this war has something to do with Russian security.
Why is Russia’s asymmetrical warfare so effective? How can they influence a foreign society’s understanding about a war? How does it work? And how do we know it is happening? As previous articles in this series have already addressed the falsehood of Moscow’s most prevalent claims, this study will concentrate on the ways and means these lies skillfully influence Western audiences and why they continue circulating in western political discourse. To do this we will first define what disinformation is and looks like in a broader context of a 21st century hybrid war.
What is Disinformation?
When it comes to asymmetrical warfare, the goal of disinformation is to create confusion, complacency, and overall weaken a society’s resolve to continue in a war of attrition. Russian disinformation has a flood of mutually contradictory excuses why you should not support any form of aid to Ukraine during its attritional war with Russia: that Ukraine is Nazi-controlled, part of a Jewish conspiracy, persecuting minorities, merely a Western puppet, historically Russian territory, or not a real country at all. They would also have you believe the war is a NATO provocation, a mere civil conflict, a border dispute, or a Western proxy war. Still more allege bioweapons labs are a conspiracy against Russians, the Bucha atrocities were staged, Zelenskyy is a dictator who is persecuting Christians, he had an American journalist murdered, all Ukrainian aid is a money-laundering scheme, it will make the US bankrupt, supporting Ukraine makes you a warmonger, and halting aid to Ukraine will end the war saving lives.
When it comes to asymmetrical warfare, the goal of disinformation is to create confusion, complacency, and overall weaken a society’s resolve to continue in a war of attrition. Russian disinformation has a flood of mutually contradictory excuses why you should not support any form of aid to Ukraine during its attritional war with Russia: that Ukraine is Nazi-controlled, part of a Jewish conspiracy, persecuting minorities, merely a Western puppet, historically Russian territory, or not a real country at all. They would also have you believe the war is a NATO provocation, a mere civil conflict, a border dispute, or a Western proxy war. Still more allege bioweapons labs are a conspiracy against Russians, the Bucha atrocities were staged, Zelenskyy is a dictator who is persecuting Christians, he had an American journalist murdered, all Ukrainian aid is a money-laundering scheme, it will make the US bankrupt, supporting Ukraine makes you a warmonger, and halting aid to Ukraine will end the war saving lives.
|
The point is not coherence. The point is volume. The sheer number of claims makes comprehensive rebuttal nearly impossible—overwhelming fact-checkers and muddying the informational space. Contradictions do not matter because different audiences receive different messages. Algorithms ensure that individuals are targeted according to their predispositions: left-leaning audiences may see stories about fascism or minority oppression; right-leaning audiences may encounter narratives about religious persecution, corruption, or global conspiracies.
|
The same state actor can simultaneously brand Ukrainians as Nazis, Jews, and “gay” confident that segmented audiences will not see the implausibility.
Unlike traditional propaganda, which seeks belief, disinformation seeks cynicism. It aims to persuade citizens that everyone lies, that truth is unknowable, and that moral distinctions are naive. Once public discourse is saturated with doubt, even well-informed consumers default to “both-sides” reasoning, assuming the truth lies somewhere in the middle. That erosion of certainty weakens democratic will.
Public opinion data suggests this effect. In February 2022, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion, only a small minority of Americans believed U.S. support for Ukraine was excessive; by early 2025, that share had risen dramatically (Enten, 2025). Even without battlefield victories, sustained informational pressure can shift perceptions over time—demonstrating how disinformation functions as a strategic weapon in modern conflict.
This is how genocide happens in a modern era that swore never again. This is how a united West that once risked World War III to protect half a city (West Berlin) from tyranny now hesitates to defend the independence of a European state roughly the size of Texas.
To navigate this new threat, we will identify patterns of the Kremlin’s asymmetrical means to influence western public opinion. If everything can be doubted, then absurdity can be possible.
Case Study: Malaysia Airlines Flight 17
On July 17, 2014, a Boeing airliner flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down by a Russian surface-to-air missile, killing all 298 civilians on board. The perpetrators had mistaken the aircraft for another target (Weiss & Miller, 2015). In the aftermath, Igor Girkin, an FSB-linked militant commander in the Donbas, boasted that his forces had shot down another plane over “our sky,” a claim echoed by others such as Alexander Khodakovskii who later confirmed that a Russian Buk missile system had been operating in the area. The launcher was soon withdrawn to Russia and photographed en route with an empty silo (Bellingcat, 2017). The sequence of events was clear. Even Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations cited “confusion” to explain the downing of the civilian airliner, as the head of Russia’s media apparatus, Vladislav Surkov, moved swiftly to reassert a narrative of Russian innocence—demonstrating a stunning example of how a Russian disinformation campaign works (Snyder, 2018, p.180-1).
Unlike traditional propaganda, which seeks belief, disinformation seeks cynicism. It aims to persuade citizens that everyone lies, that truth is unknowable, and that moral distinctions are naive. Once public discourse is saturated with doubt, even well-informed consumers default to “both-sides” reasoning, assuming the truth lies somewhere in the middle. That erosion of certainty weakens democratic will.
Public opinion data suggests this effect. In February 2022, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion, only a small minority of Americans believed U.S. support for Ukraine was excessive; by early 2025, that share had risen dramatically (Enten, 2025). Even without battlefield victories, sustained informational pressure can shift perceptions over time—demonstrating how disinformation functions as a strategic weapon in modern conflict.
This is how genocide happens in a modern era that swore never again. This is how a united West that once risked World War III to protect half a city (West Berlin) from tyranny now hesitates to defend the independence of a European state roughly the size of Texas.
To navigate this new threat, we will identify patterns of the Kremlin’s asymmetrical means to influence western public opinion. If everything can be doubted, then absurdity can be possible.
Case Study: Malaysia Airlines Flight 17
On July 17, 2014, a Boeing airliner flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down by a Russian surface-to-air missile, killing all 298 civilians on board. The perpetrators had mistaken the aircraft for another target (Weiss & Miller, 2015). In the aftermath, Igor Girkin, an FSB-linked militant commander in the Donbas, boasted that his forces had shot down another plane over “our sky,” a claim echoed by others such as Alexander Khodakovskii who later confirmed that a Russian Buk missile system had been operating in the area. The launcher was soon withdrawn to Russia and photographed en route with an empty silo (Bellingcat, 2017). The sequence of events was clear. Even Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations cited “confusion” to explain the downing of the civilian airliner, as the head of Russia’s media apparatus, Vladislav Surkov, moved swiftly to reassert a narrative of Russian innocence—demonstrating a stunning example of how a Russian disinformation campaign works (Snyder, 2018, p.180-1).
|
Rather than deny the obvious, Russian state media flooded the information space with contradictory explanations the following day. On July 18, 2014, Russian television variously blamed MH17 on a “Ukrainian missile,” a “Ukrainian fighter jet,” and manipulated air traffic controllers. The fake reports of Ukrainian fighter jets in the area could not get straight which kind of aircraft they might have been, providing pictures of various jets, and proposing altitudes that were impossible for the aircraft in question. A week later, Russian media accounts spun new versions of a training accident, or even an assassination attempt against Vladimir Putin (RT, 2014). Some claims were so implausible—such as the allegation that the CIA had filled the aircraft with corpses —that they were abandoned abroad but still circulated domestically (Snyder, p. 2018, 180–1).
|
These mutually exclusive narratives could not form a coherent account, yet their purpose was not clarity but confusion. By overwhelming the public with a cacophony of competing fictions, the truth was no longer the headline and was obscured. This is precisely the goal of disinformation.
Such fabrications were elevated to the level of Russian foreign policy. When questioned about MH17, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov echoed media inventions involving air traffic controllers and nearby Ukrainian fighter jets, despite the absence of any supporting evidence (p.181).
Such fabrications were elevated to the level of Russian foreign policy. When questioned about MH17, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov echoed media inventions involving air traffic controllers and nearby Ukrainian fighter jets, despite the absence of any supporting evidence (p.181).
|
Russian media accounts failed not only as journalism but also as narrative. Their claims produced a fictional universe that could not logically exist. The aircraft was said to have been destroyed both by ground fire and by aerial attack; from the air, it was allegedly struck by both a MiG and an Su-25; from the ground, it was alternately the result of a training mishap and an assassination attempt against Putin (p.180–1). Though these falsehoods could not form a coherent explanation, they succeeded in creating public distrust of the official story. No one was required to believe any single version of the Kremlin’s implausible stories, only to doubt the most plausible one.
|
|
The disinformation strategy proved effective. Surveys conducted by Russia’s only credible sociological institute showed that 86% of respondents in September 2014 blamed Ukraine for the downing of MH17, a view still held by 85% in July 2015 (p.182). The public was shielded from confronting responsibility, as media outlets encouraged outrage at any suggestion of Russian culpability. Ignorance was recast as innocence, allowing the war of aggression to continue.
In November 2022, a Dutch court convicted Girkin and two associates of murdering the 298 passengers and crew aboard MH17 (Government of the Netherlands, 2025). Despite the ruling, the Kremlin continues to deny responsibility.
What is Hybrid War?
According to Dr. Ofer Fridman, a senior lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London, hybrid warfare is commonly used to describe the combination of military and non-military means used simultaneously to achieve political objectives—including military force, information operations, cyber activity, diplomacy, economic pressure, and subversion (Fridman, 2019). In Western scholarship, the concept is most closely associated with U.S. military theorist Frank Hoffman, who cites the 2006 Second Lebanon War as “the clearest example of a modern hybrid challenger” (Hoffman, 2007, p.38-9). Although Hezbollah’s conventional military gains were limited, it effectively used guerrilla tactics and information warfare to magnify the political impact of its actions, weakening the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and strengthening its own ideological appeal (Fridman, 2022, p.34-5).
In November 2022, a Dutch court convicted Girkin and two associates of murdering the 298 passengers and crew aboard MH17 (Government of the Netherlands, 2025). Despite the ruling, the Kremlin continues to deny responsibility.
What is Hybrid War?
According to Dr. Ofer Fridman, a senior lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London, hybrid warfare is commonly used to describe the combination of military and non-military means used simultaneously to achieve political objectives—including military force, information operations, cyber activity, diplomacy, economic pressure, and subversion (Fridman, 2019). In Western scholarship, the concept is most closely associated with U.S. military theorist Frank Hoffman, who cites the 2006 Second Lebanon War as “the clearest example of a modern hybrid challenger” (Hoffman, 2007, p.38-9). Although Hezbollah’s conventional military gains were limited, it effectively used guerrilla tactics and information warfare to magnify the political impact of its actions, weakening the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and strengthening its own ideological appeal (Fridman, 2022, p.34-5).
|
Hoffman’s concept of hybrid warfare is not entirely new but rather a reframing of longstanding practices in warfare. What distinguishes the contemporary form is the speed and scale with which regular and irregular forces are blended, driven by modern military technology and new communication platforms (Hoffman, 2009).
Traditionally, Americans have placed great confidence in their technological and logistical superiority (Gray, 2001, p.45-7). However, the U.S. military has been slow to incorporate hybrid warfare theory into its doctrinal publications. Notably, the Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2017), contained no entries for either “hybrid warfare” or “hybrid threats” (Fridman, 2022, p.45).
|
As early as 2004, William Lind criticized the U.S. military for failing to adapt to fourth-generation warfare (Lind, 2004, p.12-13). Lind and his colleagues called for a shift from an industrial-age focus on destroying enemy forces to an information-age strategy aimed at influencing the political decision-makers of adversaries (Hammes, 2005, p.197).
This concern was echoed in the inaugural National Defense Strategy of 2005, authored by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, which warned that future conflicts would involve not clearly defined threats but a dangerous blend of cyber operations and other asymmetrical methods.
The Russian Theory of Hybrid Warfare
Russian conceptions of hybrid warfare differ fundamentally from Hoffman’s model, emphasizing abstract struggle across “all spheres of public life—politics, economy, social development, and culture.” Rather than focusing on the integration of regular and irregular forces, “gibridnaya voyna” frames conflict as an effort to erode an adversary’s socio-cultural cohesion while safeguarding one’s own (Fridman, 2018, p.92). Professors Vladimir Lisichkin and Leonid Shelepin explain it as wars waged “by a direct influence on the public consciousness, on the souls of people. The main purpose is to coerce masses to act in a desired direction, even against their own general interests, and in the adversary camp to split people and force them to rise one against another” (cited by Fidman, 2022, p.85).
This approach has deep historical roots. As early as 1899, Lieutenant General Evgeny Martynov argued that effective strategy required identifying and exploiting an enemy’s internal political and social weaknesses by cultivating dissatisfied collaborators within society (Martynov, 1899). Similarly, former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin described Soviet intelligence as dedicated to weakening the West by sowing discord among allies, particularly within NATO, and undermining the United States’ global credibility —preparing the ground for conflict without direct war (CNN, 1998). While such methods are not uniquely Russian, the Kremlin has adapted these long-standing practices to the geopolitical, social, and technological conditions of the twenty-first century.
Disinformation plays a central role in this strategy, enabling Russia to accuse NATO of illegality while deflecting criticism of its own actions. Contemporary Russian information warfare draws on earlier theoretical traditions, including 1) Evgeny Messner’s concept of subversion-war, 2) Aleksandr Dugin’s net-centric warfare, and 3) Igor Panarin’s theories of information conflict.
This concern was echoed in the inaugural National Defense Strategy of 2005, authored by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, which warned that future conflicts would involve not clearly defined threats but a dangerous blend of cyber operations and other asymmetrical methods.
The Russian Theory of Hybrid Warfare
Russian conceptions of hybrid warfare differ fundamentally from Hoffman’s model, emphasizing abstract struggle across “all spheres of public life—politics, economy, social development, and culture.” Rather than focusing on the integration of regular and irregular forces, “gibridnaya voyna” frames conflict as an effort to erode an adversary’s socio-cultural cohesion while safeguarding one’s own (Fridman, 2018, p.92). Professors Vladimir Lisichkin and Leonid Shelepin explain it as wars waged “by a direct influence on the public consciousness, on the souls of people. The main purpose is to coerce masses to act in a desired direction, even against their own general interests, and in the adversary camp to split people and force them to rise one against another” (cited by Fidman, 2022, p.85).
This approach has deep historical roots. As early as 1899, Lieutenant General Evgeny Martynov argued that effective strategy required identifying and exploiting an enemy’s internal political and social weaknesses by cultivating dissatisfied collaborators within society (Martynov, 1899). Similarly, former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin described Soviet intelligence as dedicated to weakening the West by sowing discord among allies, particularly within NATO, and undermining the United States’ global credibility —preparing the ground for conflict without direct war (CNN, 1998). While such methods are not uniquely Russian, the Kremlin has adapted these long-standing practices to the geopolitical, social, and technological conditions of the twenty-first century.
Disinformation plays a central role in this strategy, enabling Russia to accuse NATO of illegality while deflecting criticism of its own actions. Contemporary Russian information warfare draws on earlier theoretical traditions, including 1) Evgeny Messner’s concept of subversion-war, 2) Aleksandr Dugin’s net-centric warfare, and 3) Igor Panarin’s theories of information conflict.
|
1. Evgeny Messner’s Theory of Subversion-War
Evgeny Messner was an Imperial Russian émigré officer whose writings were banned in the Soviet Union because of his strong anti-Communist views. After the Cold War, however, his work gained renewed prominence within Russian military thought. During the Second World War, Messner served in the military propaganda department of the Wehrmacht’s South East Army under Nazi authority. After surviving the war, he continued publishing on political and security issues until his death in 1974 (Fridman, 2022, p. 49 & 52). Effective subversion, Messner argued, required layered narratives tailored to different audiences and sustained support for opposition movements, sabotage, and unrest. |
|
Through media manipulation and the deliberate creation of crises, a state could erode an adversary’s political legitimacy more effectively than through military force alone (p.62–67).
Messner argued that the Soviet Union exploited social and cultural change much like “Japanese jujitsu,” using an opponent’s strength against itself. In his view, terrorists and subversive actors weaponized the openness of free societies, turning democratic freedoms into tools of penetration and self-protection (cited by Fidman, p.56). He maintained that future wars would hinge less on territorial conquest than on weakening an enemy’s political will by shaping the perceptions of its population. As he put it, “from now, it will be the conquest of the souls in the enemy state” (cited by Fridman, p.57–58).
Although Messner remained largely unknown in the Soviet Union, in the post-Soviet era his concept of subversion-war has experienced a notable revival (p.70).
2. Dugin’s Net-Centric War
Alexandr Dugin and Igor Panarin have played a central role in reviving Messner’s ideas in modern Russia. Their theories adapt his concept of subversion-war to the twenty-first century, arguing that political objectives are more effectively achieved by undermining adversaries through the manipulation of political elites and the stimulation of dissent, separatism, and social instability than through conventional warfare (Fridman, 2022, p.75). Dugin argues that control of the informational domain is decisive, rendering military operations secondary and largely supportive in an essentially informational form of warfare (p.78).
Messner argued that the Soviet Union exploited social and cultural change much like “Japanese jujitsu,” using an opponent’s strength against itself. In his view, terrorists and subversive actors weaponized the openness of free societies, turning democratic freedoms into tools of penetration and self-protection (cited by Fidman, p.56). He maintained that future wars would hinge less on territorial conquest than on weakening an enemy’s political will by shaping the perceptions of its population. As he put it, “from now, it will be the conquest of the souls in the enemy state” (cited by Fridman, p.57–58).
Although Messner remained largely unknown in the Soviet Union, in the post-Soviet era his concept of subversion-war has experienced a notable revival (p.70).
2. Dugin’s Net-Centric War
Alexandr Dugin and Igor Panarin have played a central role in reviving Messner’s ideas in modern Russia. Their theories adapt his concept of subversion-war to the twenty-first century, arguing that political objectives are more effectively achieved by undermining adversaries through the manipulation of political elites and the stimulation of dissent, separatism, and social instability than through conventional warfare (Fridman, 2022, p.75). Dugin argues that control of the informational domain is decisive, rendering military operations secondary and largely supportive in an essentially informational form of warfare (p.78).
|
“It is especially important to bring geopolitical turmoil into the US domestic reality by encouraging all kinds of separatism, various ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements of extremist, racist and sectarian groups that destabilize internal political processes in the USA” (Dugin, 1997, p.358).
In what Dugin calls “net-centric warfare,” the objective is not simply to control information but to shape its meaning and effects. As Dugin argues, network strategists can transform even dangerous information by neutralizing or diminishing its impact (Fridman, 2022, p.79). One can see Russia’s response to MH17 or the Russian army’s disastrous retreat from Kyiv in 2022 as examples. He distinguishes several types of networks used for this purpose. The first are “natural networks,” such as ethnic or religious minorities, which on their own lack strategic power but become key targets for foreign actors when influenced through focused investment of resources, attention, and technical expertise. |
|
These are complemented by “artificial networks,” deliberately constructed to reinforce natural ones. Together, they enable the creation of “agents of influence”—political actors who generate or transmit information that strengthens the network, either knowingly or unknowingly. A final mechanism is globalization, which facilitates the expansion and coordination of networks across borders. Dugin contends that dominance in the informational dimension allows for near-total control over participants in actual or potential conflicts, making information the decisive environment of net-centric war (Fridman, p.80–1).
|
|
Domestically, Dugin employed internal propaganda to portray the collapse of the Soviet Union as the result of an American conspiracy that manipulated Soviet political elites. This narrative fostered a sense of wounded national pride while insulating the population from external ideas beyond Kremlin control. Framed as “defensive propaganda,” it recast Vladimir Putin’s consolidation of information control not as authoritarian expansion but as the restoration of Russia’s traditional networks and sovereignty against Western influence (p.83).
Since its introduction in 2007, Dugin’s concept of net-centric warfare has been widely applied to interpret geopolitical developments across the post-Soviet space and beyond (p.84).
Case Study: Net-Centric War in Action
The deliberate stoking of racial and political tensions has long been a Kremlin tactic for fracturing American society. This was the conclusion reflected in the Mueller Report, U.S. intelligence assessments, Senate findings (SSCI, 2017, p.33-4), and even the writings of Dugin himself. Russian operations amplified conspiracy content and divisive rhetoric with the aim of eroding trust in democratic institutions.
Since its introduction in 2007, Dugin’s concept of net-centric warfare has been widely applied to interpret geopolitical developments across the post-Soviet space and beyond (p.84).
Case Study: Net-Centric War in Action
The deliberate stoking of racial and political tensions has long been a Kremlin tactic for fracturing American society. This was the conclusion reflected in the Mueller Report, U.S. intelligence assessments, Senate findings (SSCI, 2017, p.33-4), and even the writings of Dugin himself. Russian operations amplified conspiracy content and divisive rhetoric with the aim of eroding trust in democratic institutions.
|
Consistent with Dugin’s concept of “artificial networks,” Russian operatives created fake social media accounts that boosted real “agents of influence” through coordinated bot activity. In 2014, a Facebook page for a nonexistent group called “Heart of Texas” promoted Texas secession and pro-Russian messaging. The page—written in awkward English—nonetheless gained more followers by 2016 than the official accounts of both major Texas political parties (Michel, 2017).
Its theme aligned neatly with Moscow’s broader policy of supporting separatist movements in the West while suppressing them at home (the South from the U.S., California from the U.S., Scotland from the United Kingdom, Catalonia from Spain, Crimea from Ukraine, the Donbas from Ukraine, every member state from the EU, etc.) (Elentir, 2024). |
Russia employed similar tactics across the political spectrum: sites appealing to families of slain police officers, to African American activists protesting police violence, to armed Black nationalist imagery, and even to white supremacist slogans reposted by fake Black activists (Alba, 2017). During protests over the Dakota Access Pipeline, Russian-linked accounts sought to inflame tensions, sometimes clumsily—such as by promoting Russian vodka alongside activist messaging—yet still managed to attract engagement (Brooks, 2017). The objective was not ideological consistency, but polarization.
On Twitter, a Russian-operated account posing as the Tennessee Republican Party amassed ten times more followers than the real Tennessee Republican Party organization. High-profile figures such as Michael Flynn and Kellyanne Conway retweeted its content. When the account was removed after nearly a year, some followers expressed confusion, failing to recognize that their participation had amplified a foreign influence campaign (Nakashima & Ortutay, 2017).
These efforts were not abstract. A Justice Department indictment unsealed in Tampa charged Russian national Aleksandr Ionov with working on behalf of the Russian government and the FSB to cultivate U.S. based political groups in Florida, Georgia, and California. According to prosecutors, Ionov supported organizations—including one advocating California’s secession—and directed protests tied to narratives about Russia’s war in Ukraine, seeking to weaken American unity and electing candidates pledging to reduce support for Kyiv (U.S. Department of Justice, 2022).
Across these cases, the pattern is consistent: Russia does not invent American divisions, but identifies and amplifies them—transforming existing grievances into instruments of strategic disruption.
The True ‘Russia, Russia, Russia’
A hallmark of Alexander Dugin’s concept of net-centric warfare is the fusion of covert cyber operations with overt state messaging—combining intelligence services, government agencies, state-funded media, intermediaries, and paid “trolls” to influence Western politics (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017). The strategy is not ideological consistency but systemic disruption.
During the 2016 Democratic primaries, automated bots amplified support for both Bernie Sanders and Tulsi Gabbard—candidates on opposing ends of the spectrum —while Russian commentators claimed Sanders’s nomination was being “stolen” and dismissed rival candidates as “puppets” (Davis, 2024, p.31). The objective was to erode trust in the electoral process itself. The same ecosystem later magnified right-wing claims of widespread fraud in the 2020 election, including baseless allegations of millions of illegal or deceased voters. As one Russian lawmaker bragged, “That’s how you delegitimize a nation” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.59–60).
On Twitter, a Russian-operated account posing as the Tennessee Republican Party amassed ten times more followers than the real Tennessee Republican Party organization. High-profile figures such as Michael Flynn and Kellyanne Conway retweeted its content. When the account was removed after nearly a year, some followers expressed confusion, failing to recognize that their participation had amplified a foreign influence campaign (Nakashima & Ortutay, 2017).
These efforts were not abstract. A Justice Department indictment unsealed in Tampa charged Russian national Aleksandr Ionov with working on behalf of the Russian government and the FSB to cultivate U.S. based political groups in Florida, Georgia, and California. According to prosecutors, Ionov supported organizations—including one advocating California’s secession—and directed protests tied to narratives about Russia’s war in Ukraine, seeking to weaken American unity and electing candidates pledging to reduce support for Kyiv (U.S. Department of Justice, 2022).
Across these cases, the pattern is consistent: Russia does not invent American divisions, but identifies and amplifies them—transforming existing grievances into instruments of strategic disruption.
The True ‘Russia, Russia, Russia’
A hallmark of Alexander Dugin’s concept of net-centric warfare is the fusion of covert cyber operations with overt state messaging—combining intelligence services, government agencies, state-funded media, intermediaries, and paid “trolls” to influence Western politics (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017). The strategy is not ideological consistency but systemic disruption.
During the 2016 Democratic primaries, automated bots amplified support for both Bernie Sanders and Tulsi Gabbard—candidates on opposing ends of the spectrum —while Russian commentators claimed Sanders’s nomination was being “stolen” and dismissed rival candidates as “puppets” (Davis, 2024, p.31). The objective was to erode trust in the electoral process itself. The same ecosystem later magnified right-wing claims of widespread fraud in the 2020 election, including baseless allegations of millions of illegal or deceased voters. As one Russian lawmaker bragged, “That’s how you delegitimize a nation” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.59–60).
Undermining confidence in democratic elections—the symbolic core of Western governance—has been a recurring goal.
As Russian media analyst Julia Davis (2024) notes, “Americans should be well aware that by spreading divisive rhetoric, exacerbating internal divisions, and disseminating conspiracy theories they are helping Russia and not their chosen candidate” (p.36). The Kremlin’s approach is opportunistic: it amplifies whatever narratives inflame polarization.
Russian state media figures have been unusually candid about these aims. Margarita Simonyan acknowledged that even when RT is restricted, operations continue covertly under alternative branding and personnel (Davis, 2024, p.208–9). Commentators on Russian television have openly discussed exploiting social divisions, diaspora communities, and Spanish-language media to deepen polarization in the United States. Some have even expressed hope for civil war in the US (Davis, p.172-3).
To domestic audiences, these discussions are not hidden. Russian television frequently frames information warfare as a strategic campaign to weaken adversaries from within. The message is explicit: when direct confrontation is costly, amplifying division abroad can achieve similar ends.
Russian Disinformation and Bots
During the Scotland independence vote of 2014, videos appeared on the internet meant to cast doubt on the validity of the vote. One of them showed actual vote rigging in Russia, presented as Scotland. These videos were then promoted over Twitter by accounts based in Russia. Although no actual irregularities were reported, roughly a third of Scottish voters gained the impression that something fraudulent had taken place (Carrell, 2017). RT published several opinion pieces on its website claiming that the British electoral system was rigged (Clark, 2015). It was a victory for Russia if the inhabitants of the United Kingdom came to distrust their own elections.
During the 2016 Brexit vote, all major Russian television channels, including RT, supported a vote to leave the EU (RT, 2016). Russian Twitter bots, computer programs that sent out millions of targeted messages, engaged massively on behalf of the Leave campaign. Four hundred and nineteen Twitter accounts that posted on Brexit were localized to Russia’s Internet Research Agency. About a third of the discussion of Brexit on Twitter was generated by bots—of which over 90% were located outside the United Kingdom. Britons had no idea at the time that they were reading material disseminated by bots, nor that the bots were part of a Russian foreign policy to weaken their country. The vote was 52% for leaving and 48% for staying (Bastos & Merea, 2017).
As Russian media analyst Julia Davis (2024) notes, “Americans should be well aware that by spreading divisive rhetoric, exacerbating internal divisions, and disseminating conspiracy theories they are helping Russia and not their chosen candidate” (p.36). The Kremlin’s approach is opportunistic: it amplifies whatever narratives inflame polarization.
Russian state media figures have been unusually candid about these aims. Margarita Simonyan acknowledged that even when RT is restricted, operations continue covertly under alternative branding and personnel (Davis, 2024, p.208–9). Commentators on Russian television have openly discussed exploiting social divisions, diaspora communities, and Spanish-language media to deepen polarization in the United States. Some have even expressed hope for civil war in the US (Davis, p.172-3).
To domestic audiences, these discussions are not hidden. Russian television frequently frames information warfare as a strategic campaign to weaken adversaries from within. The message is explicit: when direct confrontation is costly, amplifying division abroad can achieve similar ends.
Russian Disinformation and Bots
During the Scotland independence vote of 2014, videos appeared on the internet meant to cast doubt on the validity of the vote. One of them showed actual vote rigging in Russia, presented as Scotland. These videos were then promoted over Twitter by accounts based in Russia. Although no actual irregularities were reported, roughly a third of Scottish voters gained the impression that something fraudulent had taken place (Carrell, 2017). RT published several opinion pieces on its website claiming that the British electoral system was rigged (Clark, 2015). It was a victory for Russia if the inhabitants of the United Kingdom came to distrust their own elections.
During the 2016 Brexit vote, all major Russian television channels, including RT, supported a vote to leave the EU (RT, 2016). Russian Twitter bots, computer programs that sent out millions of targeted messages, engaged massively on behalf of the Leave campaign. Four hundred and nineteen Twitter accounts that posted on Brexit were localized to Russia’s Internet Research Agency. About a third of the discussion of Brexit on Twitter was generated by bots—of which over 90% were located outside the United Kingdom. Britons had no idea at the time that they were reading material disseminated by bots, nor that the bots were part of a Russian foreign policy to weaken their country. The vote was 52% for leaving and 48% for staying (Bastos & Merea, 2017).
|
This time, no Russian voice questioned the result, presumably because the vote went Russia’s way. Brexit was a triumph for Russian foreign policy, and a sign that a cyber campaign directed from Moscow could change reality (Snyder, 2018, p.106).
With the growth of AI technologies, social media bots are only becoming more sophisticated in fooling internet users with fake videos and images. If a citizen has no idea whether the person that they are arguing with is even human, how can reasonable political discourse even take place? |
|
3. Panarin’s Informational Warfare
Nikolaevich Panarin, a full member of the Military Academy of Science of the Russian Federation and a senior political advisor, develops the concept of “information warfare” as the central arena of Russia’s struggle with the West. Unlike Dugin, who emphasizes the broader informational dimension, Panarin defines the conflict as a battle for control over the minds of elites and key social groups (Fridman, 2022, p.84-5).
Nikolaevich Panarin, a full member of the Military Academy of Science of the Russian Federation and a senior political advisor, develops the concept of “information warfare” as the central arena of Russia’s struggle with the West. Unlike Dugin, who emphasizes the broader informational dimension, Panarin defines the conflict as a battle for control over the minds of elites and key social groups (Fridman, 2022, p.84-5).
|
For Panarin, information war consists of influencing an adversary’s informational environment while protecting one’s own in order to achieve specific political objectives. This includes manipulation, disinformation, fabrication, lobbying, and blackmail—any means capable of shaping public opinion for strategic gain. When conducted between states, information warfare seeks to disrupt the balance of power and secure dominance in the global informational sphere by targeting the adversary’s decision-making processes through the manipulation of domestic and international opinion (p.85).
Panarin identifies social objects as the primary targets of such warfare, particularly “medium” groups that transmit informational trends between large institutions and smaller units such as families, businesses, or military formations (p.86). |
Like Dugin, his framework is grounded in opposition to the West. He calls for the creation of a new, ideologically committed Russian elite capable of coordinating state authorities, media, security services, and major corporations to conduct both defensive and offensive informational operations at home and abroad (Fridman, p.88–90).
In this vision, Russia secures its national interests not only by defending its informational space but by shifting the battlefield into the West itself.
Case Study: Information War in Action
The value of influential Western figures echoing Kremlin narratives has been openly acknowledged by Margarita Simonyan, head of RT, who described her network as an “empire of covert projects” shaping public opinion abroad (cited by Davis, 2024, p. 444). In Panarin’s framework of information warfare, media elites are prime targets because they serve as conduits to broader audiences within an adversary’s information space. Few American media figures, Davis (2024) argues, proved more useful to this strategy than Tucker Carlson.
In this vision, Russia secures its national interests not only by defending its informational space but by shifting the battlefield into the West itself.
Case Study: Information War in Action
The value of influential Western figures echoing Kremlin narratives has been openly acknowledged by Margarita Simonyan, head of RT, who described her network as an “empire of covert projects” shaping public opinion abroad (cited by Davis, 2024, p. 444). In Panarin’s framework of information warfare, media elites are prime targets because they serve as conduits to broader audiences within an adversary’s information space. Few American media figures, Davis (2024) argues, proved more useful to this strategy than Tucker Carlson.
|
Russian propagandists were thrilled by how easy it was to manipulate Carlson. President Putin himself pulled off a targeted propaganda operation against the US that was so simple it never should have worked—and he did it in plain sight as part of the build-up to the summit with Joe Biden. The ploy began when Putin sat down for an interview with NBC’s Keir Simmons. He directed the conversation away from his suspected involvement in the murders of his critics. Instead, he asked, “Did you order the assassination of the woman who walked into Congress and who was shot and killed by a policeman?” (NBC News, 2021). The response had been preplanned. According to Olga Skabeeva, “[Biden] is planning to tell us about Navalny and we will tell him about the woman shot on January 6 at the capitol” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.89). Carlson took the bait and began airing clips of Putin’s comments to NBC on his show and expressed agreement stating, “those are fair questions” (Fox News, 2022).
|
|
Consistent with Panarin’s theory, high-profile commentators such as Carlson function as influential social nodes capable of shaping millions of smaller networks. By feeding tailored narratives for Tucker to pick up and attack Joe Biden—ranging from very real stories of Hunter Biden to conspiracy theories about Ukrainian biolabs—the Kremlin reinforced existing partisan divides and helped shift segments of conservative opinion toward skepticism of U.S. support for Ukraine. The exchange began a long process of aligning Russian state media with Carlson’s rhetoric, long after his departure from Fox News (Davis, 2024, p.95 & 185).
Russian state TV reporter Valentin Bogdanov also noted Tucker Carlson’s contributions to convincing a number of Republicans that the United States should not intervene against Russian aggression on behalf of Ukraine (Davis, p.124). Carlson has at times even suggested the United States should side with Russia in the conflict (Baragona, 2025), while dismissing concerns about political assassinations by falsely asserting that “every leader kills people”---openly endorsing the elimination of inconvenient opposition figures and journalists (Houghtaling, 2024).
Russian state TV reporter Valentin Bogdanov also noted Tucker Carlson’s contributions to convincing a number of Republicans that the United States should not intervene against Russian aggression on behalf of Ukraine (Davis, p.124). Carlson has at times even suggested the United States should side with Russia in the conflict (Baragona, 2025), while dismissing concerns about political assassinations by falsely asserting that “every leader kills people”---openly endorsing the elimination of inconvenient opposition figures and journalists (Houghtaling, 2024).
|
Rejoicing after Congress omitted aid to Ukraine from its most recent government funding bill, Russian experts have long predicted that it’s only a matter of time before U.S. aid to Ukraine is jeopardized by war fatigue and domestic issues. Russia’s gibridnya volnya delivered in spades. To avert a shutdown much-needed funding for Ukraine was excluded from the federal budget. State TV host Olga Skabeeva cheerfully noted, “Only recently, it was impossible to even imagine anything like this!...the United States will certainly stop helping Ukraine!” (cited by Davis, 2024, p.349).
|
State Duma deputy Andrey Isayev concurred, “Just a short while ago, the West seemed to be a consolidated and united front that was fighting against us. This consolidation keeps on fading” (cited by Davis, p.350).
The convergence between Russian messaging and segments of American media illustrates how effective information warfare operates not through overt control, but through targeting specific social groups to amplify existing fractures within American society.
Influencing the Political Left
During Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Moscow sought to cultivate left-wing opinion leaders by tailoring narratives to their specific “susceptibilities”—the beliefs they were already inclined to accept. Ukraine was presented simultaneously as a fascist project for left-leaning audiences and as a corrupt or Jewish construct for others. The strategy was not consistency, but resonance.
The convergence between Russian messaging and segments of American media illustrates how effective information warfare operates not through overt control, but through targeting specific social groups to amplify existing fractures within American society.
Influencing the Political Left
During Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Moscow sought to cultivate left-wing opinion leaders by tailoring narratives to their specific “susceptibilities”—the beliefs they were already inclined to accept. Ukraine was presented simultaneously as a fascist project for left-leaning audiences and as a corrupt or Jewish construct for others. The strategy was not consistency, but resonance.
|
Similar to how Tucker Carlson was targeted, left-wing journalists were drawn in by stories that aligned with their ideological commitments. John Pilger relied on a fabricated online account by a nonexistent “doctor” describing alleged Ukrainian atrocities in Odesa—an event that never occurred. The Guardian later noted only that the source had been removed, but stopped short of a full retraction. Associate editor Seumas Milne similarly claimed in 2014 that far-right nationalists dominated Ukraine’s protests, echoing Russian propaganda rather than his paper’s own reporting (Walker, 2018, p.203-232).
|
|
In the United States, Stephen Cohen repeated a mistranslation originating in Russian media, alleging that Ukraine’s prime minister had referred to opponents as “subhuman” as proposed evidence of his Nazi convictions (Cohen, 2014). In fact, the original Ukrainian term (neliudy) “inhuman,” was used to describe the Russian attackers during his condolences to families of those killed by the invasion. Russian outlets rendered “inhuman” as “subhuman,” and RT broadcast the distortion in English. Although the RT segment was removed in the UK for violating broadcasting standards, the false claim persisted in American discourse (Jackson, 2015).
Once engaged by such narratives, these commentators increasingly framed the conflict in Kremlin-friendly terms. Cohen and The Nation’s publisher Katrina vanden Heuvel described the 2014 invasion as a “civil war” and portrayed Moscow as calling for peace, obscuring Russia’s direct role in directing and staffing separatist entities in Donetsk and Luhansk with Russian citizens (Goodman, 2014). The “prime ministers” of two newly invented “people’s republics” in Ukraine’s southeast were Russian media managers. Similar talking points were echoed by segments of the British Left (Snyder, 2018, p.211–212, 214).
Notably, many of these commentators neither visited Ukraine nor engaged with on-the-ground reporting. By amplifying distant conspiracies—of coups, fascism, and genocide—they helped substitute propaganda for reality, contributing to the broader informational distortion that Russia sought to achieve (Snyder, p.214).
Influencing the Political Right
Despite low church attendance in Russia—only about 6% regularly attend services (Levada Center, 2023)—Kremlin propagandists, many raised in the atheist Soviet system, promote the war against Ukraine and the West as a “holy” struggle (Davis, 2024, p.302). At the same time, the state has rehabilitated Joseph Stalin: of roughly 110 new Stalin monuments erected in Russia, 105 have appeared during Vladimir Putin’s 25-year rule, with construction accelerating after the 2022 invasion (Moscow Times, 2025). While courting Western conservatives in a charm offensive, the contradictions are often stark.
Russia has positioned itself as an “anti-woke” alternative for Western audiences, particularly viewers of Fox News. Unable to compete on gun rights, free speech, or living standards, the Kremlin instead markets political incorrectness, often through fabricated cultural grievances. As usual, this is done by creating false stories that bait them. In one instance, Foreign Secretary Sergei Lavron falsely claimed, “In a number of Western countries, students learn at school that Jesus Christ was bisexual.” There does not seem to be a suggestion—much less any evidence—-of such a curriculum existing or being taught anywhere (cited by Davis, 2024, p.93).
Once engaged by such narratives, these commentators increasingly framed the conflict in Kremlin-friendly terms. Cohen and The Nation’s publisher Katrina vanden Heuvel described the 2014 invasion as a “civil war” and portrayed Moscow as calling for peace, obscuring Russia’s direct role in directing and staffing separatist entities in Donetsk and Luhansk with Russian citizens (Goodman, 2014). The “prime ministers” of two newly invented “people’s republics” in Ukraine’s southeast were Russian media managers. Similar talking points were echoed by segments of the British Left (Snyder, 2018, p.211–212, 214).
Notably, many of these commentators neither visited Ukraine nor engaged with on-the-ground reporting. By amplifying distant conspiracies—of coups, fascism, and genocide—they helped substitute propaganda for reality, contributing to the broader informational distortion that Russia sought to achieve (Snyder, p.214).
Influencing the Political Right
Despite low church attendance in Russia—only about 6% regularly attend services (Levada Center, 2023)—Kremlin propagandists, many raised in the atheist Soviet system, promote the war against Ukraine and the West as a “holy” struggle (Davis, 2024, p.302). At the same time, the state has rehabilitated Joseph Stalin: of roughly 110 new Stalin monuments erected in Russia, 105 have appeared during Vladimir Putin’s 25-year rule, with construction accelerating after the 2022 invasion (Moscow Times, 2025). While courting Western conservatives in a charm offensive, the contradictions are often stark.
Russia has positioned itself as an “anti-woke” alternative for Western audiences, particularly viewers of Fox News. Unable to compete on gun rights, free speech, or living standards, the Kremlin instead markets political incorrectness, often through fabricated cultural grievances. As usual, this is done by creating false stories that bait them. In one instance, Foreign Secretary Sergei Lavron falsely claimed, “In a number of Western countries, students learn at school that Jesus Christ was bisexual.” There does not seem to be a suggestion—much less any evidence—-of such a curriculum existing or being taught anywhere (cited by Davis, 2024, p.93).
|
Russian state media openly discussed efforts to influence Republican voters before the 2022 invasion (Davis, p.441). Russian bots boosted hyperpartisan content for outlets like Breitbart and Next News Network to both agitate and win influence (Soula & Eisentraut, 2017). The strategy followed Dugin’s strategy of building trust within large social groups with the use of ‘artificial networks.’ One such network was “Right to Bear Arms” which was founded by the Russian operative, Alexander Torshin. Although Russians will never have the right to bear arms under Putin's regime, the group successfully engaged with the National Rifle Association’s leadership. In 2015, the NRA had complained that American policy regarding Russia was too weak. Once the NRA began its involvement with Right to Bear Arms, it said the opposite (Helderman & Hamburger, 2017).
|
Right-leaning libertarians were also taking the same line at the time as the Kremlin: Russia had done nothing wrong, and Europeans and Americans were to blame for the Russian invasion. This was because writers they trusted were not analysts of, but rather participants in, the Russian campaign to undermine factuality. Ron Paul, a libertarian who critiques American wars abroad, now defends a Russian war abroad. Although Sergei Glazyev’s fascist politics and neocommunist economics contradicted Paul’s libertarianism, Paul cited Glazyev and endorsed the Eurasia project, echoing that “the US government pulled off a coup” in Ukraine. Like others, he provided no evidence. Instead he cited propaganda from RT (Hall, 2014).
|
As with the political left, right-wing opinion makers were just as ignorant of Ukraine both politically and culturally. Claims that Russia was defending Orthodox Christians ignored that many Ukrainian soldiers were themselves Orthodox and Russian-speaking. In some cases, when captured, the Ukrainian soldiers could recite more prayers than their captives and curiously ask, “So which one of us is Orthodox?” (Shore, 2018, p.233–234). In this sense, Russia achieved a significant informational victory. Enormous amounts of time were wasted in Britain, the United States, and Europe in 2014 and 2015 on discussions about whether Ukraine existed and whether Russia had invaded it (Snyder, 2018, p.194, 214–215).
|
|
The lesson of 2014 was largely unheeded. In the invasion of Ukraine, the main Russian victories were in the minds of Europeans and Americans, not on the battlefields. Naive right-wing influencers spread Russia’s messages, and gullible left-wing journalists helped to bring them to the mainstream.
|
Politicization
Western debate over Russia’s asymmetrical and information warfare quickly became politicized, with competing factions advancing partisan agendas rather than coordinated responses. In Germany, Moscow was accused of trying to weaken Chancellor Merkel’s reelection prospects (Wagstyl, 2017); in the United States, Russia was widely seen as interfering in 2016 to harm Hillary Clinton and assist Donald Trump (Fidman, 2022, p.122). While U.S. intelligence concluded that Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign to undermine confidence in American democracy, the issue itself became a tool of domestic political struggle (p.123). |
At the same time, Russia politicized the concept of “hybrid war” for its own purposes. Russian military thinkers framed the West as Russia’s primary adversary, claiming Moscow was under attack from Western-backed “color revolutions” (Fidman, p.134). This narrative helped justify internal crackdowns, including laws expanding state control over online speech in 2013 and 2014 (BBC News, 2014). By portraying itself as the victim of Western information aggression, the Kremlin rationalized both foreign intervention and domestic repression.
In a hyperpolarized climate, assessments of Russian interference increasingly depended less on evidence than on partisan alignment—facts mattered less than who invoked them.
Western Incompetence
Before 2022, NATO lacked a coherent strategy to deter or counter Russia’s non-military operations, including cyber and information warfare (Fidman, 2022, p.121). During the 2014 Maidan protests, Moscow claimed—without evidence—that the West had already perfected “hybrid war,” even as Russian forces demonstrated a coordinated blend of information, cyber, covert military, and economic pressure tactics in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (Fidman, p.101, 108). The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015) consequently expanded its definition of “hybrid warfare” to reflect this integrated approach.
Early Western assessments underestimated the threat. In January 2014, Heidi Reisinger described Russia as “neither a threat, nor a partner” (cited by Fidman, 2022, p.108). Within months, she concluded that while none of Russia’s tools were new, their orchestration created ambiguity and surprise—complicating consensus-based responses within multinational institutions (Reisinger & Golts, 2014).
This strategic surprise reflected a broader Western decline in Russia expertise. In 2015, the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies warned of sharp reductions in funding, language training, and research fellowships. As understanding diminished, Russia’s leadership deepened its study of Western vulnerabilities. According to Fidman (2022), the Kremlin’s objective has been to erode Western political cohesion from within—amplifying existing social and ideological divisions through modern technology (p.169).
Observers such as Fiona Hill later acknowledged that Russia often signaled its intentions, but Western analysts failed to recognize them (Demirjian, 2015). Contemporary Russian ideology, drawing on figures like Ivan Ilyin and Alexander Dugin, openly frames confrontation with the West in civilizational terms. Yet persistent political disagreement in Western discourse has hindered the development of a unified, apolitical strategy to address Russia’s hybrid warfare (Fidman, 2022, p.153–154).
Conclusion
“Whether or not you are interested in Russia, Russia is interested in you” warns Russian media analyst, Julia Davis (2024). The Kremlin’s objective, as Davis argues, is to weaken the post–World War II rules-based order and replace it with a sphere of influence unconstrained by liberal norms. Achieving that goal requires constant interference—cyber operations, propaganda, and overt political messaging—often obscured through disinformation and whataboutism (p.451).
Ukraine’s prospects depend heavily on sustained Western belief and support. After years of war and immense casualties, Russia controls only about 20% of Ukrainian territory, yet Moscow can still claim momentum if Western unity fractures. Even if Russia struggles militarily, it can prevail politically by eroding American and European resolve. In that sense, the decisive arena is not only the battlefield, but public opinion.
The deeper challenge is strategic. The West must adapt to twenty-first-century non-military confrontation by strengthening its own social, political, and economic cohesion—addressing vulnerabilities rather than merely reacting to hacks, leaks, and troll farms. In 1946, George F. Kennan warned that exhausted and divided societies were susceptible to Soviet propaganda exploiting economic and racial grievances (Truman Library Institute, n.d.). The Cold War response focused less on countering propaganda directly and more on rebuilding prosperity, stability, and confidence. By the mid-1950s, Western Europe’s recovery had blunted Soviet influence (Fidman, 2022, p.170).
Similarly today, Russia exploits polarization. After the Mueller investigation, partisan reflexes often overshadowed sober assessment of interference, with accusations both dismissed as hysteria or weaponized for domestic gain. In a hyperconnected environment, citizens are vulnerable to manipulation that amplifies tribal impulses while obscuring its origins.
Russia’s strategy, as Historian Timothy Snyder notes, rests on “strategic relativism”: if it cannot become stronger internally, it can weaken others by exporting division and doubt (Snyder, 2018, p.249). The central question is not whether the Kremlin’s aims are clear, but whether democratic societies will reinforce their own resilience—preserving the distinction between fact and preference—before internal fragmentation achieves what the Russian military force alone cannot.
In a hyperpolarized climate, assessments of Russian interference increasingly depended less on evidence than on partisan alignment—facts mattered less than who invoked them.
Western Incompetence
Before 2022, NATO lacked a coherent strategy to deter or counter Russia’s non-military operations, including cyber and information warfare (Fidman, 2022, p.121). During the 2014 Maidan protests, Moscow claimed—without evidence—that the West had already perfected “hybrid war,” even as Russian forces demonstrated a coordinated blend of information, cyber, covert military, and economic pressure tactics in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (Fidman, p.101, 108). The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015) consequently expanded its definition of “hybrid warfare” to reflect this integrated approach.
Early Western assessments underestimated the threat. In January 2014, Heidi Reisinger described Russia as “neither a threat, nor a partner” (cited by Fidman, 2022, p.108). Within months, she concluded that while none of Russia’s tools were new, their orchestration created ambiguity and surprise—complicating consensus-based responses within multinational institutions (Reisinger & Golts, 2014).
This strategic surprise reflected a broader Western decline in Russia expertise. In 2015, the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies warned of sharp reductions in funding, language training, and research fellowships. As understanding diminished, Russia’s leadership deepened its study of Western vulnerabilities. According to Fidman (2022), the Kremlin’s objective has been to erode Western political cohesion from within—amplifying existing social and ideological divisions through modern technology (p.169).
Observers such as Fiona Hill later acknowledged that Russia often signaled its intentions, but Western analysts failed to recognize them (Demirjian, 2015). Contemporary Russian ideology, drawing on figures like Ivan Ilyin and Alexander Dugin, openly frames confrontation with the West in civilizational terms. Yet persistent political disagreement in Western discourse has hindered the development of a unified, apolitical strategy to address Russia’s hybrid warfare (Fidman, 2022, p.153–154).
Conclusion
“Whether or not you are interested in Russia, Russia is interested in you” warns Russian media analyst, Julia Davis (2024). The Kremlin’s objective, as Davis argues, is to weaken the post–World War II rules-based order and replace it with a sphere of influence unconstrained by liberal norms. Achieving that goal requires constant interference—cyber operations, propaganda, and overt political messaging—often obscured through disinformation and whataboutism (p.451).
Ukraine’s prospects depend heavily on sustained Western belief and support. After years of war and immense casualties, Russia controls only about 20% of Ukrainian territory, yet Moscow can still claim momentum if Western unity fractures. Even if Russia struggles militarily, it can prevail politically by eroding American and European resolve. In that sense, the decisive arena is not only the battlefield, but public opinion.
The deeper challenge is strategic. The West must adapt to twenty-first-century non-military confrontation by strengthening its own social, political, and economic cohesion—addressing vulnerabilities rather than merely reacting to hacks, leaks, and troll farms. In 1946, George F. Kennan warned that exhausted and divided societies were susceptible to Soviet propaganda exploiting economic and racial grievances (Truman Library Institute, n.d.). The Cold War response focused less on countering propaganda directly and more on rebuilding prosperity, stability, and confidence. By the mid-1950s, Western Europe’s recovery had blunted Soviet influence (Fidman, 2022, p.170).
Similarly today, Russia exploits polarization. After the Mueller investigation, partisan reflexes often overshadowed sober assessment of interference, with accusations both dismissed as hysteria or weaponized for domestic gain. In a hyperconnected environment, citizens are vulnerable to manipulation that amplifies tribal impulses while obscuring its origins.
Russia’s strategy, as Historian Timothy Snyder notes, rests on “strategic relativism”: if it cannot become stronger internally, it can weaken others by exporting division and doubt (Snyder, 2018, p.249). The central question is not whether the Kremlin’s aims are clear, but whether democratic societies will reinforce their own resilience—preserving the distinction between fact and preference—before internal fragmentation achieves what the Russian military force alone cannot.
References
Alba, D. (2017, November 8). A fake website made by Russian trolls is still running and still co‑opting Black organizers’ events. Slate. https://slate.com/technology/2017/11/a-fake-website-made-by-russian-trolls-is-still-running-and-still-co-opting-black-organizers-events.html
Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. (2015, August). Assessment report on Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies. https://aseees.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/FINAL-ASEEES-assessment-report.pdf
Baragona, J. (2025, March 7). Tucker Carlson says he’s “definitely more sympathetic to Putin than Zelensky” because Russia is “thriving.” The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/tucker-carlson-putin-zelensky-b2711134.html
Bastos, M. T., & Mercea, D. (2019). The Brexit Botnet and User-Generated Hyperpartisan News. Social Science Computer Review, 37(1), 38-54.
BBC News. (2014, July 5). Russian MPs back law on internet data storage. BBC.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28173513
Bellingcat. (2017, December 8). Russian colonel general identified as key MH17 figure. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/europe/2017/12/08/russian-colonel-general-delfin/
Brooks, R. C. (2017, November 8). Russian troll efforts extended to Standing Rock social media activism. BuzzFeed News. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryancbrooks/russian-troll-efforts-extended-to-standing-rock
Carrell, S. (2017, December 13). Russian cyber activists tried to discredit Scottish independence vote, says analyst. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/13/russian-cyber-activists-tried-to-discredit-scottish-independence-vote-says-analyst
Clark, N. (2015). UK general election: Establishment wins again? RT. https://www.rt.com/op-ed/257349-uk-general-election-tories/
CNN. (1998, January). Inside the KGB: An interview with retired KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin. In Cold War (CNN documentary series), Episode 21. https://web.archive.org/web/20070627183623/http://www3.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/21/interviews/kalugin/
Cohen, S. F. (2014, July 15). Kiev’s atrocities and the silence of the hawks. The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/kievs-atrocities-and-silence-hawks/
Complex crises call for adaptable and durable capabilities. (2015). The Military Balance, 115(1), 5–8. https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2015.996334
Davis, J. (2024). In Their Own Words: How Russian Propagandists Reveal Putin’s Intentions (Ukrainian Voices, Vol. 54). Ibidem.
Demirjian, K. (2015, December 30). Lack of Russia experts has some in U.S. worried. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/12/30/lack-of-russia-experts-has-the-u-s-playing-catch-up/
Department of Defense (2017, March). Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (Report No. AD1029823). Defense Technical Information Center. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1029823.pdf
Dugin, A. (1997). The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia. Arktogeja. https://www.maieutiek.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Foundations-of-Geopolitics.pdf
Elentir. (2024, June 23). Russia’s support for separatist groups in Western countries and its purpose. Counting Stars. Outono.net. https://www.outono.net/elentir/2024/06/23/russias-support-for-separatist-groups-in-western-countries-and-its-purpose/
Enten, H. (2025, February 17). Harry Enten looks at shifting American support for Ukraine [Video]. CNN. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c5qvMkyoazA
Fidman, O. (2018). Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicization. Oxford University Press.
Fox News. (2022, June 17). Tucker Carlson Tonight [Video]. Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20220617_000000_Tucker_Carlson_Tonight/start/2220/end/2280
Goodman, A. (Host). (2014, July 24). Katrina vanden Heuvel: With 100,000+ displaced, why is Ukraine crisis being ignored? Democracy Now! https://www.democracynow.org/2014/7/24/katrina_vanden_heuvel_with_100_000
Government of the Netherlands. (2025, July 9). European Court of Human Rights: Russia responsible for downing of flight MH17. https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2025/07/09/european-court-of-human-rights-russia-responsible-for-downing-of-flight-mh17
Gray, C. S. (2018). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American way of war adapt? Generic.
Hall, K. G. (2014, July 22). Ron Paul raises eyebrows with Russia sympathy.
The Charlotte Observer. https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article9142664.html
Hammes, T. X. (2005). War evolves into the fourth generation. Contemporary Security Policy, 26(2), 189–221. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260500190500
Helderman, R. S., & Hamburger, T. (2017, April 30). Guns and Religion: How the Republican right found allies in Russia. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-the-republican-right-found-allies-in-russia/2017/04/30/e2d83ff6-29d3-11e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html
Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
Hoffman, F. G. (2009, October 1). Hybrid vs. compound war: The Janus choice—Defining today’s multifaceted conflict. Armed Forces Journal. http://armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/
Houghtaling, E. Q. (2024, February 16). Tucker Carlson days ago on Navalny and assassinations: “Leadership requires killing people.” Rolling Stone. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/tucker-carlson-putin-navalny-assassinations-1234969774/
Jackson, J. (2015, September 21). RT sanctioned by Ofcom over series of misleading and biased articles. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/sep/21/rt-sanctioned-over-series-of-misleading-articles-by-media-watchdog
Levada Center. (2023, May 24). Easter Eggs: Russia remains a country with low levels of religiosity, and Russians’ declarative orthodoxy is primarily associated with festive social rituals. Re:Russia. https://re-russia.net/en/review/278/
Lind, W.S. (2004). Understanding Fourth Generation War. Military Review, 84, 12.
Martynov, E. I. (2021). The responsibilities of politics in its relations with strategy. In O. Fridman (Ed.), Strategiya: The foundations of the Russian art of strategy (pp. 75–106). Oxford University Press. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357944322_The_Responsibilities_of_Politics_in_its_Relations_with_Strategy
Mueller, R. S., III. (2019). Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Special Counsel. https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl?inline=
Nakashima, R., & Ortutay, B. (2017, November 9). AP exclusive: Russia Twitter trolls deflected Trump bad news. KOMO News / Associated Press. https://komonews.com/news/tech/ap-exclusive-russia-twitter-trolls-deflected-trump-bad-news
NBC News. (2021, June 15). Exclusive: Full interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6pJd6O_NT0
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2017, January 6). Assessing Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections (ICA‑2017‑01). U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-ica-2017-01.pdf
Reisinger, H. & Golts, A. (2014, November). Russia’s hybrid warfare: Waging war below the radar of traditional collective defence. NATO Defense College. 105(3). https://www.ndc.nato.int/fr/download/russias-hybrid-warfare-waging-war-below-the-radar-of-traditional-collective-defence/
RT. (2016). Is Parliament preparing to ignore public vote for Brexit? RT UK News. https://www.rt.com/uk/345545-mps-majority--single-market/
Rumsfeld, D. (2005, March). The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Department of Defense. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2005_NDS.pdf?ver=tFA4Qqo94ZB0x_S6uL0QEg%3d%3d
Shore, M. (2017). The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution. Yale University Press.
Snyder, T. (2018). The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America. Crown.
Soula, E., & Eisentraut, S. (2017, September 22). Russia pulling strings on both sides of the Atlantic. The Cipher Brief. https://www.thecipherbrief.com/russia-pulling-strings-on-both-sides-of-the-atlantic
Stanley, J. (2015). How Propaganda Works. Princeton University Press.
Truman Library Institute. (n.d.). George F. Kennan. https://www.trumanlibraryinstitute.org/kennan/
UK Parliament Defence Committee. (2019). Written evidence submitted by Dr. Ofer Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicization (WHA0099). https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/103201/html/
United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (2017). Open hearing on the intelligence community’s assessment of Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections (S. Hrg. 115-298). U.S. Government Publishing Office. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-hearings-chrg-115shrg29830.pdf
U.S. Department of Justice. (2022, July 29). Russian national charged with conspiring to have U.S. citizens act as illegal agents of the Russian government. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-conspiring-have-us-citizens-act-illegal-agents-russian-government
Wagstyl, S. (2017). German politics: Russia’s next target? Officials fear Moscow may interfere in this year’s election to benefit the hard-right. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/31a5758c‑e3d8‑11e6‑9645‑c9357a75844a
Walker, S. (2018). The Long Hangover: Putin’s New Russia and the Ghosts of the Past. Oxford University Press.
Weiss, M., & Miller, J. (2015, July 17). How we know Russia shot down MH17. The Daily Beast. https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-we-know-russia-shot-down-mh17/
Alba, D. (2017, November 8). A fake website made by Russian trolls is still running and still co‑opting Black organizers’ events. Slate. https://slate.com/technology/2017/11/a-fake-website-made-by-russian-trolls-is-still-running-and-still-co-opting-black-organizers-events.html
Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. (2015, August). Assessment report on Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies. https://aseees.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/FINAL-ASEEES-assessment-report.pdf
Baragona, J. (2025, March 7). Tucker Carlson says he’s “definitely more sympathetic to Putin than Zelensky” because Russia is “thriving.” The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/tucker-carlson-putin-zelensky-b2711134.html
Bastos, M. T., & Mercea, D. (2019). The Brexit Botnet and User-Generated Hyperpartisan News. Social Science Computer Review, 37(1), 38-54.
BBC News. (2014, July 5). Russian MPs back law on internet data storage. BBC.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28173513
Bellingcat. (2017, December 8). Russian colonel general identified as key MH17 figure. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/europe/2017/12/08/russian-colonel-general-delfin/
Brooks, R. C. (2017, November 8). Russian troll efforts extended to Standing Rock social media activism. BuzzFeed News. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryancbrooks/russian-troll-efforts-extended-to-standing-rock
Carrell, S. (2017, December 13). Russian cyber activists tried to discredit Scottish independence vote, says analyst. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/13/russian-cyber-activists-tried-to-discredit-scottish-independence-vote-says-analyst
Clark, N. (2015). UK general election: Establishment wins again? RT. https://www.rt.com/op-ed/257349-uk-general-election-tories/
CNN. (1998, January). Inside the KGB: An interview with retired KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin. In Cold War (CNN documentary series), Episode 21. https://web.archive.org/web/20070627183623/http://www3.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/21/interviews/kalugin/
Cohen, S. F. (2014, July 15). Kiev’s atrocities and the silence of the hawks. The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/kievs-atrocities-and-silence-hawks/
Complex crises call for adaptable and durable capabilities. (2015). The Military Balance, 115(1), 5–8. https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2015.996334
Davis, J. (2024). In Their Own Words: How Russian Propagandists Reveal Putin’s Intentions (Ukrainian Voices, Vol. 54). Ibidem.
Demirjian, K. (2015, December 30). Lack of Russia experts has some in U.S. worried. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/12/30/lack-of-russia-experts-has-the-u-s-playing-catch-up/
Department of Defense (2017, March). Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (Report No. AD1029823). Defense Technical Information Center. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1029823.pdf
Dugin, A. (1997). The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia. Arktogeja. https://www.maieutiek.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Foundations-of-Geopolitics.pdf
Elentir. (2024, June 23). Russia’s support for separatist groups in Western countries and its purpose. Counting Stars. Outono.net. https://www.outono.net/elentir/2024/06/23/russias-support-for-separatist-groups-in-western-countries-and-its-purpose/
Enten, H. (2025, February 17). Harry Enten looks at shifting American support for Ukraine [Video]. CNN. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c5qvMkyoazA
Fidman, O. (2018). Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicization. Oxford University Press.
Fox News. (2022, June 17). Tucker Carlson Tonight [Video]. Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20220617_000000_Tucker_Carlson_Tonight/start/2220/end/2280
Goodman, A. (Host). (2014, July 24). Katrina vanden Heuvel: With 100,000+ displaced, why is Ukraine crisis being ignored? Democracy Now! https://www.democracynow.org/2014/7/24/katrina_vanden_heuvel_with_100_000
Government of the Netherlands. (2025, July 9). European Court of Human Rights: Russia responsible for downing of flight MH17. https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2025/07/09/european-court-of-human-rights-russia-responsible-for-downing-of-flight-mh17
Gray, C. S. (2018). Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American way of war adapt? Generic.
Hall, K. G. (2014, July 22). Ron Paul raises eyebrows with Russia sympathy.
The Charlotte Observer. https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article9142664.html
Hammes, T. X. (2005). War evolves into the fourth generation. Contemporary Security Policy, 26(2), 189–221. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260500190500
Helderman, R. S., & Hamburger, T. (2017, April 30). Guns and Religion: How the Republican right found allies in Russia. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-the-republican-right-found-allies-in-russia/2017/04/30/e2d83ff6-29d3-11e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html
Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
Hoffman, F. G. (2009, October 1). Hybrid vs. compound war: The Janus choice—Defining today’s multifaceted conflict. Armed Forces Journal. http://armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/
Houghtaling, E. Q. (2024, February 16). Tucker Carlson days ago on Navalny and assassinations: “Leadership requires killing people.” Rolling Stone. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/tucker-carlson-putin-navalny-assassinations-1234969774/
Jackson, J. (2015, September 21). RT sanctioned by Ofcom over series of misleading and biased articles. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/sep/21/rt-sanctioned-over-series-of-misleading-articles-by-media-watchdog
Levada Center. (2023, May 24). Easter Eggs: Russia remains a country with low levels of religiosity, and Russians’ declarative orthodoxy is primarily associated with festive social rituals. Re:Russia. https://re-russia.net/en/review/278/
Lind, W.S. (2004). Understanding Fourth Generation War. Military Review, 84, 12.
Martynov, E. I. (2021). The responsibilities of politics in its relations with strategy. In O. Fridman (Ed.), Strategiya: The foundations of the Russian art of strategy (pp. 75–106). Oxford University Press. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357944322_The_Responsibilities_of_Politics_in_its_Relations_with_Strategy
Mueller, R. S., III. (2019). Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Special Counsel. https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl?inline=
Nakashima, R., & Ortutay, B. (2017, November 9). AP exclusive: Russia Twitter trolls deflected Trump bad news. KOMO News / Associated Press. https://komonews.com/news/tech/ap-exclusive-russia-twitter-trolls-deflected-trump-bad-news
NBC News. (2021, June 15). Exclusive: Full interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6pJd6O_NT0
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2017, January 6). Assessing Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections (ICA‑2017‑01). U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-ica-2017-01.pdf
Reisinger, H. & Golts, A. (2014, November). Russia’s hybrid warfare: Waging war below the radar of traditional collective defence. NATO Defense College. 105(3). https://www.ndc.nato.int/fr/download/russias-hybrid-warfare-waging-war-below-the-radar-of-traditional-collective-defence/
RT. (2016). Is Parliament preparing to ignore public vote for Brexit? RT UK News. https://www.rt.com/uk/345545-mps-majority--single-market/
Rumsfeld, D. (2005, March). The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Department of Defense. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2005_NDS.pdf?ver=tFA4Qqo94ZB0x_S6uL0QEg%3d%3d
Shore, M. (2017). The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution. Yale University Press.
Snyder, T. (2018). The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America. Crown.
Soula, E., & Eisentraut, S. (2017, September 22). Russia pulling strings on both sides of the Atlantic. The Cipher Brief. https://www.thecipherbrief.com/russia-pulling-strings-on-both-sides-of-the-atlantic
Stanley, J. (2015). How Propaganda Works. Princeton University Press.
Truman Library Institute. (n.d.). George F. Kennan. https://www.trumanlibraryinstitute.org/kennan/
UK Parliament Defence Committee. (2019). Written evidence submitted by Dr. Ofer Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicization (WHA0099). https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/103201/html/
United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (2017). Open hearing on the intelligence community’s assessment of Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections (S. Hrg. 115-298). U.S. Government Publishing Office. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-hearings-chrg-115shrg29830.pdf
U.S. Department of Justice. (2022, July 29). Russian national charged with conspiring to have U.S. citizens act as illegal agents of the Russian government. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-conspiring-have-us-citizens-act-illegal-agents-russian-government
Wagstyl, S. (2017). German politics: Russia’s next target? Officials fear Moscow may interfere in this year’s election to benefit the hard-right. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/31a5758c‑e3d8‑11e6‑9645‑c9357a75844a
Walker, S. (2018). The Long Hangover: Putin’s New Russia and the Ghosts of the Past. Oxford University Press.
Weiss, M., & Miller, J. (2015, July 17). How we know Russia shot down MH17. The Daily Beast. https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-we-know-russia-shot-down-mh17/