| By Timothy Holtgrefe September 2024 For several years prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin had devoted much of his time and effort to promoting false narratives and a revisionist history of Ukraine as early as 2005. However, the rhetorical gaslighting and denial of Ukraine’s rich cultural heritage is actually nothing new. In fact for Russian autocrats it is an historical continuity going back several hundred years in an effort to subjugate a race of people. |  |
What is surprising is not that the Russian Empire ‘russified’ their ethnic minorities, as all colonizers have performed similar practices, but that so many of these false narratives continue to persist into today’s political discourse regarding the current war in Ukraine; even in the West. This is part 8 of an HQ exclusive series to investigate Russia’s relentless attack on history. In this episode, we will explore Russia’s revisionist history of NATO’s enlargement as Putin’s rationale for invading and annexing Ukraine.
NATO ‘Expansion’ vs Russian Imperialism Dichotomy
When Vladimir Putin announced his “special military operation” on February 24, 2022, one of the goals outlined in his full scale invasion was a change in Ukraine’s constitution strictly stating neutrality, and referred to NATO as an existential threat to Russia. This was a tremendous escalation of the ongoing conflict which began in 2014 shortly after Kyiv’s Revolution of Dignity caused its pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovich to flee the country. However, the claim that NATO ‘provoked’ or shares blame for the conflict is not limited to Russian state controlled media. It has also influenced various western commentators and skeptics on American power. Some have even gone as far as to view Putin’s ‘security concerns’ as legitimate.
On the other side of the coin, the problem with the ‘NATO expansion’ narrative is it implies that without NATO’s existence, Russia would have no reason to behave aggressively towards Ukraine’s sovereignty. This position fails to take into account Russia’s imperialist and genocidal rhetoric towards Ukraine, Moscow's autocratic resurgence, historical aggression towards Ukraine and its other neighbors, and the rise of fascism in Russia after 1991. The myth is easily dispelled when examining the political development of Russia and Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Cause 1: Imperialism vs Statehood: The Post Soviet Path
When the Soviet Union collapsed, it is often taken for granted that Poland made no territorial claims to Lithuania, Belarus, or Ukraine. For hundreds of years all three of these countries were once ruled by the Polish-Lithuanian CommonWealth and each had a large ethnic and Polish speaking population in their territories after the Soviet collapse. Both the Polish and Lithuanian approaches to historical claims were strikingly different from the Russian presumption that Ukraine and Belarus are stray “Russian” lands simply because all three “descended” from Kyivan Rus.
When Vladimir Putin announced his “special military operation” on February 24, 2022, one of the goals outlined in his full scale invasion was a change in Ukraine’s constitution strictly stating neutrality, and referred to NATO as an existential threat to Russia. This was a tremendous escalation of the ongoing conflict which began in 2014 shortly after Kyiv’s Revolution of Dignity caused its pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovich to flee the country. However, the claim that NATO ‘provoked’ or shares blame for the conflict is not limited to Russian state controlled media. It has also influenced various western commentators and skeptics on American power. Some have even gone as far as to view Putin’s ‘security concerns’ as legitimate.
On the other side of the coin, the problem with the ‘NATO expansion’ narrative is it implies that without NATO’s existence, Russia would have no reason to behave aggressively towards Ukraine’s sovereignty. This position fails to take into account Russia’s imperialist and genocidal rhetoric towards Ukraine, Moscow's autocratic resurgence, historical aggression towards Ukraine and its other neighbors, and the rise of fascism in Russia after 1991. The myth is easily dispelled when examining the political development of Russia and Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Cause 1: Imperialism vs Statehood: The Post Soviet Path
When the Soviet Union collapsed, it is often taken for granted that Poland made no territorial claims to Lithuania, Belarus, or Ukraine. For hundreds of years all three of these countries were once ruled by the Polish-Lithuanian CommonWealth and each had a large ethnic and Polish speaking population in their territories after the Soviet collapse. Both the Polish and Lithuanian approaches to historical claims were strikingly different from the Russian presumption that Ukraine and Belarus are stray “Russian” lands simply because all three “descended” from Kyivan Rus.
 | In 1991, some Poles in Lithuania favored autonomy within their ethnic enclaves and the more radical among them wished to be unified with Poland. However, Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski and President Wałęsa opposed these territorial demands, proposing instead that Poles in Lithuania regard themselves as citizens of a future Lithuanian nation-state. As a result, Polish-Lithuanian relations became excellent by the end of the 1990s. |
There were perhaps 215,000 Belarusians in Poland and 417,000 Poles in Belarus (Snyder, 2003, p.267-76). Despite these individuals also forming political communities and making controversial demands, Poland and Belarus signed agreements in October 1991 marking the end of Belarusian claims on Polish territory. Likewise, Belarusian nationalists also gave up claims to Vilnius (Karp, 1993, p.229-230). By 1992, Lithuania, Belarus, and Poland each dissolved the regional governments where ethnic Poles constituted a majority (Snyder, 2003, p.269).
Poles, no less than Russians, Hungarians, or Serbs, have a complicated historical relationship with their neighbors, which includes, in the twentieth century, open revanchism, official states of war, massive ethnic cleansing, and memories of injustice. The Polish-Ukrainian ethnic cleansings of the 1940s in particular were completely savage and widespread. The success of Poland’s “European Standard” policy should not blind us to the fact that the challenges were real (p.261-2). Polish troops invaded Vilnius as recently as 1920 to claim it as historically Poland. Before the Second World War, the language spoken in Vilnius was predominantly Polish and the language of its countryside was Belarusian (p.9-15).
Poles, no less than Russians, Hungarians, or Serbs, have a complicated historical relationship with their neighbors, which includes, in the twentieth century, open revanchism, official states of war, massive ethnic cleansing, and memories of injustice. The Polish-Ukrainian ethnic cleansings of the 1940s in particular were completely savage and widespread. The success of Poland’s “European Standard” policy should not blind us to the fact that the challenges were real (p.261-2). Polish troops invaded Vilnius as recently as 1920 to claim it as historically Poland. Before the Second World War, the language spoken in Vilnius was predominantly Polish and the language of its countryside was Belarusian (p.9-15).
 | Lithuania for its part had its own historical claims to neighboring regions. Since the Grand Duchy of Lithuania historically included a majority of Orthodox subjects and most of the Kyivan patrimony, it was called a “Rusian” realm. In 1385, Jogaila acted as “Grand Duke of Lithuania and Lord and Heir of Rus.” In fact, in a 1449 treaty signed between Lithuania and Muscovy, the former was called “Rusians,” the latter “Muscovite” (p.24). In other words, Lithuanians were claiming political continuity to historically Ukrainian lands long before it ever occurred to Moscow that it could do so in pursuit of its own imperial mythology. If it chose to, Lithuania could hold a more believable historical claim to Ukrainian lands for this reason. At least their legal traditions followed Old Kyivan Rus, whereas Muscovy inherited its political origins from the Mongols (Pelenski, 1977, p.48-50). |
Upon independence, Poland immediately and unconditionally confirmed existing frontiers and introduced what it called “European standards of ministry rights” (Snyder, 2003, p.258). Hungary and Romania were able to reach a similar understanding regarding their ethnic minorities. This was possible because each of these states were pursuing statehood, not empire. Furthermore, the policy of European standards emphasized that the fate of minorities is a domestic matter for the sovereign states of which they are citizens, while other approaches challenge the sovereignty of neighbors (p.260).
The Russian and Serbian Contrast
Russian attitudes towards former imperial possessions demonstrated a clear difference. In January 1991, as a response to Lithuanian independence, Soviet special forces seized the Lithuanian television building in Vilnius, killing thirteen and wounding hundreds. Soviet officials spoke of partitioning Lithuania amongst Poland and Belarus. However, Moscow’s attempts for divide and rule tempted neither of the emerging new states, even as Russia claimed it militarily intervened on behalf of Polish and Belarusian minorities. Furthermore, 90% of Polish citizens surveyed in February 1991 favored the independence of Lithuania. This was mainly due to the lack of imperialist propaganda in Polish society (Senn, 1995, p.145). Russia, on the other hand, supported armed occupation of part of Moldova to support its ethnic enclave of Transitria, and Yeltsin himself often suggested that the border with Ukraine was not fixed. The attitude of the Russian parliament in the mid-1990s was that Crimea must be returned to Russia by Ukraine (Snyder, 2003, p.260).
The Russian and Serbian Contrast
Russian attitudes towards former imperial possessions demonstrated a clear difference. In January 1991, as a response to Lithuanian independence, Soviet special forces seized the Lithuanian television building in Vilnius, killing thirteen and wounding hundreds. Soviet officials spoke of partitioning Lithuania amongst Poland and Belarus. However, Moscow’s attempts for divide and rule tempted neither of the emerging new states, even as Russia claimed it militarily intervened on behalf of Polish and Belarusian minorities. Furthermore, 90% of Polish citizens surveyed in February 1991 favored the independence of Lithuania. This was mainly due to the lack of imperialist propaganda in Polish society (Senn, 1995, p.145). Russia, on the other hand, supported armed occupation of part of Moldova to support its ethnic enclave of Transitria, and Yeltsin himself often suggested that the border with Ukraine was not fixed. The attitude of the Russian parliament in the mid-1990s was that Crimea must be returned to Russia by Ukraine (Snyder, 2003, p.260).
 | As Lithuania, Belarus, and Poland told their minorities abroad to regard themselves as citizens of the country they resided, Yugoslavia and Russia most notably used the issues of borders and diasporas to consolidate their power. The Serbian, and later Russian, Orthodox Churches called upon their believers to fight for territory (p.276). |
Similar to Russia, Serbia also experienced humiliation after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav activism on behalf of ethnic Serbs caused four wars, two interventions by NATO, over a million refugees, and tens of thousands of deaths (p.260). Russia, which ignored western European institutions and norms, prosecuted two fantastically brutal wars in Chechnya, intervened regularly in the Caucasus, and occupied Transnistria, part of Moldova.
In spite of Putin’s revisionist history of the 90s, official US policy favored Russian empire. As early as August 1, 1991, George Bush senior visited Kyiv just 3 weeks before Ukrainians voted 92% for independence and gave a speech begging Ukraine to remain in the Soviet Union. Ukrainians would remember this speech as “the Chicken Kyiv speech” (p.243). In addition to monetary support for the USSR, the collapse occurred in spite of American intentions. Furthermore, the rejection of peace talks and complete destruction of Chechnya’s capital Grozny in February 2000 went completely unnoticed with almost no international outcry from the west (Plokhy, 2023, p.55).
Ivan Drach, Ukrainian independence leader, said just before independence was achieved, “We want to travel the Polish path. We know that the path to Europe really does lead through Poland” (Burant, 1993, p.410). The May 1992 treaty with Poland made it a more important partner for Ukraine than Russia. Once again, the minority concerns would not serve as a pretext for intervention in Ukrainian affairs, Russian policy was quite the opposite (Snyder, 2003, p.265).
In the end, the Poles, Lithuanians, and Belarusians proved that nations could secure their interests by giving up all claims to their historical colonies. Instead of extending Polish power, spreading Polish culture, or annexing territory under the guise of preventing discrimination against Polish minorities, they preserved peace, economic prosperity, and their present borders by choosing statehood rather than empire.
As for Russia, no state gives up on empire willingly. The British, French, Dutch and Germans only gradually gave up their imperial entanglements after losing colonial wars. Moscow, however, with few minor exceptions, lost their colonies without any military attempts to hold on to them. Faced with collapse, the Soviet armies were short of resources and morale to fight for their imperial possessions that dated back to tsarist Russia.
Cause 2: Democracy vs Autocracy
In addition to imperialist rhetoric, there were early warnings that the new Russian Federation was not going to be the reformed democracy many had hoped for. The problem for Russia was that Ukraine, as a partially Russian speaking democracy, was a threat to its autocratic power as it emboldened its own liberal opposition, provided a model to follow, and made the soft power reconquest of Ukraine more difficult as their institutions became less corruptible and looked more towards the west in its aspirations.
After the Russian parliament refused to extend Yeltsin’s emergency powers, Yeltsin signed a decree dissolving both houses of parliament in September 1993, a move that violated Russia’s existing constitution. In response, the Supreme Soviet annulled the decree and Congress impeached the president. On October 4, 1993, Boris Yeltsin ordered T-80 tanks to open fire on the Russian parliament building to resolve the political standoff and granted himself stronger executive powers. All of this was done under the guise of “protecting” democracy (Colton, 2011, p.272-77).
Ivan Drach, Ukrainian independence leader, said just before independence was achieved, “We want to travel the Polish path. We know that the path to Europe really does lead through Poland” (Burant, 1993, p.410). The May 1992 treaty with Poland made it a more important partner for Ukraine than Russia. Once again, the minority concerns would not serve as a pretext for intervention in Ukrainian affairs, Russian policy was quite the opposite (Snyder, 2003, p.265).
In the end, the Poles, Lithuanians, and Belarusians proved that nations could secure their interests by giving up all claims to their historical colonies. Instead of extending Polish power, spreading Polish culture, or annexing territory under the guise of preventing discrimination against Polish minorities, they preserved peace, economic prosperity, and their present borders by choosing statehood rather than empire.
As for Russia, no state gives up on empire willingly. The British, French, Dutch and Germans only gradually gave up their imperial entanglements after losing colonial wars. Moscow, however, with few minor exceptions, lost their colonies without any military attempts to hold on to them. Faced with collapse, the Soviet armies were short of resources and morale to fight for their imperial possessions that dated back to tsarist Russia.
Cause 2: Democracy vs Autocracy
In addition to imperialist rhetoric, there were early warnings that the new Russian Federation was not going to be the reformed democracy many had hoped for. The problem for Russia was that Ukraine, as a partially Russian speaking democracy, was a threat to its autocratic power as it emboldened its own liberal opposition, provided a model to follow, and made the soft power reconquest of Ukraine more difficult as their institutions became less corruptible and looked more towards the west in its aspirations.
After the Russian parliament refused to extend Yeltsin’s emergency powers, Yeltsin signed a decree dissolving both houses of parliament in September 1993, a move that violated Russia’s existing constitution. In response, the Supreme Soviet annulled the decree and Congress impeached the president. On October 4, 1993, Boris Yeltsin ordered T-80 tanks to open fire on the Russian parliament building to resolve the political standoff and granted himself stronger executive powers. All of this was done under the guise of “protecting” democracy (Colton, 2011, p.272-77).
| After two years, one month, and two weeks, Russia all but ended its experiment in parliamentary democracy. In a telephone conversation with President Bill Clinton the next day, Yeltsin presented his actions as a victory for democracy. In the tradition of Soviet political discourse, he called his opponents “fascists.” Clinton was eager to support his Russian ally. “You did everything exactly as you had to, and I congratulate you for the way you handled it,” declared the American President (cited by Plokhy, 2023, p.39). |  |
The death of Russian democracy took place in full view and public approval from Washington and Yeltsin’s new constitution established a precedent for authoritarian rule. When Putin took power in 1999, whatever remained of democracy was curtailed and the road to authoritarianism was solidified. Elections of regional governors were abolished and new laws were introduced targeting activities of political parties and NGOs (Colton, 2011, p.280-1).
Meanwhile, as Russia became more authoritarian, Ukraine was becoming more democratic by successfully resisting each presidential attempt to follow the Russian model (D’Anieri, 2019, p.3-4). Furthermore, western insistence on democratic rule as a prerequisite for good relations with Europe, privileged Ukraine in building stronger ties to Europe (p.15). As Yeltsin used economic and political crises to justify his dictatorship, Ukraine found itself impoverished, had its own difficulties with corruption, and yet still survived its many hardships as a democracy with a total of four electoral turnovers, a vibrant media, and repeated mass movements of political change (Milanovic, 1998, p.186).
Meanwhile, as Russia became more authoritarian, Ukraine was becoming more democratic by successfully resisting each presidential attempt to follow the Russian model (D’Anieri, 2019, p.3-4). Furthermore, western insistence on democratic rule as a prerequisite for good relations with Europe, privileged Ukraine in building stronger ties to Europe (p.15). As Yeltsin used economic and political crises to justify his dictatorship, Ukraine found itself impoverished, had its own difficulties with corruption, and yet still survived its many hardships as a democracy with a total of four electoral turnovers, a vibrant media, and repeated mass movements of political change (Milanovic, 1998, p.186).
 | This clash between authoritarian Russia and democratic Ukraine almost exploded into an international crisis in the 2004 Orange Revolution when the Russian-backed candidate Viktor Yanokovych attempted to falsify the results of the presidential election and his opponent Viktor Yushencko survived an assassination attempt. The alleged assassin fled to Russia and found a safe haven there. Ukrainians responded with mass protests occupying the independence square of Maidan and succeeded in demanding a new vote in which the pro-Western candidate Yushencko won handedly (Wilson, 2005, p.36). |
Failing in his targeting of Ukraine’s political elite, however, Putin began to alter his tactics by saturating Russian language media and Orthodox Churches with propaganda aimed at the Ukrainian public.
Cause 3: Genocidal Language and the Rise of Fascism
Putin called the Soviet collapse the “greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century” (Putin, 2005). Not the Holocaust, Holodomor, nor Stalin’s mass deportations, but the end to the Soviet Empire that silenced millions of voices and lives. The statement further suggests he prefers Moscow’s colonial rule as it was prior to 1991. However, seeing as Soviet identity was now rejected, state propaganda was in need of an alternative instrument of Russian nation-building or a means of maintaining Russian control over the post-Soviet space. Yeltsin even called for a new model of the Russian idea (Rubin, 1996). This was eventually recovered in the old tsarist mythology for empire building of Pan-Slavism and the Third Rome Theory (see Part 1).
The “big Russian nation” to include Ukraine and Belarus was adopted by imperial elites in the late 1800s and once again in Putin’s Russia (Miller, 2003, p.24-26).
Cause 3: Genocidal Language and the Rise of Fascism
Putin called the Soviet collapse the “greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century” (Putin, 2005). Not the Holocaust, Holodomor, nor Stalin’s mass deportations, but the end to the Soviet Empire that silenced millions of voices and lives. The statement further suggests he prefers Moscow’s colonial rule as it was prior to 1991. However, seeing as Soviet identity was now rejected, state propaganda was in need of an alternative instrument of Russian nation-building or a means of maintaining Russian control over the post-Soviet space. Yeltsin even called for a new model of the Russian idea (Rubin, 1996). This was eventually recovered in the old tsarist mythology for empire building of Pan-Slavism and the Third Rome Theory (see Part 1).
The “big Russian nation” to include Ukraine and Belarus was adopted by imperial elites in the late 1800s and once again in Putin’s Russia (Miller, 2003, p.24-26).
| Putin’s ideological mentor, Aleksandr Dugin, advocated for the creation of a Eurasian empire and has been long considered an ideologue of Russian fascism. Dugin became an advisor and chief of the presidential staff, speaker of the Duma, and then head of foreign intelligence service (Laruelle, 2015). |  |
Perhaps the most historically outspoken fascist that Putin admires is Ivan Ilyin who in 1950 wrote, “What the Dismemberment of Russia Promises the World.” It has been a frequently quoted source of Russian officials including Putin himself. Ilyin argued that one day Russia would gather its lands back under its tutelage (Snyder, 2018,p.16-35). In May 2009, less than a year after the invasion of Georgia, Putin made a public show of his admiration for imperial Russian thinkers. In conversation with President George Bush in 2008, Putin shared his belief that he saw Ukraine’s borders as illegitimate and part of historical Russia. The Slavic roots of the two peoples became his excuse to condemn any Western support for Ukraine (Plokhy, 2017, p.326). Identity and old imperial views of the world were once again taught in Russian schools and its “manifest destiny” in its old Soviet sphere became popular among Russians. It offered justification for the existence of the Russian Federation as a whole and Putin’s dictatorial rule (Plokhy, 2023, p.105).
In a speech after annexing Crimea, Putin made it clear that he does not recognize Ukrainian identity, nationality, history, nor right to exist. His speeches do not reflect self-defense from an existential threat, but rather a revisionist history full of genocidal language. Russian historian Andrei Zubov, at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, compared the planned annexation of the peninsula to Hitler’s Anschluss of Austria in 1938. He drew parallels between Hitler’s vision of Greater Germany and Russia’s reunification rhetoric, pointed out that both acts were justified to the public by the need to protect allegedly persecuted minorities, German (in Czechoslavakia) in the first case and Russian in the second, and mentioned the staged referendum as a sham to provide legal cover for the forcible annexation. Zubov was soon dismissed never to work in academia again, but he did not lose the argument (Reutors, 2014). In both cases (The Anschluss of 1938 and Crimea 2014) little concern was aroused in London and Paris, as it was assumed that the aggressor’s appetite for expansion was limited to German or Russian ethnic territories. Both instances proved wishful thinking at its worst (Plokhy, 2023, p.117).
Both Putin’s rhetoric and actions do not reflect self-defense, but annexation. Annexation in and of itself demonstrates empire, not defense. In fact, the very act of annexation disproves the NATO ‘expansion’ narrative entirely.
Cause 4: Russian Aggression and Betrayal
The new Russian elite never made a clean break from their communist past. Shortly after the new Russian Federation was created, Moscow and local party elites sought to mobilize Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in the republics long before NATO enlargement was ever a thought (p.25-26). “When it [Russia] is back on its feet,” Yeltsin prophesied in 1991, “everyone will rally to it and the question [of the Union] can be resolved again” (cited by Zubok, 2023, p.426). In addition to declaring the Crimea had been illegitimately transferred to Ukraine, the Russian parliament declared the city of Sevastopol for the Russian Federation (Plokhy, 2023, p.63).
When Ukraine voted for independence in 1991, Ukraine was holding on to the third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, however, it was statements from Boris Yeltsin that made them hesitate in giving them up. A statement issued by his press secretary indicated that Ukraine’s borders could be guaranteed only in union with Russia. Volodymyr Filenko, a prominent member of Ukraine’s parliament, stated, “We’re afraid of Russia, if you like. We’re fighting for our independence from Russia. We cannot say there is a nuclear threat, but they did recently raise territorial claims” (cited by Sanders, 2001, p.43-44). Keeping the nukes seemed the only plausible way of assuring the country’s security. Ukraine and Kazakhstan were singled out. “If those republics enter into a union with Russia, then there is no problem….But if they withdraw, then we must be concerned about the population living there and not forget that those lands were colonized by Russians” (cited by Plokhy, 2023, p.66). Press secretary Voshchanovs’s remarks would set Kremlin policy towards former Soviet states, Ukraine in particular, for years to come. Both Ukraine and Kazakhstan had large ethnic Russian minorities; however, the Russian Ukrainians living in Ukraine were not apprehensive about independence and gave it their majority support (p.33).
In a speech after annexing Crimea, Putin made it clear that he does not recognize Ukrainian identity, nationality, history, nor right to exist. His speeches do not reflect self-defense from an existential threat, but rather a revisionist history full of genocidal language. Russian historian Andrei Zubov, at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, compared the planned annexation of the peninsula to Hitler’s Anschluss of Austria in 1938. He drew parallels between Hitler’s vision of Greater Germany and Russia’s reunification rhetoric, pointed out that both acts were justified to the public by the need to protect allegedly persecuted minorities, German (in Czechoslavakia) in the first case and Russian in the second, and mentioned the staged referendum as a sham to provide legal cover for the forcible annexation. Zubov was soon dismissed never to work in academia again, but he did not lose the argument (Reutors, 2014). In both cases (The Anschluss of 1938 and Crimea 2014) little concern was aroused in London and Paris, as it was assumed that the aggressor’s appetite for expansion was limited to German or Russian ethnic territories. Both instances proved wishful thinking at its worst (Plokhy, 2023, p.117).
Both Putin’s rhetoric and actions do not reflect self-defense, but annexation. Annexation in and of itself demonstrates empire, not defense. In fact, the very act of annexation disproves the NATO ‘expansion’ narrative entirely.
Cause 4: Russian Aggression and Betrayal
The new Russian elite never made a clean break from their communist past. Shortly after the new Russian Federation was created, Moscow and local party elites sought to mobilize Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in the republics long before NATO enlargement was ever a thought (p.25-26). “When it [Russia] is back on its feet,” Yeltsin prophesied in 1991, “everyone will rally to it and the question [of the Union] can be resolved again” (cited by Zubok, 2023, p.426). In addition to declaring the Crimea had been illegitimately transferred to Ukraine, the Russian parliament declared the city of Sevastopol for the Russian Federation (Plokhy, 2023, p.63).
When Ukraine voted for independence in 1991, Ukraine was holding on to the third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, however, it was statements from Boris Yeltsin that made them hesitate in giving them up. A statement issued by his press secretary indicated that Ukraine’s borders could be guaranteed only in union with Russia. Volodymyr Filenko, a prominent member of Ukraine’s parliament, stated, “We’re afraid of Russia, if you like. We’re fighting for our independence from Russia. We cannot say there is a nuclear threat, but they did recently raise territorial claims” (cited by Sanders, 2001, p.43-44). Keeping the nukes seemed the only plausible way of assuring the country’s security. Ukraine and Kazakhstan were singled out. “If those republics enter into a union with Russia, then there is no problem….But if they withdraw, then we must be concerned about the population living there and not forget that those lands were colonized by Russians” (cited by Plokhy, 2023, p.66). Press secretary Voshchanovs’s remarks would set Kremlin policy towards former Soviet states, Ukraine in particular, for years to come. Both Ukraine and Kazakhstan had large ethnic Russian minorities; however, the Russian Ukrainians living in Ukraine were not apprehensive about independence and gave it their majority support (p.33).
 | Unlike any other modern state, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighboring states would be conditioned on alliance with Moscow. Due to imperial rhetoric and mythology, many Russians living outside Ukraine believed that Russia had a historical right to Crimea and should reclaim it. Yeltsin took the position that the Black Sea Fleet should stay Russian no matter what position Ukraine and its leadership might take (p.67). |
In 1992, Russia’s first ambassador to Washington, Vladimir Lukin, proposed the issue of Crimean sovereignty to undermine Ukraine’s position at negotiations on the future of the Black Sea Fleet (Berliner, 1992). The Ukrainian parliament refused to negotiate, denouncing Moscow’s attempts to interfere with its own internal affairs; even as Russia threatened to use Ukrainian dependency on Russian natural gas as a coercive weapon (D’Aneiri, 2019, p.80). John Mearsheimer published an article in Foreign Affairs arguing that Ukraine should be encouraged to keep its nuclear weapons, not pressured to give them up. In his view this was the only way to prevent a future Russo-Ukrainian war. He argued, “Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent against Russian aggression” (Mearsheimer, 1993, p.53).
| Recognizing that Russia was Ukraine’s main security concern, Clinton and Kuchma signed the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on security assurances from the United States and several other nations including Russia, in exchange for surrendering its nukes. As guarantor, Moscow promised to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” (BMSA, 1994). |  |
In May 1997, Kuchma and Yeltsin signed a Friendship Treaty whereby Russia recognized the territorial integrity of Ukraine in its post-Soviet borders and Russia was granted a 20 year lease on its Sevastopol naval base (Plokhy, 2023, p.74). However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exposed the ineffectiveness of any assurances or treaties with Russia. In 2014, control of the Sevastopol base would allow Vladimir Putin to take over the entire peninsula in a few days.
As western leaders continued to accommodate Russia’s imperialist tendencies, continuing dependence on Russian oil and gas would lead to more political blackmail and coercion.
NATO “Expansion” vs Enlargement
The most repeated falsehood regarding NATO enlargement is Putin’s myth that the US promised not to expand NATO “one inch” after Germany’s reunification in 1990. According to both American and Russian eyewitnesses, this alleged promise never took place.
On the question of NATO enlargement, the exact conversation went as follows: US secretary of state James Baker, asked Gorbachev, “Would you prefer to see a unified Germany outside NATO, independent and with no US forces, or would you prefer a unified Germany tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position?” Gorbachev's response was that he would object to any movement of NATO infrastructure into eastern Germany and would later admit that Baker’s statement was made in the context of negotiations on Germany only.
As western leaders continued to accommodate Russia’s imperialist tendencies, continuing dependence on Russian oil and gas would lead to more political blackmail and coercion.
NATO “Expansion” vs Enlargement
The most repeated falsehood regarding NATO enlargement is Putin’s myth that the US promised not to expand NATO “one inch” after Germany’s reunification in 1990. According to both American and Russian eyewitnesses, this alleged promise never took place.
On the question of NATO enlargement, the exact conversation went as follows: US secretary of state James Baker, asked Gorbachev, “Would you prefer to see a unified Germany outside NATO, independent and with no US forces, or would you prefer a unified Germany tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position?” Gorbachev's response was that he would object to any movement of NATO infrastructure into eastern Germany and would later admit that Baker’s statement was made in the context of negotiations on Germany only.
 | Furthermore, this statement was made in 1990 with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact expected to remain in existence, which it shortly afterwards was not. But that did not stop Russian leaders, including Putin, from using Baker’s words as “proof” that NATO had agreed not to expand “beyond” eastern Germany (Sarotte, 2022). |
The context of the conversation was understood by Boris Yeltsin who on August 24, 1993 declared in writing that Polish membership in NATO would not harm the interests of the Russian Federation (Snyder, 2003, p.272). In October 1994, the Lithuanian parliament ratified the treaty to join NATO: 91 in favor, 8 against. Poland’s parliament ratified their treaty earlier the same day by a vote of 295-0 (Prizel, 1995, p.24).
Putin has also promoted a narrative that the Western alliance pressured its former Warsaw Pact allies into joining NATO. But this charge has no evidence. Having made territorial claims and aggressive posture towards its former satellites, it is clear that Russia has mostly itself to blame for the alienation of its former allies. In fact, the former eastern block has a much more favorable opinion of NATO and stronger stance than the rest of the alliance (Moskowitz, 2022).
When Putin came to office in 1999, opposition to NATO enlargement had been a matter of elite rather than public opinion in Russia. NATO enlargement did not even change the basically favorable attitude of the Russian populace to the United States. In the late 1990s, Russians ranked Poland as the most stable state in Eastern Europe, and a stunning 56% believed that Poland should be invited to mediate in ethnic conflicts within the Russian Federation (Snyder, 2003, p.279). Poland’s eastern policy and domestic successes found favorable perceptions for the Russian people to follow. Putin was determined to change that.
Putin has also promoted a narrative that the Western alliance pressured its former Warsaw Pact allies into joining NATO. But this charge has no evidence. Having made territorial claims and aggressive posture towards its former satellites, it is clear that Russia has mostly itself to blame for the alienation of its former allies. In fact, the former eastern block has a much more favorable opinion of NATO and stronger stance than the rest of the alliance (Moskowitz, 2022).
When Putin came to office in 1999, opposition to NATO enlargement had been a matter of elite rather than public opinion in Russia. NATO enlargement did not even change the basically favorable attitude of the Russian populace to the United States. In the late 1990s, Russians ranked Poland as the most stable state in Eastern Europe, and a stunning 56% believed that Poland should be invited to mediate in ethnic conflicts within the Russian Federation (Snyder, 2003, p.279). Poland’s eastern policy and domestic successes found favorable perceptions for the Russian people to follow. Putin was determined to change that.
| With the last nuclear weapon leaving its territory in 1996, the Ukrainians began looking for a substitute to protect their sovereignty and integrity by pursuing NATO membership, especially after neighboring Poland and the Baltics were able to solve their “Russia problem” by joining the alliance (Plokhy, 2023, p.74). “After decades of Soviet domination, we are all afraid of Russia,” Wałęsa told Clinton. |  |
“If Russia again adopts an aggressive foreign policy, this aggression will be directed against Ukraine and Poland. We need America to prevent this” (cited by Sarotte, 2021, p.161). The direct link between nuclear weapons and the desirability of NATO membership for the East European countries was demonstrated by Ukraine’s hesitation to give them up and when Polish officials suggested to their American counterparts that they would acquire nuclear weapons if not allowed to join NATO. This prospect frightened many in Washington and some were prepared to offer NATO membership to Ukraine as a carrot to give up their nuclear arsenal (cited p.166).
In August 1993, Wałęsa reached an informal agreement with Yeltsin that ensured Poland’s membership in NATO. In fact, Russia gave no official objections to eastern expansion of NATO at the time with the exception of Ukraine. “We must be careful not to pull this off in a way that makes Ukraine feel it is being left out in the cold with its furry neighbor to the north,” warned Clinton’s under secretary of state, Strobe Talbott (cited p.166). Washington decided to solve this problem by opening the door to NATO membership to both Ukraine and Russia in order to avoid an anti-Russian rationale for its membership and not leave Ukraine defenseless.
In August 1993, Wałęsa reached an informal agreement with Yeltsin that ensured Poland’s membership in NATO. In fact, Russia gave no official objections to eastern expansion of NATO at the time with the exception of Ukraine. “We must be careful not to pull this off in a way that makes Ukraine feel it is being left out in the cold with its furry neighbor to the north,” warned Clinton’s under secretary of state, Strobe Talbott (cited p.166). Washington decided to solve this problem by opening the door to NATO membership to both Ukraine and Russia in order to avoid an anti-Russian rationale for its membership and not leave Ukraine defenseless.
 | This process was called the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. Ukraine became the first state to join this program since partnering with NATO was the only security option left after surrendering its nukes in 1994 (D’Anieri, 2019, p.65-6). As another compromise, Russia was invited to join the G7 group (now G8) of the largest democratic economies, even though Russia’s democratic credentials were questionable. “I took criticism on G8 and APEC for bringing Russia in,” Clinton told Ukraine’s president Kuchma. “But I wanted them to see more benefits from cooperation with…Ukraine, than from dominating it” (cited by Plokhy, 2023, p.79). |
Russian Aggression Pushed Ukraine to NATO
Putin was eager to see a similar political system to Moscow installed in Ukraine, and openly campaigned for Viktor Yanukovych. Having failed to fake election results in the 2004 Orange Revolution (Wilson, 2006, p.174-83), his victorious challenger, Viktor Yushchenko, formally requested a MAP (Membership Action Plan) from NATO and closer ties to the EU. He went out of his way to reassure Russia that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations would by “no means be against the interests of other countries, including Russia” (cited by Plokhy, 2023, p.85). However, behind this assurance was the backdrop of tensions already long-standing with Russia’s historic aggression towards Ukraine, its modern territorial claims, and its recent and direct intervention in Ukraine’s presidential elections. As far as Ukrainians were concerned, the threat from Russia was real and immediate prompting Kyiv to opt decisively with NATO.
Putin was eager to see a similar political system to Moscow installed in Ukraine, and openly campaigned for Viktor Yanukovych. Having failed to fake election results in the 2004 Orange Revolution (Wilson, 2006, p.174-83), his victorious challenger, Viktor Yushchenko, formally requested a MAP (Membership Action Plan) from NATO and closer ties to the EU. He went out of his way to reassure Russia that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations would by “no means be against the interests of other countries, including Russia” (cited by Plokhy, 2023, p.85). However, behind this assurance was the backdrop of tensions already long-standing with Russia’s historic aggression towards Ukraine, its modern territorial claims, and its recent and direct intervention in Ukraine’s presidential elections. As far as Ukrainians were concerned, the threat from Russia was real and immediate prompting Kyiv to opt decisively with NATO.
| Once again, Moscow responded by using Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas and role as transit country for the export of that gas to Europe to interfere with Ukraine’s drift towards the West. In March 2005, soon after Yushchenko’s visit to Brussels requesting a MAP, Russia raised gas prices for Ukraine. Ukraine’s rates would eventually become higher than those paid by customers in central Europe. Known as the “gas wars,” these series of economic retaliations did little to deter Ukraine’s pro-Western policies. Indeed, it only strengthened their resolve (D’Anieri, 2019, p.155-7). |  |
Due to Putin’s propaganda blitz, as late as 2012 pro-Russian sentiment was stronger in the east, but the largest plurality was for neutrality. The 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and the fomenting of a violent separatist movement in eastern Ukraine sharply shifted Ukrainian public opinion. A poll by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in June 2017 found nearly 70% supported joining the alliance (Moskowitz, 2022).
In short, it was Russia’s open territorial aspirations for Ukrainian territory, blatant interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs, and energy war with Ukraine that pushed Ukrainians decisively towards NATO.
The Build Up to War
Russia’s relations with NATO took a decisive turn for the worse in the spring of 1999 after NATO’s decision to bomb Serbia in order to stop the atrocities being committed by the Yugoslav army against the population of Kosovo. The UN Security Council refused to support the strikes as both Russia and China were opposed. Overnight, the Russians decided to interpret NATO as an offensive alliance instead of a defensive one (Plokhy, 2023, p.79). In the aftermath, Russia reinstated its old imperialist policy towards the Balkans through pan-Slavic rhetoric from the 19th century emphasizing Slavic roots and Orthodox heritage. Nationalism and religion replaced Marxist ideology as “fraternal” Serbia was enduring the same loss-of-empire shock as Russia itself (p.80).
In short, it was Russia’s open territorial aspirations for Ukrainian territory, blatant interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs, and energy war with Ukraine that pushed Ukrainians decisively towards NATO.
The Build Up to War
Russia’s relations with NATO took a decisive turn for the worse in the spring of 1999 after NATO’s decision to bomb Serbia in order to stop the atrocities being committed by the Yugoslav army against the population of Kosovo. The UN Security Council refused to support the strikes as both Russia and China were opposed. Overnight, the Russians decided to interpret NATO as an offensive alliance instead of a defensive one (Plokhy, 2023, p.79). In the aftermath, Russia reinstated its old imperialist policy towards the Balkans through pan-Slavic rhetoric from the 19th century emphasizing Slavic roots and Orthodox heritage. Nationalism and religion replaced Marxist ideology as “fraternal” Serbia was enduring the same loss-of-empire shock as Russia itself (p.80).
 | The aftermath of 9/11 presumably saw an improvement in Russia-NATO relations. In reality, Putin saw an opportunity and took advantage of it to offer the Bush administration a partnership built on fighting the common threat from radical Islam. Just as China would use the war on terror to soften American criticism of its policy towards Muslim Urgars, Putin would use it to Russify and subjugate Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan in the name of fighting terrorism. |
Eventually this would include its military intervention and support for Syria’s dictator Bashir Al Assad to prevent prospects for any future alternative pipeline to Europe that would ease its dependence on Russian energy. In the early 2000s at least, Putin’s plan succeeded. Washington was prepared to maintain public silence over Russia’s brutal pacification of Chechnya, now designated by
Russia as a terrorist state, and helped Russia join the World Trade Organization. The partnership worked for a while, but tensions were apparent even in the area of common interest. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq became a point of contention between Moscow and Washington, but it was Bush’s “democracy crusade,” or policies designed to support democracy on a global scale in particular, that put them on a collision course (D’Anieri, 2019, p.129-33). Putin’s regime found democracy promotion a threat to his stability at home and political objectives abroad.
| In 2007, Putin decided to go on the offensive against the attractiveness of western prestige and America’s global leadership. During the Munich Summit, he took full advantage of Washington’s significantly diminished standing in the world owing to the Iraq War. It was here when he first publicly mischaracterized Gorbachev’s 1990 conversation with Secretary Baker. |  |
He referred to the promises never made by NATO leadership to expand beyond Germany to paint the West as an aggressor and Russia as a victim of NATO antagonization due to its eastern “expansion.” Senator John McCain was the most vocal in his response to Putin: “Moscow must understand that it cannot enjoy a genuine partnership with the West so long as its actions at home and abroad conflict so fundamentally with the core values of Euro-Atlantic democracies” (cited by D’Anieri, 2019, p.162).
In March the following year, Putin threatened Ukraine with a missile attack if it accepted NATO missiles (Plokhy, 2023, p.87). Putin’s threats and western weakness paid off. France and Germany in particular, blocked any decision to offer Ukraine or Georgia a MAP in 2008 and every year following. The matter was postponed and would not return to NATO’s agenda. Everyone understood the decision to deny MAP to the two post-Soviet republics was a concession to their former imperial master, Russia. This was the worst possible outcome for Ukraine. Its application for NATO was suspended indefinitely, leaving them with no protection from the Western block that had negotiated the disarmament of its nuclear arsenal in the previous decade (p.89).
EuroMaidan 2014
With the help of Paul Manafort, Putin’s ally Yanukovych reinvented himself and was finally able to win election to Ukraine’s presidency. The new president promptly used his allies in parliament to remove limitations on his presidential powers, dropped NATO membership as his country’s agenda, and signed a deal with Moscow extending the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol until 2042 (Watson & Tkachenko, 2010). This proved devastating for Ukraine’s security as it put Kyiv in the most vulnerable position that it had experienced since independence. It left the Russian military on its doorstep without nuclear weapons and NATO membership.
In March the following year, Putin threatened Ukraine with a missile attack if it accepted NATO missiles (Plokhy, 2023, p.87). Putin’s threats and western weakness paid off. France and Germany in particular, blocked any decision to offer Ukraine or Georgia a MAP in 2008 and every year following. The matter was postponed and would not return to NATO’s agenda. Everyone understood the decision to deny MAP to the two post-Soviet republics was a concession to their former imperial master, Russia. This was the worst possible outcome for Ukraine. Its application for NATO was suspended indefinitely, leaving them with no protection from the Western block that had negotiated the disarmament of its nuclear arsenal in the previous decade (p.89).
EuroMaidan 2014
With the help of Paul Manafort, Putin’s ally Yanukovych reinvented himself and was finally able to win election to Ukraine’s presidency. The new president promptly used his allies in parliament to remove limitations on his presidential powers, dropped NATO membership as his country’s agenda, and signed a deal with Moscow extending the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol until 2042 (Watson & Tkachenko, 2010). This proved devastating for Ukraine’s security as it put Kyiv in the most vulnerable position that it had experienced since independence. It left the Russian military on its doorstep without nuclear weapons and NATO membership.
 | These measures, followed by the establishment of a highly corrupt system of government that siphoned billions of dollars from the state budget into secret accounts held by the president, members of his family, and close advisors and associates made Yanukovych extremely unpopular. However, with Ukraine’s scheduled association agreement with the EU in Vilnius, many Ukrainians held on to hope for better days. |
However, when threatened by Putin with an economic blockade and a $15 billion offer to back out, Yanukovych reneged on his pledge to sign. When news of this got out, Ukrainians decided that they had had enough and took to the streets en masse in what became the Revolution of Dignity (Plokhy, 2023, p.95). Putin never concealed his disapproval of Yanukovych’s refusal to use massive force and possibly send in the army against the protesters. Furthermore, he withheld the $15 billion till the protests were crushed; however, the more violence the police used, the larger the protests became (p.107).
Putin’s outside pressure on his ally was an overreach and miscalculation. Ironically, Putin would blame the United States for instigating the protests and called the events in Kyiv a coup. Stuck between the anger of his people and Putin’s threats, this blunder caused Yanukovych to flee to Russia leaving Putin without any ally in Kyiv to carry out his plans for slow absorption of Ukraine into his sphere of influence based on the Belarusian model. Now without soft power options, war was politics by other means.
War Begins
In February 2014, Putin invaded Crimea starting the Russo-Ukrainian War. Having failed to keep all of Ukraine in his orbit, Putin opted for the annexation of part of its territory to develop his Greater Russia project, all while invoking the legacy of empire to support Russia's claim (Putin, 2014).
Putin assured the world that the rest of Ukraine was safe. “Do not believe those who want you to fear Russia, shouting that other regions will follow Crimea,” declared Putin. “We do not want to divide Ukraine; we do not need that” (Putin, 2014). In fact, Putin did exactly that in the weeks and months that followed in blatant violation of international law and treaties signed by Russia, including the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the Russo-Ukrainian Friendship Agreement of 1997 (Plokhy, 2023, p.120). In Russia, imperialism and nationalism are the driving forces behind foreign policy.
Putin’s position on Ukraine was to push federalism on Ukraine and “political and military” neutrality. Although the proposal spoke of federalization, it in fact would have turned Ukraine into a loose confederation of semi-autonomous regions that can veto state policy on international affairs, making Ukraine cease to exist as a sovereign state, ungovernable and open to manipulation from the Kremlin. This proposal was of course rejected by Kyiv (p.121). Russia then financed revolts in Kharkiv, Odesa, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and other centers of southeastern Ukraine described by Putin in mid-April as “New Russia” (p.123). The historically russified population of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, had been mobilized for years by the Russian Orthodox Church and propaganda (see part 2) to stoke resentment against Ukrainian speaking west and Western Ukraine. However, these plans too fell short of expectations. Although ethnic Russians were a significant minority in the Donbas, only 30% of those polled in April 2014 favored union with Russia. However, Russia was able to exploit the Odesa violence of early May to mobilize separatist propaganda.
Soviet mythology and “New Russia” became a battle cry attracting Russian Eurasianists, Russian nationalists, Orthodox monarchists, and neo-Nazis.
Putin’s outside pressure on his ally was an overreach and miscalculation. Ironically, Putin would blame the United States for instigating the protests and called the events in Kyiv a coup. Stuck between the anger of his people and Putin’s threats, this blunder caused Yanukovych to flee to Russia leaving Putin without any ally in Kyiv to carry out his plans for slow absorption of Ukraine into his sphere of influence based on the Belarusian model. Now without soft power options, war was politics by other means.
War Begins
In February 2014, Putin invaded Crimea starting the Russo-Ukrainian War. Having failed to keep all of Ukraine in his orbit, Putin opted for the annexation of part of its territory to develop his Greater Russia project, all while invoking the legacy of empire to support Russia's claim (Putin, 2014).
Putin assured the world that the rest of Ukraine was safe. “Do not believe those who want you to fear Russia, shouting that other regions will follow Crimea,” declared Putin. “We do not want to divide Ukraine; we do not need that” (Putin, 2014). In fact, Putin did exactly that in the weeks and months that followed in blatant violation of international law and treaties signed by Russia, including the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the Russo-Ukrainian Friendship Agreement of 1997 (Plokhy, 2023, p.120). In Russia, imperialism and nationalism are the driving forces behind foreign policy.
Putin’s position on Ukraine was to push federalism on Ukraine and “political and military” neutrality. Although the proposal spoke of federalization, it in fact would have turned Ukraine into a loose confederation of semi-autonomous regions that can veto state policy on international affairs, making Ukraine cease to exist as a sovereign state, ungovernable and open to manipulation from the Kremlin. This proposal was of course rejected by Kyiv (p.121). Russia then financed revolts in Kharkiv, Odesa, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and other centers of southeastern Ukraine described by Putin in mid-April as “New Russia” (p.123). The historically russified population of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, had been mobilized for years by the Russian Orthodox Church and propaganda (see part 2) to stoke resentment against Ukrainian speaking west and Western Ukraine. However, these plans too fell short of expectations. Although ethnic Russians were a significant minority in the Donbas, only 30% of those polled in April 2014 favored union with Russia. However, Russia was able to exploit the Odesa violence of early May to mobilize separatist propaganda.
Soviet mythology and “New Russia” became a battle cry attracting Russian Eurasianists, Russian nationalists, Orthodox monarchists, and neo-Nazis.
| Backed by Russian money, Russian mercenaries who were not locals, and instructed and directed by Russia’s FSB—these few separatists declared independence and seized transportation centers in the Donetsk oblast. The importance of Russian agents in destabilizing the Donbas and turning it into a separatist enclave is hard to overestimate. Arms and mercenaries began to flood into Ukraine’s eastern countryside (Laruelle, 2020, p.196-206). |  |
The shooting war began as Russian nationals opened fire on Ukrainian security offices in Donbas killing one of them (Plokhy, 2023, p.126). Russia’s direct invasion of eastern Ukraine began on August 24, 2014. Hundreds of Russian tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, trucks, and thousands of regular troops crossed the Ukrainian border in multiple locations (p.128-9). By August 26, Ukrainians already had proof that they were facing Russian soldiers and not separatists. Ten Russian paratroopers were taken prisoners and paraded in front of television cameras. However, the Russian side stated that the soldiers, captured 12 miles from the Russian border, had simply lost their way (p.129).
As more Russian forces and equipment poured in, Ukraine’s new president Poroshenko had little choice but to agree to the ceasefire conditions of the Minsk Accords.
Russia Violates the Minsk Protocols
The protocol called for the withdrawal of illegal armed units and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory, and the establishment of an OSCE mission to monitor movement across the Russo-Ukrainian border—a measure that was supposed to prevent the influx of new Russian troops. However, the protocols also recognized the existence of new entities on Ukrainian territory not controlled by Kyiv and gave special status to regions captured by Russian-backed separatists (D’Anieri, 2019, p.247).
As more Russian forces and equipment poured in, Ukraine’s new president Poroshenko had little choice but to agree to the ceasefire conditions of the Minsk Accords.
Russia Violates the Minsk Protocols
The protocol called for the withdrawal of illegal armed units and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory, and the establishment of an OSCE mission to monitor movement across the Russo-Ukrainian border—a measure that was supposed to prevent the influx of new Russian troops. However, the protocols also recognized the existence of new entities on Ukrainian territory not controlled by Kyiv and gave special status to regions captured by Russian-backed separatists (D’Anieri, 2019, p.247).
 | The Minsk agreements were broken by Russia almost immediately after they were signed. Russian troops continued to move across the border into Donbas. In January 2015, Russia resumed a large-scale military campaign as it tried to improve the position of its puppets on the front lines. That same month, 8000 Russian troops launched a major operation against the Ukrainian-held city of Debaltseve. As the battle continued, Poroshenko met with presidents of Germany and France to adopt Minsk II in the middle of February 2015. Putin, finding little military success in the operation, agreed to renegotiate. |
Under the new protocols, Ukraine had to adopt a law on the status of the breakaway republics in its Constitution. However, the power under the revised Ukrainian constitution would give the regions power to stall the country’s movement toward the EU (Kuzio, 2017, p.256).
The question which would come first was Ukrainian control over the border or the elections in Donbas. This became the largest obstacle to the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Russia refused to withdraw its troops until elections were held and Kyiv refused to have Russian troops present while Ukrainians in the Donbas cast their votes fearing another sham election. With a ceasefire that would be constantly violated by exchange of fire over 7 years, the war in Ukraine’s east became a frozen conflict (Plokhy, 2023, p.131). In 2017, as Russia continued to violate the ceasefire, Ukraine once again put NATO membership back on its agenda by including it in the Ukrainian constitution (p.134).
The question which would come first was Ukrainian control over the border or the elections in Donbas. This became the largest obstacle to the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Russia refused to withdraw its troops until elections were held and Kyiv refused to have Russian troops present while Ukrainians in the Donbas cast their votes fearing another sham election. With a ceasefire that would be constantly violated by exchange of fire over 7 years, the war in Ukraine’s east became a frozen conflict (Plokhy, 2023, p.131). In 2017, as Russia continued to violate the ceasefire, Ukraine once again put NATO membership back on its agenda by including it in the Ukrainian constitution (p.134).
| Putin began to compare himself with such Russian emperors as Peter I, Catherine II, and Alexander II. Their busts and portraits made their way into Putin’s antechamber in the Kremlin (p.136). In July 2021, Putin published an essay he had apparently written himself titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” Putin was returning to the imperial vision of the big Russian nation proclaimed by the Russian fascist philosophers he followed. “I said that Russians and Ukrainians were one people—a single whole,” wrote Putin in the opening statement to his lengthy essay. Among other ahistorical claims made in the essay, he blamed the United States for Ukraine’s unity and outrage against Russia. |  |
“The wall that has emerged in recent years between Russia and Ukraine….are also the result of deliberate efforts by those forces that have always sought to undermine our unity.” He further implied that Ukraine historically did not exist nor had any right to exist and that Ukrainians as a people and a state were all a concoction of evil Western forces as “a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia” (Putin, 2021).
Putin was clearly upset with the Ukrainian democracy that kept generating political leaders dedicated to the idea of the independence of Ukraine. He complained, “presidents, members of parliament, and ministers would change, but the attitude of separation from and enmity toward Russia would remain,” which he blamed on the “Western authors of the anti-Russia project” (Putin, 2021). In other words, Ukrainian independence and willingness to defend its sovereignty is viewed by Putin as “Anti-Russian.”
Putin Invades All of Ukraine, 2022
When Volodymir Zelenskyy was elected Ukraine’s president in 2019, there may have been hope that Putin could gain some concessions. Zelenskyy was a native Russian speaker and ethnic Jew from southeastern Ukraine who ran on a platform of promising lasting peace to Ukraine and ending the frozen war in Donbas. However, when they met for the first time, Putin felt betrayed by his aides, especially Vladislav Surkov, who had promised him that Zelenskyy would accept the Russian conditions.
Putin was clearly upset with the Ukrainian democracy that kept generating political leaders dedicated to the idea of the independence of Ukraine. He complained, “presidents, members of parliament, and ministers would change, but the attitude of separation from and enmity toward Russia would remain,” which he blamed on the “Western authors of the anti-Russia project” (Putin, 2021). In other words, Ukrainian independence and willingness to defend its sovereignty is viewed by Putin as “Anti-Russian.”
Putin Invades All of Ukraine, 2022
When Volodymir Zelenskyy was elected Ukraine’s president in 2019, there may have been hope that Putin could gain some concessions. Zelenskyy was a native Russian speaker and ethnic Jew from southeastern Ukraine who ran on a platform of promising lasting peace to Ukraine and ending the frozen war in Donbas. However, when they met for the first time, Putin felt betrayed by his aides, especially Vladislav Surkov, who had promised him that Zelenskyy would accept the Russian conditions.
 | Instead, Zelenskyy was not willing to move past any areas that did not first respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. No progress was made on the fundamental question of the Minsk agreements—whether local elections in the Donbas or Russian withdrawal should come first. Zelenskyy repeated again and again that he would not trade territory for peace, but accepted constitutional reforms envisioned by Putin on neutrality and regional federation. The only problem was, Russia had to first withdrawal from eastern Ukraine (Plokhy, 2023, p.140). |
As talks stalled, Zelenskyy’s party adopted a resolution reaffirming Ukraine’s course toward NATO membership. Annoyed by Russia’s continuing interference in Ukrainian affairs through Moscow-backed television channels, he clamped down on Russian-funded media. Putin was displeased. Russia was losing its presence in Ukrainian public space, its ability to influence the Ukrainian public and intimidate the Ukrainian political elite. In April 2021, Russia moved an unprecedented number of troops to the Ukrainian border and the rest is history (p.140-1). However, this time American intelligence was wise to the Kremlin’s plans. There would be no planned false flag attacks or surprises.
Moscow responded by denying that Russia had any intentions of invading Ukraine. Putin spent the weeks, months, and days leading up to the war publicly denying his intention to start it. He went on record on February 12, less than two weeks before the invasion, denying any plans of invading Ukraine. “The facts are that the Americans are artificially whipping up hysteria around an alleged Russian plan for invasion, even providing the dates of such an invasion,” declared the Russian president (cited by VOA News, 2022).
Ukraine, on the other hand, intensified their negotiations with Russia and even created a draft agreement whereby Ukraine was to deter possible Russian aggression by assuring the Kremlin that it would not join NATO. France and Germany, while unable to put together anything in writing, were understood to continue their blocking Ukraine from having a MAP for fear of antagonizing Moscow (Flynn, 2022).
In reality, NATO gave no signs a Ukrainian MAP was imminent and Ukraine demonstrated a willingness to move into neutrality. However, this status quo would only suffice if Russia’s security interests were legitimate and their decision to invade Ukraine had anything to do with its NATO status other than its lack thereof. Any draft agreement from Ukraine would have risked Russia’s invasion pretext. Ukraine was vulnerable and not offered a MAP. This was precisely why it was invaded.
Western Accomplices
In a tweet in August 2024, presidential candidate RFK Jr. blamed NATO for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine calling its enlargement “decades of aggressive expansion,” while providing no hint of what he interpreted as “aggressive.” In the same week, former Democratic Presidential candidate Tulsi Gabbard, in a tweet claimed NATO could have avoided the war if only they “simply acknowledged Russia’s legitimate security concerns regarding Ukraine’s becoming a member of NATO” (RAT, 2024).
Although many scholarly critics of Putin have pointed out that he would pursue an aggressive foreign policy in former Soviet Republics regardless of Western involvement, the same John Mearsheimer who once argued Ukraine should keep its nuclear weapons to avoid a future war, has since maintained the position that the U.S. is at fault for provoking Putin. Ironically Mearsheimer points to the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest as a western provocation since it verbally welcomed the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO, while ignoring the context of Ukraine’s prior pursuit of NATO and Russian aggression that he himself once wrote about (Chotiner, 2022). His forgetfulness and abrupt change in position has yet to be challenged by reporters.
Moscow responded by denying that Russia had any intentions of invading Ukraine. Putin spent the weeks, months, and days leading up to the war publicly denying his intention to start it. He went on record on February 12, less than two weeks before the invasion, denying any plans of invading Ukraine. “The facts are that the Americans are artificially whipping up hysteria around an alleged Russian plan for invasion, even providing the dates of such an invasion,” declared the Russian president (cited by VOA News, 2022).
Ukraine, on the other hand, intensified their negotiations with Russia and even created a draft agreement whereby Ukraine was to deter possible Russian aggression by assuring the Kremlin that it would not join NATO. France and Germany, while unable to put together anything in writing, were understood to continue their blocking Ukraine from having a MAP for fear of antagonizing Moscow (Flynn, 2022).
In reality, NATO gave no signs a Ukrainian MAP was imminent and Ukraine demonstrated a willingness to move into neutrality. However, this status quo would only suffice if Russia’s security interests were legitimate and their decision to invade Ukraine had anything to do with its NATO status other than its lack thereof. Any draft agreement from Ukraine would have risked Russia’s invasion pretext. Ukraine was vulnerable and not offered a MAP. This was precisely why it was invaded.
Western Accomplices
In a tweet in August 2024, presidential candidate RFK Jr. blamed NATO for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine calling its enlargement “decades of aggressive expansion,” while providing no hint of what he interpreted as “aggressive.” In the same week, former Democratic Presidential candidate Tulsi Gabbard, in a tweet claimed NATO could have avoided the war if only they “simply acknowledged Russia’s legitimate security concerns regarding Ukraine’s becoming a member of NATO” (RAT, 2024).
Although many scholarly critics of Putin have pointed out that he would pursue an aggressive foreign policy in former Soviet Republics regardless of Western involvement, the same John Mearsheimer who once argued Ukraine should keep its nuclear weapons to avoid a future war, has since maintained the position that the U.S. is at fault for provoking Putin. Ironically Mearsheimer points to the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest as a western provocation since it verbally welcomed the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO, while ignoring the context of Ukraine’s prior pursuit of NATO and Russian aggression that he himself once wrote about (Chotiner, 2022). His forgetfulness and abrupt change in position has yet to be challenged by reporters.
 | The most overused analogy by Mearshiemer and other accomplices to the NATO ‘expansion’ narrative is the false equivalency of Mexican or Cuban alliance with US adversaries. The problem with such an analogy is that it can only make argumentative sense if the United States had historically pursued a policy of continuous genocide against Mexico or Cuba and was actively pursuing an effort for their annexation to the United States; in which case, Mexico and Cuba would be completely justified in seeking an outside defensive alliance for their security. Furthermore, the analogy is self-defeating all the more since the US pledged to not invade Cuba only after it had missiles aimed at Washington and an alliance with the Soviets. |
Conclusion
In short, the narrative that NATO provoked Russia into invading Ukraine makes no argumentative sense in the context of Moscow’s choice to pursue empire instead of statehood. It was Russia’s drift towards authoritarianism after the humiliating collapse of the USSR that made Russia more militarily aggressive. Not only was NATO not responsible for Russian aggression, western leaders are only to blame if for appeasing it. Every concession to Russia is an invitation for more aggression.
As demonstrated, the NATO ‘expansion’ narrative offers no explanation for Russia’s genocidal and imperial rhetoric towards Ukraine. The Kremlin’s 200 years of aggression towards Ukraine predates NATO’s existence and Russian aggression post 1991 predates NATO’s enlargement. This is evidenced in Moldova 1993, Chechnya in 1994, and aggressive posture towards Ukraine since 1991. The NATO ‘expansion’ claim is based on a lie told by Putin in 2007 at Bucharest. It completely contradicts both Russian and American eyewitnesses who were present. At every turn, the narrative has not a single fact to stand on. Russian autocracy, aggression and imperialism had caused Putin to invade Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.
Subsequently, NATO has not ‘expanded.’ Free, democratic nations joined a military alliance of their own freewill to be safe from aggressive, totalitarian countries endangering their safety and their liberty.
The Polish model destroys any legitimacy towards Russia’s alleged security concerns. Poland surrendered any territorial claims to ethnic enclaves without any conditions regarding foreign alliances. In fact, Belarus is currently aligned with Russia, Poland’s historical security threat. Concurrently, why would anyone believe an authoritarian dictatorship like Putin’s, which crushes dissent in its own elections, could be trusted enough to hold an election in territories under occupation by its military?
Russia is still clinging to empire because it has not lost enough colonial wars to be ready to choose statehood. Western Europeans did not pursue statehood until they lost all their colonial wars in Southeast Asia, Africa, and India. For Russia to become a normal state, it too must lose its colonial war in Ukraine. No negotiated settlement can halt Russian aggression since every agreement with Ukraine thus far has been violated.
Most importantly, there is nothing in how this invasion has been conducted to suggest a war of defense. Putin’s annexation of Ukrainian territory and mass deportations of children are proof that the war is really about resolving once and for all Russia’s 200-year genocidal project to turn Ukrainians into Russians. Those who spread false narratives about the origin of this conflict are simply complicit in the very propaganda promoting this project.
In short, the narrative that NATO provoked Russia into invading Ukraine makes no argumentative sense in the context of Moscow’s choice to pursue empire instead of statehood. It was Russia’s drift towards authoritarianism after the humiliating collapse of the USSR that made Russia more militarily aggressive. Not only was NATO not responsible for Russian aggression, western leaders are only to blame if for appeasing it. Every concession to Russia is an invitation for more aggression.
As demonstrated, the NATO ‘expansion’ narrative offers no explanation for Russia’s genocidal and imperial rhetoric towards Ukraine. The Kremlin’s 200 years of aggression towards Ukraine predates NATO’s existence and Russian aggression post 1991 predates NATO’s enlargement. This is evidenced in Moldova 1993, Chechnya in 1994, and aggressive posture towards Ukraine since 1991. The NATO ‘expansion’ claim is based on a lie told by Putin in 2007 at Bucharest. It completely contradicts both Russian and American eyewitnesses who were present. At every turn, the narrative has not a single fact to stand on. Russian autocracy, aggression and imperialism had caused Putin to invade Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.
Subsequently, NATO has not ‘expanded.’ Free, democratic nations joined a military alliance of their own freewill to be safe from aggressive, totalitarian countries endangering their safety and their liberty.
The Polish model destroys any legitimacy towards Russia’s alleged security concerns. Poland surrendered any territorial claims to ethnic enclaves without any conditions regarding foreign alliances. In fact, Belarus is currently aligned with Russia, Poland’s historical security threat. Concurrently, why would anyone believe an authoritarian dictatorship like Putin’s, which crushes dissent in its own elections, could be trusted enough to hold an election in territories under occupation by its military?
Russia is still clinging to empire because it has not lost enough colonial wars to be ready to choose statehood. Western Europeans did not pursue statehood until they lost all their colonial wars in Southeast Asia, Africa, and India. For Russia to become a normal state, it too must lose its colonial war in Ukraine. No negotiated settlement can halt Russian aggression since every agreement with Ukraine thus far has been violated.
Most importantly, there is nothing in how this invasion has been conducted to suggest a war of defense. Putin’s annexation of Ukrainian territory and mass deportations of children are proof that the war is really about resolving once and for all Russia’s 200-year genocidal project to turn Ukrainians into Russians. Those who spread false narratives about the origin of this conflict are simply complicit in the very propaganda promoting this project.
References
Berliner, J. (1992). Yeltsin Turns Up on Black Sea. UPI. January 28, 1992. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1992/01/28/Yeltsin-turns-up-on-Black-Sea/7315696574800/
Burant, S. R. (1993). International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours--Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies, 45(3), 395–418. http://www.jstor.org/stable/153265
Chotiner, I. (2022). Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine
Colton, T. J. (2011). Yeltsin: A Life. Basic Books.
D’Anieri, P. (2019). Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorse to Uncivil War. Cambridge University Press.
Flynn, D. (2022). Exclusive: As war began, Putin rejected a Ukraine peace deal recommended by aide. Reuters. September, 12 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-war-began-putin-rejected-ukraine-peace-deal-recommended-by-his-aide-2022-09-14/
Karp, R. O. (1993). Central and Eastern Europe. Oxford University Press.
Kuzio, T. (2017). Putin's War Against Ukraine: Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime. Toronto University Press.
Laruelle, M. (2015). Scared of Putin’s Shadow: In Sanctioning Dugin, Washington Got the Wrong Man. Foreign Affairs. March 15, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2015-03-25/scared-putins-shadow
Laruelle, M. (2020). Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields. Routledge.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1993). The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent. Foreign Affairs. 72(3). Summer, 1993. https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf
Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1994, December 5). Budapest. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf
Milanovic, B. (1998). Income, Inequality, and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy. World Bank.
Miller, A. (2003). The Ukrainian Question: Russian Empire and Nationalism in the 19th Century. Central European University Press.
Moskowitz, K. (2022). Did Nato Expansion Really Cause Putin’s Invasion? The Foreign Service Journal. https://afsa.org/did-nato-expansion-really-cause-putins-invasion
Pelenski, J. (1977). The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to the “Kievan Rus Inheritance.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 1(1), 29–52. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41035738
Plokhy, S. (2017). Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation. Basic Books.
Plokhy, S. (2023). The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History. W. W. Norton & Company.
Prizel, I. (1995). Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered: Challenges of Independence. Palgrave Macmillan.
Putin, V. (2005, April 25). Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931
Putin, V. (2014, March 18). Address by President of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603
Putin, V. (2021). On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians. Article by Vladimir Putin. Kremlin. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181#sel=68:55:L6w,68:122:vnx;77:33:36j,77:71:rQx;82:1:W3l,83:55:lx3
Republicans Against Trump [@RpsAgainstTrump]. (2024, August 26). These two endorsed Trump citing his anti-Ukraine views. If you care about Ukraine and NATO and believe in standing with our global allies to defend freedom and democracy, vote for Harris. X. https://x.com/RpsAgainstTrump/status/1828386982806135199
Reutors. (2014). Russian professor sacked over criticism of actions in Ukraine. March 24, 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/russian-professor-sacked-over-criticism-of-actions-in-ukraine-idUSBREA2N1BM/
Rubin, J. (1996). Meditations on Russia: Yeltsin Calls for New National ‘Idea’. AP NEWS. 2 August. https://apnews.com/article/122cd732a8cf8b35989afeec4db69dcd
Sanders, D. (2001). Security Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in the Post-Soviet Era. Palgrave Macmillan.
Sarotte, M. E. (2021). Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate. Yale University Press.
Sarotte, M. E. (2022). The Betrayal Myth Behind Putin’s Brinkmanship. Wall Street Journal. January 7, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-betrayal-myth-behind-putins-brinkmanship-11641568161
Senn, A. E. (1995). Gorbachev's Failure in Lithuania. Palgrave Macmillan.
Snyder, T. (2003). The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999. Yale University Press.
Snyder, T. (2018). The Road to Unfreedom. Crown.
VOA News. (2022). Oh, How They Lied. The Many Times Russia Denied Ukraine Invasion Plans. March 9, 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-russia-lies-ukraine-war/6743309.html
Watson, I. & Tkachenko, M. (2010). Russia, Ukraine agree on naval-base-for-gas deal. CNN. April 21, 2010. https://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/04/21/russia.ukraine/index.html
Wilson, A. (2006). Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Yale University Press.
Zubok, V. M. (2023). Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union. Yale University Press.
Berliner, J. (1992). Yeltsin Turns Up on Black Sea. UPI. January 28, 1992. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1992/01/28/Yeltsin-turns-up-on-Black-Sea/7315696574800/
Burant, S. R. (1993). International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours--Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies, 45(3), 395–418. http://www.jstor.org/stable/153265
Chotiner, I. (2022). Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine
Colton, T. J. (2011). Yeltsin: A Life. Basic Books.
D’Anieri, P. (2019). Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorse to Uncivil War. Cambridge University Press.
Flynn, D. (2022). Exclusive: As war began, Putin rejected a Ukraine peace deal recommended by aide. Reuters. September, 12 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-war-began-putin-rejected-ukraine-peace-deal-recommended-by-his-aide-2022-09-14/
Karp, R. O. (1993). Central and Eastern Europe. Oxford University Press.
Kuzio, T. (2017). Putin's War Against Ukraine: Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime. Toronto University Press.
Laruelle, M. (2015). Scared of Putin’s Shadow: In Sanctioning Dugin, Washington Got the Wrong Man. Foreign Affairs. March 15, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2015-03-25/scared-putins-shadow
Laruelle, M. (2020). Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields. Routledge.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1993). The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent. Foreign Affairs. 72(3). Summer, 1993. https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf
Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1994, December 5). Budapest. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf
Milanovic, B. (1998). Income, Inequality, and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy. World Bank.
Miller, A. (2003). The Ukrainian Question: Russian Empire and Nationalism in the 19th Century. Central European University Press.
Moskowitz, K. (2022). Did Nato Expansion Really Cause Putin’s Invasion? The Foreign Service Journal. https://afsa.org/did-nato-expansion-really-cause-putins-invasion
Pelenski, J. (1977). The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to the “Kievan Rus Inheritance.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 1(1), 29–52. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41035738
Plokhy, S. (2017). Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation. Basic Books.
Plokhy, S. (2023). The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History. W. W. Norton & Company.
Prizel, I. (1995). Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered: Challenges of Independence. Palgrave Macmillan.
Putin, V. (2005, April 25). Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931
Putin, V. (2014, March 18). Address by President of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603
Putin, V. (2021). On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians. Article by Vladimir Putin. Kremlin. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181#sel=68:55:L6w,68:122:vnx;77:33:36j,77:71:rQx;82:1:W3l,83:55:lx3
Republicans Against Trump [@RpsAgainstTrump]. (2024, August 26). These two endorsed Trump citing his anti-Ukraine views. If you care about Ukraine and NATO and believe in standing with our global allies to defend freedom and democracy, vote for Harris. X. https://x.com/RpsAgainstTrump/status/1828386982806135199
Reutors. (2014). Russian professor sacked over criticism of actions in Ukraine. March 24, 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/russian-professor-sacked-over-criticism-of-actions-in-ukraine-idUSBREA2N1BM/
Rubin, J. (1996). Meditations on Russia: Yeltsin Calls for New National ‘Idea’. AP NEWS. 2 August. https://apnews.com/article/122cd732a8cf8b35989afeec4db69dcd
Sanders, D. (2001). Security Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in the Post-Soviet Era. Palgrave Macmillan.
Sarotte, M. E. (2021). Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate. Yale University Press.
Sarotte, M. E. (2022). The Betrayal Myth Behind Putin’s Brinkmanship. Wall Street Journal. January 7, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-betrayal-myth-behind-putins-brinkmanship-11641568161
Senn, A. E. (1995). Gorbachev's Failure in Lithuania. Palgrave Macmillan.
Snyder, T. (2003). The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999. Yale University Press.
Snyder, T. (2018). The Road to Unfreedom. Crown.
VOA News. (2022). Oh, How They Lied. The Many Times Russia Denied Ukraine Invasion Plans. March 9, 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-russia-lies-ukraine-war/6743309.html
Watson, I. & Tkachenko, M. (2010). Russia, Ukraine agree on naval-base-for-gas deal. CNN. April 21, 2010. https://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/04/21/russia.ukraine/index.html
Wilson, A. (2006). Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Yale University Press.
Zubok, V. M. (2023). Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union. Yale University Press.
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