By Timothy Holtgrefe |  |
What is surprising is not that the Russian Empire ‘russified’ their ethnic minorities, as all colonizers have performed similar practices, but that so many of these false narratives continue to persist into today’s political discourse regarding the current war in Ukraine; even in the West. This is part 9 of an HQ exclusive series to investigate Russia’s relentless attack on history. In this episode, we will explore Russia’s revisionist history of Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity.
The Knife’s Edge
Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution was a dramatic turning point for not only Ukraine’s history and destiny, but the world itself. It began November 2013 as a small non-violent protest led by a handful of youth disappointed in their president’s reneging of an EU association agreement. These protests quickly exploded into a mass national movement involving hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens across the countryside all gathering in their nation’s capital at the Maidan square. As Ukrainians refused to back down in the face of unprecedented brutality, the violence ended in 103 civilian protestors dead as well as 13 police officers, and with a would-be autocrat abandoning his office into exile in Russia.
What should have been a celebration of victory for the protestors quickly turned into a war between Ukraine and its neighboring superpower—Russia. In order to justify his invasion and undermine global support for Ukraine’s resistance, Vladimir Putin on several occasions called the revolution an “armed coup” led by the west in order to justify his war and annexations. Additionally, Kremlin officials have labeled the protestors “Banderites” implying neo-Nazi origins or sympathies to attack both the cause of Ukraine’s revolution and its character. According to the Russian narrative, Western agents such as Victoria Nuland supported neo-Nazis to overthrow Ukraine’s legitimate and democratically elected president.
Not only is there a complete lack of evidence supporting the western-backed coup narrative, all of these claims are empirically false by virtue of: 1) Ukraine has had a consistent history of mass political movements since the 1980s. 2) Putin’s own actions, through Yanukovych, provoked the protests, 3) the far Right were not a significant presence on the Maidan, nor were they beneficiaries of the aftermath, and 4) Putin himself is the only international player who unequivocally interfered in Ukraine’s internal politics and orchestrated a coup on the territory of Ukraine in Crimea.
1) Ukraine’s Mass Political Movements: Maidan 1991
Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution was a dramatic turning point for not only Ukraine’s history and destiny, but the world itself. It began November 2013 as a small non-violent protest led by a handful of youth disappointed in their president’s reneging of an EU association agreement. These protests quickly exploded into a mass national movement involving hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens across the countryside all gathering in their nation’s capital at the Maidan square. As Ukrainians refused to back down in the face of unprecedented brutality, the violence ended in 103 civilian protestors dead as well as 13 police officers, and with a would-be autocrat abandoning his office into exile in Russia.
What should have been a celebration of victory for the protestors quickly turned into a war between Ukraine and its neighboring superpower—Russia. In order to justify his invasion and undermine global support for Ukraine’s resistance, Vladimir Putin on several occasions called the revolution an “armed coup” led by the west in order to justify his war and annexations. Additionally, Kremlin officials have labeled the protestors “Banderites” implying neo-Nazi origins or sympathies to attack both the cause of Ukraine’s revolution and its character. According to the Russian narrative, Western agents such as Victoria Nuland supported neo-Nazis to overthrow Ukraine’s legitimate and democratically elected president.
Not only is there a complete lack of evidence supporting the western-backed coup narrative, all of these claims are empirically false by virtue of: 1) Ukraine has had a consistent history of mass political movements since the 1980s. 2) Putin’s own actions, through Yanukovych, provoked the protests, 3) the far Right were not a significant presence on the Maidan, nor were they beneficiaries of the aftermath, and 4) Putin himself is the only international player who unequivocally interfered in Ukraine’s internal politics and orchestrated a coup on the territory of Ukraine in Crimea.
1) Ukraine’s Mass Political Movements: Maidan 1991
 | Historically, there is nothing unusual about Ukrainians occupying Kyiv's central square called “the Maidan” to resist tyranny. In the late 1980s, when previously banned literature “came like an avalanche” in then Soviet Ukraine (Shore, 2017, p.26), there were thousands of demonstrations and protests against atomic energy in the wake of the 1986 nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, marches and rallies in support of the Ukrainian language, the Greek Catholic |
Church, and Ukrainian independence. This was Glasnost and Ukraine’s nationalists saw themselves as the direct beneficiaries of Soviet premier Mikail Gorbachev’s reforms. In 1991 every region of Ukraine, including the Donbas and Crimea, gave the referendum for Ukrainian independence their majority support in spite of George Bush’s infamous ‘Chicken Kyiv’ Speech that failed in persuading them not to.
| Ukraine’s declaration of independence not only killed Gorbachev’s project of a reformed Union but also Boris Yeltsin’s more modest plan of a confederation of republics under Russian control (Plokhy, 2023, p.33). As a result, the Russian leadership decided to end the existence of the USSR because it did not want to bear the economic burden of Union without Ukraine’s substantial human and economic resources (p.26-7). However, Russia never ceded |  |
its role as the dominant power striving to lead its former Soviet satellites in some political, economic, and military union (p.28).
 | Although Ukraine would be an independent democracy, in December 1991, Leonid Kravchuk, a member of the Communist Party for over three decades, became the first president of Ukraine. “How was it possible to vote for Kravchuk, who was a continuation, who was the secretary of ideology in the Communist Party, who was in the Politburo of Soviet Ukraine?” Ukrainian translator and essayist, Jurko Prochasko asked himself in 1991. He lamented that unlike Czechoslovakia or Poland, “we will suffer for a long, long, long time in this post-Soviet purgatory” (Prochasko, 2011, p.70). |
Although Ukraine’s democracy experienced several successful electoral turnovers since the 1990s, it faced economic downturn and poverty. In 1995, 62% of Ukrainians found themselves below the poverty line (Milanovic, 1998, p.186). In Ukraine, as in Russia, economic crisis produced or exacerbated political crisis. In 1993, Kravchuk took a page from Boris Yeltsin’s book and proposed a referendum to determine whether the president should be more empowered to run the government. In response, mass protests in Kyiv prevented Kravchuk from carrying out his referendum (D’Anieri, 2019, p.45). This tradition of democratic protests would prove the main safeguard against Moscow’s influence and autocracy based on the Russian model.
| Maidan 2004 In 1994 Leonid Kuchma came to power and led what political scientist Keith Darden labeled a “blackmail state.” Corruption was so rampant that Kuchma could selectively target any opponent, or blackmail them, with corruption charges (Darden, 2001, p.67-71). However, his biggest scandal was when an outspoken journalist against Kuchma was kidnapped and later found dead in a forest outside Kyiv. Although it was never proven who had done it, many Ukrainians suspected Kuchma’s involvement when a recording surfaced of Kuchma making veiled threats about the journalist to his secret service (D’Anieri, 2019, p.104-13). |  |
In the 2004 election, Kuchma’s chosen successor was Viktor Yanukovych, a criminal with robbery convictions who represented post-Soviet corruption, oligarchy, and gangsterism (Shore, 2017, p.24). When Ukrainians went to the polling stations on October 31, exit polls showed most of them voted for his pro-EU challenger Viktor Yushchenko, not Yankukovych. However, the Central Electoral Commission, controlled by Kuchma and Yanukovych, announced a different outcome.
 | Yushchenko’s supporters, refusing to accept the forged result, flooded the Maidan to protest rigged elections (Wilson, 2005, p.82). Although Yanukovych was ardently pro-Kremlin, this was not necessarily a deal breaker. However, when he tried to threaten Ukraine’s electoral integrity, he was met with a wall of resistance. Kyivans were soon joined by supporters from across the provinces. For three weeks in late autumn 2004, Ukrainians stayed on the Maidan and froze (Shore, 2017, p.26). Despite Yanukovych’s demands, Kuchma refused to use the army against the protesters and instead opted for a |
compromise. A new round of elections were agreed upon and Yushchenko won with 52% of the vote against Yanukovych’s 44%. As a result, December 2004 saw an end to Kuchma’s attempted increase of presidential powers (Wilson, 2005, p.138-55). The “Orange Revolution” was bloodless. It was also victorious. Seemingly, all sides were satisfied with the results and everyone went home (Shore, p.26). In the aftermath of his failed authoritarian reforms, Kuchma would later famously reflect, “Ukraine is not Russia” (Plokhy, 2023, p.62).
The victory of the Orange Revolution ultimately proved hollow. Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko quickly became bitter rivals. Europe was unreceptive, and Ukraine's progress on reforms remained sluggish. Oligarchy and corruption continued to dominate the political landscape. In an effort to distance Ukraine from Moscow, Yushchenko turned to memory politics, elevating the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) as a symbol of resistance to Russian imperialism. In January 2010, he posthumously awarded the controversial anti-Semite Stepan Bandera the title of "Hero of Ukraine," the country's highest honor. While this move deepened regional divisions within Ukraine, it also diverted attention from Yushchenko's failure to address corruption. In the end, few Ukrainians ever felt truly inspired by Yushchenko's leadership (Shore, 2017, p.27).
The victory of the Orange Revolution ultimately proved hollow. Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko quickly became bitter rivals. Europe was unreceptive, and Ukraine's progress on reforms remained sluggish. Oligarchy and corruption continued to dominate the political landscape. In an effort to distance Ukraine from Moscow, Yushchenko turned to memory politics, elevating the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) as a symbol of resistance to Russian imperialism. In January 2010, he posthumously awarded the controversial anti-Semite Stepan Bandera the title of "Hero of Ukraine," the country's highest honor. While this move deepened regional divisions within Ukraine, it also diverted attention from Yushchenko's failure to address corruption. In the end, few Ukrainians ever felt truly inspired by Yushchenko's leadership (Shore, 2017, p.27).
 | Above all, the Orange Revolution was another confirmation that the will of the people would prevail against any attempts at kleptocratic dictatorship. Although many Ukrainians would later feel betrayed by Yushchenko, the experience of masses of people taking to the streets so quickly was a source of empowerment. Their country was theirs and they could hold their leaders accountable if their will were ever violated again. Unfortunately, not long after 2004, Ukrainians realized they would have to wait a little longer. “We concluded the |
revolution in three weeks,” said Jurko Prochasko, “delegated everything to him, and went away. In that sense Yushchenko’s betrayal was a very, very valuable experience” (cited by Shore, 2017, p.28).
Maidan 2014: Revolution of Dignity
Vikor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko were such disappointments that in the 2010 elections Yanukovych returned to once again run for the presidency to defeat Tymoshenko—whom he then put in prison. Of course “no one really loves him,” remembered Jurko Prochasko (cited by Shore, 2017, p.29). To some, he seemed to offer stability. Yanukovych’s mafia-like “family” of political allies built golden villas while ordinary people starved and froze and died in explosions at unregulated mines. Gangsters blackmailed small businesses, extracting money in exchange for tolerating their existence. Throughout the countryside it was understood that order was maintained by a local smotrishchii—literally, “one who is looking,” a representative of a mafia group who controlled a given area and extorted money. Yanukovych offered no visions or reform. He was nakedly, unapologetically a gangster. Ukraine had never had the rule of law. Yet under Yanukovych the kleptocracy was particularly shameless: the judicial system made itself available for private hire and police arbitrarily enforced some laws, leaving opportunities for bribery (p.29-30).
Maidan 2014: Revolution of Dignity
Vikor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko were such disappointments that in the 2010 elections Yanukovych returned to once again run for the presidency to defeat Tymoshenko—whom he then put in prison. Of course “no one really loves him,” remembered Jurko Prochasko (cited by Shore, 2017, p.29). To some, he seemed to offer stability. Yanukovych’s mafia-like “family” of political allies built golden villas while ordinary people starved and froze and died in explosions at unregulated mines. Gangsters blackmailed small businesses, extracting money in exchange for tolerating their existence. Throughout the countryside it was understood that order was maintained by a local smotrishchii—literally, “one who is looking,” a representative of a mafia group who controlled a given area and extorted money. Yanukovych offered no visions or reform. He was nakedly, unapologetically a gangster. Ukraine had never had the rule of law. Yet under Yanukovych the kleptocracy was particularly shameless: the judicial system made itself available for private hire and police arbitrarily enforced some laws, leaving opportunities for bribery (p.29-30).
| However, when Yanukovych legitimately won the Presidency in 2010, he campaigned on a rapprochement with Russia and consistently promoted some form of European integration (Shore, 2017, p.31). The EU was concerned about Yankovych’s assault on democracy and rule of law but prepared to offer Ukraine an association agreement in exchange for the release of political prisoners, in particular the former Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, whom Yanukovych had jailed. The trickier part was the EU’s principal demand was the continuation of market reforms. Yanukovych wanted no reforms and was developing a kleptocratic system of rent collection. Conversely, while the EU was demanding reforms, Russia asked for nothing of the |  |
sort but offered huge sums of bribes with no hostility towards the West. Putin also threatened Yanukovych with an economic blockade if he indeed signed the association. To show he meant business, Putin embarked on a limited trade war with Ukraine, barring Ukrainian products from Russia causing a 10% drop in exports (D’Anieri, 2019, p.200-3).
The hostility instead; however, would come from Ukrainians he swore to represent. It was felt that although Yanukovych was a despot, he would have to submit to a reform of the justice system. It would have meant his oligarchal regime would have to eventually concede its most kleptocratic practices. To everyone’s surprise, on November 21, 2013 Yanukovych unexpectedly refused to sign the much anticipated association agreement with the EU in Vilnius during what was supposed to be a signing ceremony. Russian president Vladimir Putin was pressuring Yanukovych to join his Eurasian Union, to ally with the russkii mir, “the Russian World,” against the West (Shore, 2017, p.31-32). When Yanukovych abruptly refused to sign, it felt as if all hope was robbed from its youth that looked forward to visa free entries for EU universities and economic travel.
The hostility instead; however, would come from Ukrainians he swore to represent. It was felt that although Yanukovych was a despot, he would have to submit to a reform of the justice system. It would have meant his oligarchal regime would have to eventually concede its most kleptocratic practices. To everyone’s surprise, on November 21, 2013 Yanukovych unexpectedly refused to sign the much anticipated association agreement with the EU in Vilnius during what was supposed to be a signing ceremony. Russian president Vladimir Putin was pressuring Yanukovych to join his Eurasian Union, to ally with the russkii mir, “the Russian World,” against the West (Shore, 2017, p.31-32). When Yanukovych abruptly refused to sign, it felt as if all hope was robbed from its youth that looked forward to visa free entries for EU universities and economic travel.
 | On the night of November 21, 2013, a thirty-two-year-old Afghan-Ukrainian journalist named Mustafa Nayyem posted on his Facebook, “Come on, let’s get serious. Who is ready to go out to the Maidan by midnight tonight? ‘Likes’ don’t count.” In the beginning, they were mostly young people. “Euromaidan” belonged to the students. Perhaps in the short term they had the most at stake: access to visas, scholarships, internships, opportunities to study abroad, etc. They were tired of politicians and political parties, but not politics. They formed circles and held hands shouting "Ukraine is |
Europe!” The next day, they came back and would continue to return to the Maidan (Nayem, 2014). For activist Slava Vakarchuk, being a part of Europe had little to do with Yanukovich’s signing or not signing of the association agreement. Being a part of Europe was a question of values: the freedom of choice and the value of dignity (Shore, 2017, p.35-36).
For others, it was a revolution against corruption. According to activist and journalist Ihor Petrovsky, before the Maidan, if he were pulled over by the police for driving over the speed limit, he would pay the bribe. This was how the system worked. The state bureaucracy did not need to function because it was understood that everyone paid bribes. This was the way to get anything done without losing time and energy. Yet the whole system—Ihor explained—was in fact built on these little bribes, nothing would change until everyone stopped paying them (Shore, 2017, p.194).
For Valerii and Elena the Maidan meant the end of vassalship to Russia. They were thinking about the Holodomor, the famine of the 1930s, when Soviet Ukraine was deliberately starved by Joseph Stalin killing millions. Valerii’s family still lived in the shadow of the famine, shaped by those absences, by the older relatives who were not there. “In Soviet schools…they lied to us….The whole history of Russia, it’s all invented. There’s not a word of truth there” (cited by Shore, p.187). Many Ukrainians regretted that they chose to speak Russian as they began to read more and more Ukrainian to improve their national language (p.188).
2) Yanukovych Provoked the Protests
In the twilight hours of the morning of November 28th, several hundred people were still on the Maidan. Around 4 am, riot police, called Berkut, arrived with tear gas and full riot gear. They beat the students, the women, and anyone else they saw which included an Armenian painter and an elderly ex-Soviet Army officer. Regardless of whether these protests would succeed, something had forever changed in Ukraine. Yanukovych had broken an unspoken social contract. In the two decades since independence, the government had never used this kind of violence against its own citizens. Many students were hospitalized and it was still unclear if there was a fatality. For many, the brutality against the students was the end of ambivalence (Shore, 2017, p.39).
For Valerii and Elena the Maidan meant the end of vassalship to Russia. They were thinking about the Holodomor, the famine of the 1930s, when Soviet Ukraine was deliberately starved by Joseph Stalin killing millions. Valerii’s family still lived in the shadow of the famine, shaped by those absences, by the older relatives who were not there. “In Soviet schools…they lied to us….The whole history of Russia, it’s all invented. There’s not a word of truth there” (cited by Shore, p.187). Many Ukrainians regretted that they chose to speak Russian as they began to read more and more Ukrainian to improve their national language (p.188).
2) Yanukovych Provoked the Protests
In the twilight hours of the morning of November 28th, several hundred people were still on the Maidan. Around 4 am, riot police, called Berkut, arrived with tear gas and full riot gear. They beat the students, the women, and anyone else they saw which included an Armenian painter and an elderly ex-Soviet Army officer. Regardless of whether these protests would succeed, something had forever changed in Ukraine. Yanukovych had broken an unspoken social contract. In the two decades since independence, the government had never used this kind of violence against its own citizens. Many students were hospitalized and it was still unclear if there was a fatality. For many, the brutality against the students was the end of ambivalence (Shore, 2017, p.39).
 | On Saturday, November 30th, a growing number of people gathered in the square, displaying a spontaneous spirit of self-organization. The turning point came the following day, when Yanukovych opted to use violence—transforming Euromaidan into simply “Maidan,” shedding the prefix. What had started as a protest against the association agreement evolved into a full-scale revolt against brutality, corruption, and gangster rule. Rather than seeing |
parents pulling their children away from the protests, they now stood alongside them. "We will protect our children" became the rallying cry (Shore, 2017, p.40-2).
On the night of December 10th, Yanukovych tried once again to use violence to clear the still peaceful protesters of the Maidan. When this failed, he began to rely on hired thugs in street clothes called titushki. As armored vehicles approached the barricades to break them, buses full of titushki awaited to beat the protesters as they tried to escape, but some caught wind of the plan and the protestors were able to hold their ground (Andrukhovych, 2014). Dmytro Pylypets, a fellow activist in Kharkiv, had been severely beaten and stabbed several times. Volodymyr Sklokin recalled, “I asked myself what we could possibly do against a regime that controlled the militia and was willing to behave criminally….then I asked myself…how would we look to one another if we all gave up? (It) became my realization that if I gave up then, I would no longer be myself, but someone else” (cited by Snyder & Zhurzhenko, 2014, p.8-9).
On the night of December 10th, Yanukovych tried once again to use violence to clear the still peaceful protesters of the Maidan. When this failed, he began to rely on hired thugs in street clothes called titushki. As armored vehicles approached the barricades to break them, buses full of titushki awaited to beat the protesters as they tried to escape, but some caught wind of the plan and the protestors were able to hold their ground (Andrukhovych, 2014). Dmytro Pylypets, a fellow activist in Kharkiv, had been severely beaten and stabbed several times. Volodymyr Sklokin recalled, “I asked myself what we could possibly do against a regime that controlled the militia and was willing to behave criminally….then I asked myself…how would we look to one another if we all gave up? (It) became my realization that if I gave up then, I would no longer be myself, but someone else” (cited by Snyder & Zhurzhenko, 2014, p.8-9).
| Yanukovych’s response to peaceful protestors was increasingly ruthless. Unlike the police, the military, and the Berkut riot police, titushki were recruited among criminals. Activists were being kidnapped from the streets and disappearing at night. Some returned, some did not. Those who returned were often maimed and disfigured, missing, for instance, part of an ear. The bodies like that of Yuri Verbitsky were found in the woods outside the capital. Activists brought to the hospitals were being kidnapped, taken to a forest, and murdered (Shore, 2017, p.62-3). In the Maidan, no one slept for more than 3 hours a night out of fear of Yanukovych’s titushki (p.73). The situation was growing more and more dangerous. |  |
Perhaps the most escalatory move of all on Yankovych’s part was the outrageous “dictatorship laws.” On January 16, 2014, Yanukovych, with an illegal show-of-hands vote in the parliament, forced the passage of laws revoking parliamentarian immunity and the rights of free speech and assembly (Dmytro, 2014). For many not already involved with the Maidan, January 16th was the line that was crossed. The complete absence of law meant that everyone was vulnerable. For Tara Dobko, there was “a desperate feeling among people…how can we live in such a country?” (cited by Shore, 2017, p.60). As historian Marci Shore observed:
By virtue of the January 16 laws, anyone who had taken part in the Maidan was a criminal and could be arrested. After January 16th, everyone understood that no one would be safe as long as Yanukovych remained in power. He had raised the stakes: Now it was all or nothing (p.60).
It was also at this point that some protesters began to meet violence with violence.
Thanks to donations pouring in from ordinary men and women, students, and the elderly from towns and cities across Ukraine; the Maidan had unlimited supplies (Shore, 2017, p.79). Volunteers like Iryna Iaremko spent every day organizing buses to take people from Lviv to the Maidan in Kyiv. She and her fellow volunteers did not advertise their services. People came looking for them (Kin, 2017, p.47). It was also around this time that some began to invent code words for smuggling in military equipment such as bulletproof vests into the Maidan. After the ‘dictatorship laws,’ overnight, the Maidan shifted from protest to revolution. Everyone was looking for a way to do something, so as not to do nothing. In Lviv the whole city, even the mayor, was on the side of the revolution (Shore, p.61-3, 89).
Veterans from the Soviet Afghanistan War, went to serve as guards in the hospital, protecting patients from kidnappings. However, when the Automaidan drivers arrived, some were immediately kidnapped (p.73). Yanukovych had been responding to nonviolent protests with kidnappings and torture. More and more activists had disappeared. Their bodies had not been found. Berkut was using water cannons during winter temperatures far below freezing. If confronted with violence from the other side, people needed to defend themselves. This collective preparation for violence first increased gradually, then began to soar exponentially (Forostyna, 2014). Activists began preparing molotov cocktails. It would only get worse.
By virtue of the January 16 laws, anyone who had taken part in the Maidan was a criminal and could be arrested. After January 16th, everyone understood that no one would be safe as long as Yanukovych remained in power. He had raised the stakes: Now it was all or nothing (p.60).
It was also at this point that some protesters began to meet violence with violence.
Thanks to donations pouring in from ordinary men and women, students, and the elderly from towns and cities across Ukraine; the Maidan had unlimited supplies (Shore, 2017, p.79). Volunteers like Iryna Iaremko spent every day organizing buses to take people from Lviv to the Maidan in Kyiv. She and her fellow volunteers did not advertise their services. People came looking for them (Kin, 2017, p.47). It was also around this time that some began to invent code words for smuggling in military equipment such as bulletproof vests into the Maidan. After the ‘dictatorship laws,’ overnight, the Maidan shifted from protest to revolution. Everyone was looking for a way to do something, so as not to do nothing. In Lviv the whole city, even the mayor, was on the side of the revolution (Shore, p.61-3, 89).
Veterans from the Soviet Afghanistan War, went to serve as guards in the hospital, protecting patients from kidnappings. However, when the Automaidan drivers arrived, some were immediately kidnapped (p.73). Yanukovych had been responding to nonviolent protests with kidnappings and torture. More and more activists had disappeared. Their bodies had not been found. Berkut was using water cannons during winter temperatures far below freezing. If confronted with violence from the other side, people needed to defend themselves. This collective preparation for violence first increased gradually, then began to soar exponentially (Forostyna, 2014). Activists began preparing molotov cocktails. It would only get worse.
 | The Tipping Point Between February 18-21, 2014, there were many shootings that took place at Instytutska Street. On February 18th the Maidan reached a critical mass where protestors were willing to die for their cause (Shore, 2017, p.90). When the truce between the government and protesters collapsed, thousands marched toward the Ukrainian parliament building demanding the restoration of the 2004 constitution, which had limited the powers of the president (Vakhovska et al., 2014, |
p.6-10). They attacked and set fire to the headquarters of Yanukovych’s ruling Party of Regions. In turn, the protesters’ headquarters, the Trade Union Building, was set on fire by agents of the Security Service. At least eleven civilians and seven police officers were killed or died in the fire. The violence of February 18, 2014 changed the course of the protests. (D’Anieri, 2019, p.216-8).
Yanukovych issued a warning to leave the streets before 6:00 in the evening or be considered a terrorist. He shut down the metro and taxis were no longer in service (Vakhovska et al., 2014, p.6-7). Instead of dispersing, protestors built barricades and threw stones. The police began their attack at 7:00. They blocked the entrances to the Maidan and did not let the ambulances pass.
Yanukovych issued a warning to leave the streets before 6:00 in the evening or be considered a terrorist. He shut down the metro and taxis were no longer in service (Vakhovska et al., 2014, p.6-7). Instead of dispersing, protestors built barricades and threw stones. The police began their attack at 7:00. They blocked the entrances to the Maidan and did not let the ambulances pass.
| Misha Martynenko, together with several others, decided to try to destroy one police blockade to open a corridor for the ambulances and distributed molotov cocktails. For these few protestors, the militia stopping the doctors from saving the dying was a license to kill. There would no longer be mercy (Shore, 2017, p.98-99). Soon the courage of these few inspired others to flood the more dangerous parts of the Maidan who "were absolutely ready to die," |  |
recalled activist Iryna Laremko. Berkut was using real bullets, there were snipers on rooftops, whole buildings were on fire, and protestors began burning tires to hide their numbers. (p.102). The new slogan for Maidan became, “for our freedom and yours” (p.106). The next few days brought significantly more violence as protesters tried to reclaim the Maidan but were met with gunfire by special police forces and snipers. Although the allegiance of the snipers were never conclusively identified, documents released by Ukraine’s former Deputy Interior Minister point to Russian advisers as involved with Ukraine’s Security Services in the use of snipers to disperse crowds and capture the protesters' headquarters in the House of Trade Unions. Russia's FSB denies and disputes the authenticity of these documents (Rachkevych, 2014). Among those killed by gunfire were thirteen police officers and 108 protesters shot to death that day (Plokhy, 2023, p.97).
Finally after a forty-five-minute phone call with Putin, on February 20th Yanukovych agreed to shorten his presidential term and hold early elections. The agreement would also bring back the 2004 constitution limiting the president’s powers and presidential elections would be held in December. Yanukovych knew he was losing his parliamentary majority from moment to moment and that his Party of Regions was splitting (Radynski, 2014). However, by the time Yanukovych realized he had miscalculated, it was already too late. The famous Ukrainian boxer who joined the protestors, Vitali Klitschko, failed to persuade the Maidan’s representatives to sign the agreement. “They’ve literally just seen their people die…so it was a very tough sell,” remembered Radislaw Sikorski (cited by Shore, 2017, p.117). They branded Yanukovych a murderer and refused to accept any compromises with him (Radynski, 2014).
The next day Yanukovych fled. Protestors stormed into his opulent residence in Mezhyhira and found a boxing ring, antique automobiles, a private zoo, an exotic bird collection, and bathroom sinks and tubs made of gold. The protestors did not loot the villa. Instead the thousands who flooded the Mezhyhirya left the residence as it was, a kind of museum of an oligarch’s tyranny for the world to see (Radynski, 2014).
3) The Far Right Were Not a Significant Presence in the Maidan
The groundwork for the propaganda campaign to come had already been laid through decades of Soviet misinformation and almost a decade of revisionist history taught in Russian-Speaking Ukrainian schools whose curriculum was written by the Kremlin itself (See Part II). Yanukovych, of course, played this to his advantage by repeatedly warning Ukrainians that the Maidan was full of Banderites who would persecute Russian speakers and force them to speak only Ukrainian. Yet Russian, as much as Ukrainian, was the language of the Maidan (Shore, 2017, p.56).
Finally after a forty-five-minute phone call with Putin, on February 20th Yanukovych agreed to shorten his presidential term and hold early elections. The agreement would also bring back the 2004 constitution limiting the president’s powers and presidential elections would be held in December. Yanukovych knew he was losing his parliamentary majority from moment to moment and that his Party of Regions was splitting (Radynski, 2014). However, by the time Yanukovych realized he had miscalculated, it was already too late. The famous Ukrainian boxer who joined the protestors, Vitali Klitschko, failed to persuade the Maidan’s representatives to sign the agreement. “They’ve literally just seen their people die…so it was a very tough sell,” remembered Radislaw Sikorski (cited by Shore, 2017, p.117). They branded Yanukovych a murderer and refused to accept any compromises with him (Radynski, 2014).
The next day Yanukovych fled. Protestors stormed into his opulent residence in Mezhyhira and found a boxing ring, antique automobiles, a private zoo, an exotic bird collection, and bathroom sinks and tubs made of gold. The protestors did not loot the villa. Instead the thousands who flooded the Mezhyhirya left the residence as it was, a kind of museum of an oligarch’s tyranny for the world to see (Radynski, 2014).
3) The Far Right Were Not a Significant Presence in the Maidan
The groundwork for the propaganda campaign to come had already been laid through decades of Soviet misinformation and almost a decade of revisionist history taught in Russian-Speaking Ukrainian schools whose curriculum was written by the Kremlin itself (See Part II). Yanukovych, of course, played this to his advantage by repeatedly warning Ukrainians that the Maidan was full of Banderites who would persecute Russian speakers and force them to speak only Ukrainian. Yet Russian, as much as Ukrainian, was the language of the Maidan (Shore, 2017, p.56).
 | Yanukovych claimed to the Western media that the Maidan was filled with fascists and antisemites, while telling his own riot police that the Maidan was filled with gays and Jews; all while simultaneously telling predominantly Russian speakers in the east that they were far Right neo-Nazis. In one example of orchestrated provocation: Yanukovych’s regime posted advertisements in social networks offering up 150,000 Euros for actors to stage a fake gay pride parade. |
The plan was two-folded: first, to offend those on the Maidan who were more conservative. And second, to provoke fights, perhaps between the authentic LGBT activists and their caricatures, which could then be exploited for the benefit of Western media as evidence of fascist tendencies on the Maidan (Shore, 2017, p.69). Activist Katia Mishchenko described it as “the government constructed a horrific house of mirrors…The militia is running around in the uniforms of city sanitation workers, Berkut units rampage through the streets together with hired criminals, secret service agents toss the Ukrainian flag around their shoulders and go to spy on the Maidan, looters impersonate Pravyi Sektor. Nothing was as it seemed.” On the Maidan, “Don’t fall prey to provocation” became a refrain (cited p.70).
| Not only were the protestors of the Maidan regionally diverse, they were both ethnically and politically from all walks of life. According to activist Misha Martynenko, Ukrainians from every demographic were present at the Maidan as if reporting for duty: “there were very different people—Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Poles, Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, |  |
Russian-speakers, Ukrainian-speakers, there were neo-Nazis, liberals, and anarchists” (cited by Shore, p.268). Andrej Bondar, a poet and writer, described the Maidan as a “laboratory of the social contract…a union of IT specialists from Dnipropetrovsk, a Hutsul shepherd, an Odesa mathematician, a Kyiv businessman, and a Tatar peasant from Crimea” (Snyder & Zhurzhenko, 2014, p.6). An LGBT organization transformed its confidential hotline into an emergency hotline for the Maidan (Shore, 2017, p.45). Natan Khazin, a young rabbi from Odesa who had emigrated to Israel years earlier, was a veteran of the Israeli Defense Forces. When the situation became more violent, he became a strategic advisor who helped lead the offensive to storm a building (Fisherman, 2014). Another eyewitness, Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, described the Maidan as akin to Noah’s Ark: both had “two of every kind.” There were liberals, socialists, nationalists, and lunatics. Although there was a sense of oneness within the crowd that celebrated its tolerance for its diversity, there were real differences and real tensions, for instance the far Right like Svoboda and Right Sector groups (Hrytsak, 2014, p.222).
In the Maidan’s success and aftermath, on May 25, 2014 Ukraine held an election that elected Petro Poroshenko. The far Right got very little support. Oleh Tyahnybok, leader of Svoboda, and Dmytro Yarosh, leader of Pravyi Sektory, won just over and just under 1% of the vote. Not only did they not reach the threshold needed to hold a single representative in parliament, each received fewer votes than Vadim Rainovich, leader of the Ukrainian Jewish Congress. In contrast, Austria, an EU member state, their far-Right Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, won close to 20% of the Austrian vote in elections that took place within the same week (Shore, 2017, p.149).
Far Right Violence
Svoboda, who for a time controlled City hall, had turned it into a torture site where they used tear gas and beat captured policemen and titushki. They destroyed feminist posters and even attacked fellow protestors with tear gas. However, every first-hand account on the Maidan put them as a small minority. Even Natalia, who was herself a target of the far Right’s aggression, guessed if they were about 10% of the people on the Maidan in November, they were about 1% in December. They were there the whole time, but they were a very small group. Some protestors suspected that some of Svoboda’s members were Kremlin provocateurs, paid to create a pretext for propaganda claiming that the Maidan was full of fascists (Shore, 2017, p.54-55). Regardless of their motives or identity, their existence was objectively serving the Kremlin. Had they not existed, Putin would have to invent them. Although residents of eastern Ukraine suffered no less from Yanukovych’s rule than anyone else, they could be manipulated by Russian television into believing that fascists from Galicia were coming to attack Russian speakers (Shteyngart, 2015).
In the Maidan’s success and aftermath, on May 25, 2014 Ukraine held an election that elected Petro Poroshenko. The far Right got very little support. Oleh Tyahnybok, leader of Svoboda, and Dmytro Yarosh, leader of Pravyi Sektory, won just over and just under 1% of the vote. Not only did they not reach the threshold needed to hold a single representative in parliament, each received fewer votes than Vadim Rainovich, leader of the Ukrainian Jewish Congress. In contrast, Austria, an EU member state, their far-Right Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, won close to 20% of the Austrian vote in elections that took place within the same week (Shore, 2017, p.149).
Far Right Violence
Svoboda, who for a time controlled City hall, had turned it into a torture site where they used tear gas and beat captured policemen and titushki. They destroyed feminist posters and even attacked fellow protestors with tear gas. However, every first-hand account on the Maidan put them as a small minority. Even Natalia, who was herself a target of the far Right’s aggression, guessed if they were about 10% of the people on the Maidan in November, they were about 1% in December. They were there the whole time, but they were a very small group. Some protestors suspected that some of Svoboda’s members were Kremlin provocateurs, paid to create a pretext for propaganda claiming that the Maidan was full of fascists (Shore, 2017, p.54-55). Regardless of their motives or identity, their existence was objectively serving the Kremlin. Had they not existed, Putin would have to invent them. Although residents of eastern Ukraine suffered no less from Yanukovych’s rule than anyone else, they could be manipulated by Russian television into believing that fascists from Galicia were coming to attack Russian speakers (Shteyngart, 2015).
 | On May 2nd, pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian demonstrators fought one another with guns, bricks, baseball bats, and Molotov cocktails in Odesa where some half-dozen died in the streets. The fighting reached its climax in front of the Trade Union House, where a fire broke out, killing more than forty pro-Russian demonstrators trapped inside the building (Shore, 2017, p.144-5). This was the propaganda moment Putin was waiting for. In spite of the |
fact that the violence began from the pro-Russian side, the tragic end was all that mattered.
The Ukrainian state was not ready to fight a Russian-sponsored war—which Putin denied he was fighting. The Ukrainian army had to be crowd sourced on the internet and militias had to be formed where the army lagged. In this way too, the members of the Svoboda and Pravyi Sektor served the Kremlin’s interests. Putin had claimed fascists had taken power in Kyiv (Radynski, 2014). Even though elements of the far Right sector were initially able to join these volunteer regiments such as the Azov Battalion unvetted, they were disbanded by 2015 and the volunteer regiments were eventually absorbed into the regular Ukrainian Army (See Part VI).
Conversely, there is a significant observable presence of neo-Nazis on the Russian side of this war; however, no western propaganda blitz to portray the Russian side as Nazis exists. The propaganda is only coming from one side as if it is a psychodynamic form of projection. Nor is there a concernable effort by any government west of Ukraine to portray Vladimir Putin as a fascist, which in reality would be empirically correct (See Part VIII).
Putin Proked Escalation
As early as January, Russian “tourists” began arriving in Kharkiv Oblast from across the border to take part in “anti-Maidan” demonstrations. Many of these “protesters” with Russian passports provoked violence. On February 26th, YouTubers such as Serhiy Zhadan posted videos attempting to counter the propaganda. “Don’t listen to the propaganda. There are not Banderovtsy here. There are no fascists, no extremists.
The Ukrainian state was not ready to fight a Russian-sponsored war—which Putin denied he was fighting. The Ukrainian army had to be crowd sourced on the internet and militias had to be formed where the army lagged. In this way too, the members of the Svoboda and Pravyi Sektor served the Kremlin’s interests. Putin had claimed fascists had taken power in Kyiv (Radynski, 2014). Even though elements of the far Right sector were initially able to join these volunteer regiments such as the Azov Battalion unvetted, they were disbanded by 2015 and the volunteer regiments were eventually absorbed into the regular Ukrainian Army (See Part VI).
Conversely, there is a significant observable presence of neo-Nazis on the Russian side of this war; however, no western propaganda blitz to portray the Russian side as Nazis exists. The propaganda is only coming from one side as if it is a psychodynamic form of projection. Nor is there a concernable effort by any government west of Ukraine to portray Vladimir Putin as a fascist, which in reality would be empirically correct (See Part VIII).
Putin Proked Escalation
As early as January, Russian “tourists” began arriving in Kharkiv Oblast from across the border to take part in “anti-Maidan” demonstrations. Many of these “protesters” with Russian passports provoked violence. On February 26th, YouTubers such as Serhiy Zhadan posted videos attempting to counter the propaganda. “Don’t listen to the propaganda. There are not Banderovtsy here. There are no fascists, no extremists.
 | None of that is true. Come over to our side.” Three days later, Serhiy was led away from a demonstration in Kharkiv bloodied, his head bashed in (cited by Shore, 2017, p.134). Activists like Jurko could not understand those who were against the revolution living in the east who were so susceptible to propaganda as to fear or hate the Maidan. He could not fathom how some could believe that people like Jurko were fascists who would descend upon them with weapons in hand and force them to speak Ukrainian and believe in Bandera. He wanted to |
understand them (p.135). He wanted to learn how they perceived what was happening in Ukraine. From Donetsk he traveled to Crimea. However, by the time he reached Crimea, the little Greenmen had already seized checkpoints and denied him entry (p.138). Putin and Yanukovych had created an alternative reality where fascism was anti-fascism and everything was called what it was not.
As Russian special forces appeared in the Crimea at the end of February, Leonid Finberg was among the leaders of the Ukrainian Jewish community who signed an open letter to President Putin: “We do not wish to be ‘defended’ by sundering Ukraine and annexing it territory.” The Maidan included “nationalist groups, but even the most marginal do not dare show anti-Semitism….in recent days stability in our country has been threatened. And this threat is coming from the Russian government, namely—from you personally” (Open Letter of Ukrainian Jews.., 2014).
Putin’s own Russian language television had a relative monopoly on the narrative of what was happening in Kyiv. Many young people from Luhansk and Donetsk had parents who warned them about a Nazi takeover of the capital. Some places in the east faced splits across families and friends (Shore, 2017, p.179). These differences in values had nothing to do with ethnicity or language. The language issue was imaginary, a creation of Russian state-owned television (p.184). Putin and Yanukovych won the propaganda war in the official media, but they lost in the social media. The Ukrainian revolution live-streamed itself on YouTube. Around the world everyone could watch Ukrainians being shot to death in real time (Dickerson, 2014).
Kateryna from Luhansk had taken part in the Maidan because she wanted an independent Ukraine. However, her parents felt differently. Her situation was not unusual. In the east, youth and education correlated more strongly with pro-Ukrainian and pro-European orientation than any linguistic
As Russian special forces appeared in the Crimea at the end of February, Leonid Finberg was among the leaders of the Ukrainian Jewish community who signed an open letter to President Putin: “We do not wish to be ‘defended’ by sundering Ukraine and annexing it territory.” The Maidan included “nationalist groups, but even the most marginal do not dare show anti-Semitism….in recent days stability in our country has been threatened. And this threat is coming from the Russian government, namely—from you personally” (Open Letter of Ukrainian Jews.., 2014).
Putin’s own Russian language television had a relative monopoly on the narrative of what was happening in Kyiv. Many young people from Luhansk and Donetsk had parents who warned them about a Nazi takeover of the capital. Some places in the east faced splits across families and friends (Shore, 2017, p.179). These differences in values had nothing to do with ethnicity or language. The language issue was imaginary, a creation of Russian state-owned television (p.184). Putin and Yanukovych won the propaganda war in the official media, but they lost in the social media. The Ukrainian revolution live-streamed itself on YouTube. Around the world everyone could watch Ukrainians being shot to death in real time (Dickerson, 2014).
Kateryna from Luhansk had taken part in the Maidan because she wanted an independent Ukraine. However, her parents felt differently. Her situation was not unusual. In the east, youth and education correlated more strongly with pro-Ukrainian and pro-European orientation than any linguistic
| variables did. Many youth in the east became estranged with their parents. “I have relatives there, in the Donbas,” Anastasiia added, “who say that we’re bad people here. It’s very difficult” (cited by Shore, 2017, p.203). “Our relatives don’t believe us,” bemoaned Elena Kozachek from Luhansk. “It’s a very common story,” Victoria Narizhna had explained. “You call your family and they say to you: ‘Run away! There are fascists where you are! They’ve turned you into zombies!” (cited p.206). |  |
Russian state television, which had a monopoly in the Donbas, imparted the message that Ukraine itself was a phantom state conjured up by the West for use against Russia (p.208). Pavlo Khazan blamed the peculiar efficiency of Russian propaganda for the separatist movements. Tetiana and Anstasiia tried to explain that the Donbas was a place where people watched a lot of television. “People don’t believe their eyes,” Iurii said. Instead they believe what they saw on Russian television (cited by Shore, p.209).
In Krasnoarmiisk in Donetsk oblast, some of the locals greeted the Ukrainian army enthusiastically, others were terrified that the soldiers were Ukrainian fascists who had come to kill them. Russian television had broadcast that in Sloviansk the Ukrainian military had crucified a three-year-old boy. Oleh tried to explain to them that this was a lie, that nothing like this had happened, but the women would insist “No, no, we know for certain” (cited by Shore, p.232). Oleh was convinced that if the Russian soldiers from across the border would leave, the war would end at once (p.231-3).
Prior to Russian “tourists” crossing the border into Donbas and “little green men” illegally occupying the Crimea, there were no separatist movements in sight (Plokhy, 2023, p.106). Many journalists and activists who stood in the way of the illegal referendums to come were either jailed on trumped up charges or found tortured and murdered in both regions of Ukraine (Özçelik, 2020).
4) Putin Himself Orchestrated a Coup
Putin was in touch with Yanukovych throughout the most difficult part of the Maidan protests, holding eleven telephone conversations (Plokhy, 2023, p.106). Yanukovych’s initial plan was to escape to Crimea and rally supporters to his cause. However, Putin had already decided to take Crimea away from Ukraine. The only question was how to provide such an act with a veneer of legitimacy (p.108). He would argue that he had no choice but to take Crimea allegedly because of the threat posed to its population by radical Ukrainian nationalists. No such threat existed, but Putin’s larger plan to annex Crimea to Russia would come to nothing if Yanukovych were to make the Crimea his base for attempting to return to Kyiv. To avoid this, Russian intelligence services told Yanukovych that an ambush was waiting for him in Crimea and Russian helicopters would escort him. No evidence has come to light to show that anyone besides the Russian government was trying to stop Yanukovych on his way to the Crimea. To his surprise, he was taken not to the Crimea, where he was heading, but to Russia—the pilots claimed they needed to refuel there. According to his bodyguards, once in Russia, Yanukovych demanded to be returned to Ukraine. The Russian pilot refused (p.109).
Putin had a different story to tell. Crimeans “seeing how events were developing, took to their weapons almost immediately and appealed to us to approve the measures that they were planning to take,” claimed Putin (cited by Plokhy, p.110). Meanwhile a group of unmarked special forces showed up and seized the parliament buildings in Crimea, forced a vote on a prepared resolution approving the removal of Yanukovich’s appointed prime minister of Crimea, Anatoli Mogilev, and replaced him with Sergei Aksenov. Aksenov was only deputy parliamentary member for two years, but he was head of Putin’s Russian Unity Party. Aksenov’s party only received 4% of the vote in the Crimean parliamentary elections. In other words, the men with Kalashnikovs were overriding the will of the electorate. Under duress, members of Crimea’s parliament complied with their instructions (D’Anieri, 2019, p.226).
| By the time it was obvious to everyone that these men were not from Crimea and were Spetznaz from Russia, the deed was finished and everyone had forgotten how illegal and hasty the annexation process had been. To summarize, Putin violated the will of the Ukrainian people in Kyiv through Yanukovych’s corruption. When the Ukrainians reasserted their will and rule of law in the Revolution of Dignity, Putin, |  |
no longer relying on his puppets, sent his own special forces to occupy Crimea, overthrew the Crimean parliament to install a puppet, all while claiming the response to his aggression in Kyiv as a coup. Putin committed a coup, then blamed the Ukrainians for committing a coup in their own country.
No Evidence of a Western-backed Coup
Contrary to Putin’s claim, Yanukovych was not removed from office in “an armed coup.” Instead, from a legal standpoint, Yanukovych abandoned his post. On February 22, the day after Yanukovych left Kyiv, parliament, which included his own party, voted to remove Yanukovych from office on the grounds that he had neglected his duties and abandoned his office and elected an interim president and prime minister. Parliament voted for the removal of Yanukovych by simple majority without invoking the impeachment procedure. Yanukovych refused to resign or return to Kyiv. He had fled the country to Russia, and if his bodyguards are to be believed, was removed by Putin (Plokhy, 2023, p.98).
Putin would later refer to the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland’s visit to the Maidan as proof of America's role in instigating the protest in which she merely handed out cookies (p.96). In December 2013, Nuland stated in a speech to the US–Ukraine Foundation that the US had spent about $5 billion on democracy-building programs in Ukraine since
No Evidence of a Western-backed Coup
Contrary to Putin’s claim, Yanukovych was not removed from office in “an armed coup.” Instead, from a legal standpoint, Yanukovych abandoned his post. On February 22, the day after Yanukovych left Kyiv, parliament, which included his own party, voted to remove Yanukovych from office on the grounds that he had neglected his duties and abandoned his office and elected an interim president and prime minister. Parliament voted for the removal of Yanukovych by simple majority without invoking the impeachment procedure. Yanukovych refused to resign or return to Kyiv. He had fled the country to Russia, and if his bodyguards are to be believed, was removed by Putin (Plokhy, 2023, p.98).
Putin would later refer to the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland’s visit to the Maidan as proof of America's role in instigating the protest in which she merely handed out cookies (p.96). In December 2013, Nuland stated in a speech to the US–Ukraine Foundation that the US had spent about $5 billion on democracy-building programs in Ukraine since
| since 1991. The Russians would seize on this statement, claiming it as evidence the US was orchestrating a revolution (DeBenedictis, 2021, p.40-1). Additionally, in February 2014, a phone conversation between Nuland and US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt was leaked online in which they discussed who would be in Ukraine's new government and exchanged opinions on some political figures (SCMP Archive, 2014). |  |
No evidence of any plan to influence the political outcome is discernable in that recording. Eastern European historian Timothy Snyder commented, "Imagine just how much evidence the Russians have of what the U.S. was doing in Ukraine, given that they had access to that telephone call. That was the best bit they could come up with. And in the context of the time, what that telephone conversation showed was that the Americans were, A, not up to date about what was happening in Ukraine and, B, unable to influence events happening in Ukraine" (Who is Provoking..?, 2014). Far from having any influence on events, the leaked conversation shows Nuland was actually trying to get Ukrainians to accept Yanukovych’s deal. Nuland was ignored.
Western Accomplices
Ukrainian participants in the Maidan decry how little their revolution was understood in the media. Instead of providing accurate and historical context behind Russia’s aggression and blatant interference in Ukraine’s democracy, journalists and politicians instead chose to comment on NATO policy, oil pipelines, and international finance (Shore, 2017, p. xiv).
Although Putin would claim that the West had organized a coup and that Ukraine was now a tool of the West, the sad irony is that Ukrainians felt abandoned by the West. “The context was somehow beyond the Western imagination. Yes, the far Right was there, but it was a real revolution, and in a real revolution all the oppositional forces are present.” However, there was…no real international solidarity” (Cerepanyn, 2014). According to Shore (2017), The Revolution of Dignity laid bare what had long been repressed in Western consciousness, that not only Russians, but also Europeans had proven easily seduced by Putin’s disinformation (p.156). Indeed the Revolution of Dignity was about a country standing together against a would-be dictatorship propped up by foreign aggressor.
Young leftist filmmaker Oleksiy Radynski, who was present at the Maidan, complained:
“The immediate Western response was hypocritically colonial, proclaiming that Ukrainian protests were not European enough to claim allegiance to European values…If members of the racist xenophobic extreme Right sit in nearly every one of the European parliaments, why are we constantly told that racism, xenophobia, and fascism contradict European values? The ideological composition of Ukraine’s Maidan square mirrored Europe” (Radynski, 2014).
Western Accomplices
Ukrainian participants in the Maidan decry how little their revolution was understood in the media. Instead of providing accurate and historical context behind Russia’s aggression and blatant interference in Ukraine’s democracy, journalists and politicians instead chose to comment on NATO policy, oil pipelines, and international finance (Shore, 2017, p. xiv).
Although Putin would claim that the West had organized a coup and that Ukraine was now a tool of the West, the sad irony is that Ukrainians felt abandoned by the West. “The context was somehow beyond the Western imagination. Yes, the far Right was there, but it was a real revolution, and in a real revolution all the oppositional forces are present.” However, there was…no real international solidarity” (Cerepanyn, 2014). According to Shore (2017), The Revolution of Dignity laid bare what had long been repressed in Western consciousness, that not only Russians, but also Europeans had proven easily seduced by Putin’s disinformation (p.156). Indeed the Revolution of Dignity was about a country standing together against a would-be dictatorship propped up by foreign aggressor.
Young leftist filmmaker Oleksiy Radynski, who was present at the Maidan, complained:
“The immediate Western response was hypocritically colonial, proclaiming that Ukrainian protests were not European enough to claim allegiance to European values…If members of the racist xenophobic extreme Right sit in nearly every one of the European parliaments, why are we constantly told that racism, xenophobia, and fascism contradict European values? The ideological composition of Ukraine’s Maidan square mirrored Europe” (Radynski, 2014).
| Since trust in the US government has recently been at record lows, Russian misinformation has found little difficulty in finding audiences to widen this mistrust and undermine support for Ukraine. A decade after Maidan, there are still influential voices repeating conspiracy theories involving Victoria Nuland’s role in the 2014 Revolution of dignity that originated from Moscow’s propaganda. Some media icons repeat these lies without evidence to their massive audiences. On several occasions, Fox News media personality Tucker Carlson, while citing no evidence, has described the 2014 Maidan Revolution as a US-organized “coup in Ukraine” (Davis, p.119). |  |
 | Others are merely complicit in amplifying this rhetoric unchallenged. Joe Rogan in particular has had a less than balanced representation of views on Ukraine in his podcast, which has the highest listenership. On December 3, 2024 for instance, Joe Rogan’s featured guest, Mike Benz a cyber security expert with is no expertise on the topic, stated, "Nuland handed out cookies |
and water bottles to violent street protestors as they surrounded the parliament building and ran the democratically elected government out of office. But then the eastern side of Ukraine completely broke away, and they didn’t respect this new U.S.-installed government” (PowerfulJRE, 2024). Once again, no evidence of a coup is offered, but Kremlin talking points are repeated as if they are fact.
These views are widely shared on such platforms not due to any evidence, but rather the attractiveness such rhetoric has for audiences that tend to gravitate to such platforms. Factual arguments rarely drive ratings whereas conspiracies and intrigue never fail.
Conclusion
Putin’s attempt to portray Maidan as a western-backed coup is meant to deflect his own coup and annexation of Crimea. Putin claims the Revolution of Dignity was a sinister plot concocted by someone in Washington precisely because it was a failed Russian-backed coup in Kyiv that then settled for a Russian-backed armed coup in Crimea.
Putin failed to install Yanukovych as his puppet in 2004 with the botched assassination of Viktor Yushchenko and blatant voter fraud. Ukraine was only able to fend off this foreign interference and preserve its sovereignty through mass civil protests in the Orange Revolution. When Yanukovych succeeded in getting legitimately elected in 2010, he was only able to do so in part by promising to sign the EU association agreement. When Putin attempted coercion and bribery to steer Yanukovych from this pledge, the people responded again as they did in the precedent set in 2004. The Dictatorship laws of January 2014 vindicated both protestors to remove Yanukovych as well as the verbal support given from Western leaders in favor of democracy.
No one else can be blamed for Yanukovych’s ruthless response to initially peaceful protestors. The Ukrainian president had at his disposal not only the police, the military, and the Berkut riot police, but also hired thugs dressed in street clothes recruited among criminals. Likewise, Putin both provoked and intentionally escalated the violence in Ukraine through his direct control of Russian language television by inventing neo-Nazi atrocities.
Subsequently, the Revolution of Dignity was not led by the far Right nor were they a significant presence in the Maidan. This is evidenced by the eyewitnesses on the ground and their dismal electoral performance that took place in May. Without a single far Right representative in Ukraine’s parliament, no one can argue that a victory of the Maidan was a victory for the far Right.
The purpose of the “Western-backed coup” conspiracy theory is to deny Ukraine’s agency in their destiny, remove all focus from Russia’s aggression, and to delegitimize both the ruling government and state of Ukraine. Those who choose to parrot or amplify Putin’s talking points are merely complicit in the Kremlin’s informational warfare aimed at weakening unified support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, it dehumanizes those who risked their lives and the 108 who paid the ultimate price to preserve constitutional democracy. Putin would prefer they be forgotten and replaced with ‘big power politics’ instead. Nothing is more dangerous for autocrats than ordinary people believing they have power.
Although it may prove difficult to imagine a more gaslit nation on earth, Ukraine’s true story is a people’s history of resistance to empire. From the Cossack traditions of the 17th century to 21st century political movements, one thing is clear: the Ukrainian people possess a rare strength. Their folkstories and traditions have culturally empowered them into shaping their own destiny against any form of coercion regardless of the odds. Not from their own government, nor anyone else. They are the paragon of a free people.
These views are widely shared on such platforms not due to any evidence, but rather the attractiveness such rhetoric has for audiences that tend to gravitate to such platforms. Factual arguments rarely drive ratings whereas conspiracies and intrigue never fail.
Conclusion
Putin’s attempt to portray Maidan as a western-backed coup is meant to deflect his own coup and annexation of Crimea. Putin claims the Revolution of Dignity was a sinister plot concocted by someone in Washington precisely because it was a failed Russian-backed coup in Kyiv that then settled for a Russian-backed armed coup in Crimea.
Putin failed to install Yanukovych as his puppet in 2004 with the botched assassination of Viktor Yushchenko and blatant voter fraud. Ukraine was only able to fend off this foreign interference and preserve its sovereignty through mass civil protests in the Orange Revolution. When Yanukovych succeeded in getting legitimately elected in 2010, he was only able to do so in part by promising to sign the EU association agreement. When Putin attempted coercion and bribery to steer Yanukovych from this pledge, the people responded again as they did in the precedent set in 2004. The Dictatorship laws of January 2014 vindicated both protestors to remove Yanukovych as well as the verbal support given from Western leaders in favor of democracy.
No one else can be blamed for Yanukovych’s ruthless response to initially peaceful protestors. The Ukrainian president had at his disposal not only the police, the military, and the Berkut riot police, but also hired thugs dressed in street clothes recruited among criminals. Likewise, Putin both provoked and intentionally escalated the violence in Ukraine through his direct control of Russian language television by inventing neo-Nazi atrocities.
Subsequently, the Revolution of Dignity was not led by the far Right nor were they a significant presence in the Maidan. This is evidenced by the eyewitnesses on the ground and their dismal electoral performance that took place in May. Without a single far Right representative in Ukraine’s parliament, no one can argue that a victory of the Maidan was a victory for the far Right.
The purpose of the “Western-backed coup” conspiracy theory is to deny Ukraine’s agency in their destiny, remove all focus from Russia’s aggression, and to delegitimize both the ruling government and state of Ukraine. Those who choose to parrot or amplify Putin’s talking points are merely complicit in the Kremlin’s informational warfare aimed at weakening unified support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, it dehumanizes those who risked their lives and the 108 who paid the ultimate price to preserve constitutional democracy. Putin would prefer they be forgotten and replaced with ‘big power politics’ instead. Nothing is more dangerous for autocrats than ordinary people believing they have power.
Although it may prove difficult to imagine a more gaslit nation on earth, Ukraine’s true story is a people’s history of resistance to empire. From the Cossack traditions of the 17th century to 21st century political movements, one thing is clear: the Ukrainian people possess a rare strength. Their folkstories and traditions have culturally empowered them into shaping their own destiny against any form of coercion regardless of the odds. Not from their own government, nor anyone else. They are the paragon of a free people.
References
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Cherepanyn, V. (2014, March). “It was a Real Revolution”: An Interview with Vasyl Cherepanyn. Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal. https://links.org.au/comment/308076#comment-308076
D’Anieri, P. (2019). Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War. Cambridge University Press.
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Davis, J. (2024). In Their Own Words: How Russian Propagandists Reveal Putin's Intentions. ibidem-Verlag.
DeBenedictis, K. (2021). Russian 'Hybrid Warfare' and the Annexation of Crimea: The Modern Application of Soviet Political Warfare. I.B. Tauris.
Dickinson, J. (2014). Prosymo maksymal’nyi perepost! Tactical and Discursive Uses of Social Media in Ukraine’s EuroMaidan. Ab Imperio 2014(3), 75-93. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/imp.2014.0058.
Dmytro, K. (2014, January). Summary of laws adopted by Ukrainian parliament on January 16, 2014. Transparency International Ukraine. Archived from the original on January 21, 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140121054645/http://ti-ukraine.org/news/4269.html
Fisherman, D.E. (2014, April). The Ukrainian Revolution’s Unlikely Street-Fighting Rabbi. The Jewish Daily Forward. https://forward.com/opinion/195785/the-ukrainian-revolution-s-unlikely-street-fight/
Forostyna, O. (2014, May). How to Oust a Dictator in 93 Days. Eurozine. https://www.eurozine.com/how-to-oust-a-dictator-in-93-days/
Hrytsak, Y. (2014). Ignorance is Power. (A. Svinarenko, trans.). Ab Imperio. 3. https://net.abimperio.net/files/articles_for_net/17_15.3hrytsak.pdf
Kin, O. (2017). Vasyl Lozynsky, The Maidan After Hours. Board of Publications University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa.
Milanovic, B. (1998). Income, Inequality, and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy. The World Bank. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/pt/229251468767984676/pdf/multi-page.pdf
Nayem, M. (2014, April). Uprising in Ukraine: How It All Began. Open Society Foundations. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/uprising-ukraine-how-it-all-began
Open Letter of Ukrainian Jews to Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. (2014, March). Ukrainian Jewish Encounter. https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/media/Putin20Letter1-1.pdf
Özçelik, S. (2020). The Russian Occupation of Crimea in 2014: The Second Sürgün (The Soviet Genocide) of the Crimean Tatars. Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 5(1), 29-44. https://doi.org/10.31454/usb.721939
Plokhy, S. (2023). The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History. W.W. Norton & Company.
PowerfulJRE. (2024, December 3). Joe Rogan Experience #2237 - Mike Benz [video] YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrJhQpvlkLA&t=65s
Prochasko, J. (2011). Europe’s forgotten fringes. Europe’s Foreign Cultural Relations. Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen: 70-9. https://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/Content/docs/mediathek/publikationen/kulturreport2011_europes-foreign-cultural-relations.pdf
Rachkevych, M. (2014). Ukraine Averted Greater Bloodbath, Moskal Alleges. Kyiv Post. https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/ukraine-averted-greater-bloodbath-moskal-alleges-337526.html
Radynski, O. (2014, May). Maidan and Beyond, Part I. E-Flux. 55. https://www.e-flux.com/journal/55/60303/maidan-and-beyond-part-i/
Radynski, O. (2014, June). Maidan and Beyond, Part II: The Cacophony of Donbas. E-Flux. 56. https://www.e-flux.com/journal/56/60331/maidan-and-beyond-part-ii-the-cacophony-of-donbas/
SCMP Archive. (2014, February 7). Recorded conversation between Asst. Sec. of State Victoria Nuland and Amb. Jeffery Pyatt [video] YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoW75J5bnnE
Shore, M. (2017). The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution. Yale University Press.
Shteyngart, G. (2015, February). Out of My Mouth Comes Unimpeachable Manly Truth. New York Times Magazine. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/magazine/out-of-my-mouth-comes-unimpeachable-manly-truth.html
Snyder, T. & Zhurzhenko, T. (2014, June). Diaries and memoirs of the Maidan Ukraine from November 2013 to February 2014. Eurozine. https://www.eurozine.com/diaries-and-memoirs-of-the-maidan/
Vakhovska, N., Tchermalykh. N., and Belorusets, Y. (2014) Maidan: Collected Pluralities (O. Kin, trans.). Documenting Maidan: December 2013/ February 2014. https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Ausland/Osteuropa/maidan_RLS2.pdf
"Who Is Provoking the Unrest in Ukraine? A Debate on Role of Russia, United States in Regional Crisis" (2014). Democracy Now! 4 March 2014. Retrieved 13 December 2024. https://www.democracynow.org/2014/3/3/who_is_provoking_the_unrest_in
Wilson, A. (2005). Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. Yale University Press.
Andrukhovych, Y. (2014, January). Open Letter from Ukrainian Writer Yuri Andrukhovych. (V. Chernetsky, trans.). New Eastern Europe. https://neweasterneurope.eu/2014/01/24/open-letter-from-ukrainian-writer-yuri-andrukhovych/
Cherepanyn, V. (2014, March). “It was a Real Revolution”: An Interview with Vasyl Cherepanyn. Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal. https://links.org.au/comment/308076#comment-308076
D’Anieri, P. (2019). Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War. Cambridge University Press.
Darden, K. (2001). Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine Under Kuchma. East European Constitutional Review, 10(2/3), 67–71.
Davis, J. (2024). In Their Own Words: How Russian Propagandists Reveal Putin's Intentions. ibidem-Verlag.
DeBenedictis, K. (2021). Russian 'Hybrid Warfare' and the Annexation of Crimea: The Modern Application of Soviet Political Warfare. I.B. Tauris.
Dickinson, J. (2014). Prosymo maksymal’nyi perepost! Tactical and Discursive Uses of Social Media in Ukraine’s EuroMaidan. Ab Imperio 2014(3), 75-93. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/imp.2014.0058.
Dmytro, K. (2014, January). Summary of laws adopted by Ukrainian parliament on January 16, 2014. Transparency International Ukraine. Archived from the original on January 21, 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140121054645/http://ti-ukraine.org/news/4269.html
Fisherman, D.E. (2014, April). The Ukrainian Revolution’s Unlikely Street-Fighting Rabbi. The Jewish Daily Forward. https://forward.com/opinion/195785/the-ukrainian-revolution-s-unlikely-street-fight/
Forostyna, O. (2014, May). How to Oust a Dictator in 93 Days. Eurozine. https://www.eurozine.com/how-to-oust-a-dictator-in-93-days/
Hrytsak, Y. (2014). Ignorance is Power. (A. Svinarenko, trans.). Ab Imperio. 3. https://net.abimperio.net/files/articles_for_net/17_15.3hrytsak.pdf
Kin, O. (2017). Vasyl Lozynsky, The Maidan After Hours. Board of Publications University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa.
Milanovic, B. (1998). Income, Inequality, and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy. The World Bank. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/pt/229251468767984676/pdf/multi-page.pdf
Nayem, M. (2014, April). Uprising in Ukraine: How It All Began. Open Society Foundations. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/uprising-ukraine-how-it-all-began
Open Letter of Ukrainian Jews to Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. (2014, March). Ukrainian Jewish Encounter. https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/media/Putin20Letter1-1.pdf
Özçelik, S. (2020). The Russian Occupation of Crimea in 2014: The Second Sürgün (The Soviet Genocide) of the Crimean Tatars. Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 5(1), 29-44. https://doi.org/10.31454/usb.721939
Plokhy, S. (2023). The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History. W.W. Norton & Company.
PowerfulJRE. (2024, December 3). Joe Rogan Experience #2237 - Mike Benz [video] YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrJhQpvlkLA&t=65s
Prochasko, J. (2011). Europe’s forgotten fringes. Europe’s Foreign Cultural Relations. Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen: 70-9. https://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/Content/docs/mediathek/publikationen/kulturreport2011_europes-foreign-cultural-relations.pdf
Rachkevych, M. (2014). Ukraine Averted Greater Bloodbath, Moskal Alleges. Kyiv Post. https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/ukraine-averted-greater-bloodbath-moskal-alleges-337526.html
Radynski, O. (2014, May). Maidan and Beyond, Part I. E-Flux. 55. https://www.e-flux.com/journal/55/60303/maidan-and-beyond-part-i/
Radynski, O. (2014, June). Maidan and Beyond, Part II: The Cacophony of Donbas. E-Flux. 56. https://www.e-flux.com/journal/56/60331/maidan-and-beyond-part-ii-the-cacophony-of-donbas/
SCMP Archive. (2014, February 7). Recorded conversation between Asst. Sec. of State Victoria Nuland and Amb. Jeffery Pyatt [video] YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoW75J5bnnE
Shore, M. (2017). The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution. Yale University Press.
Shteyngart, G. (2015, February). Out of My Mouth Comes Unimpeachable Manly Truth. New York Times Magazine. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/magazine/out-of-my-mouth-comes-unimpeachable-manly-truth.html
Snyder, T. & Zhurzhenko, T. (2014, June). Diaries and memoirs of the Maidan Ukraine from November 2013 to February 2014. Eurozine. https://www.eurozine.com/diaries-and-memoirs-of-the-maidan/
Vakhovska, N., Tchermalykh. N., and Belorusets, Y. (2014) Maidan: Collected Pluralities (O. Kin, trans.). Documenting Maidan: December 2013/ February 2014. https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Ausland/Osteuropa/maidan_RLS2.pdf
"Who Is Provoking the Unrest in Ukraine? A Debate on Role of Russia, United States in Regional Crisis" (2014). Democracy Now! 4 March 2014. Retrieved 13 December 2024. https://www.democracynow.org/2014/3/3/who_is_provoking_the_unrest_in
Wilson, A. (2005). Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. Yale University Press.
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